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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays which explore the determinants and 
properties of actual and implied volatilities in the crude oil and natural gas markets. 
The first two essays examine the causes and behavior of price volatility in the US 
crude oil and natural gas markets. I theorize and find that (1) the crude oil and natural 
gas markets are characterized by volatility persistence, (2) in the crude oil market, a 
negative shock has more impact on future volatility than an equal positive shock 
whereas in the natural gas market, predicted volatility increases more following a 
positive shock than an equal negative shock (3) crude oil volatility is lower at higher 
prices, (4) there is a day-of-the-week pattern in both markets, (5) OPEC meeting 
announcements and the Petroleum Status Report releases cause increased volatility in 
the crude oil market, (6) surprises in the change in natural gas in storage cause 
increased volatility in the natural gas market, (7) natural gas volatility tends to be 
higher during and immediately after bid week, (8) there is a month-of-the-year pattern 
in natural gas volatility, (9) natural gas volatility tends to be higher on winter days 
when the temperature is lower than normal, and (10) the conditional covariance and 
correlation between crude oil prices and the value of the dollar vary over time. In these 
two essays, I develop and employ an improved procedure for testing and quantifying 
the hypothesized volatility determinants within a GARCH type model.  
The third essay examines the structure, characteristics, and determinants of 
implied volatilities (IVs) calculated from crude oil and natural gas options from 
September 1999 to June 2006. In several ways, the behavior of IVs in these markets is 
opposite to that observed in most financial options markets.  Crude oil and natural gas 
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IVs tend to increase as the options approach expiration. There is a positive “skew” 
pattern in natural gas IVs and long-term crude oil IVs in which IVs tend to be lowest 
at low strike prices and increase monotonically with strike prices. There is a time-of-
the-year pattern in that natural gas IVs tend to be higher for options expiring in winter 
and crude oil IVs tend to be lower for options expiring in summer. Oil and gas IVs 
tend to decrease from Friday close to Monday close. After May 2002, natural gas IVs 
tend to decrease following the release of the Natural Gas Storage Report. A negative 
futures return has more impact on crude oil IV than an equal positive return while a 
positive futures return has more impact on natural gas IV than an equal negative 
return. IV is a fairly efficient forecast of future volatility in these markets but its 
forecasting power differs across terms-to-maturity and strike prices. 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
This dissertation consists of three essays which explore the determinants and 
properties of actual and implied volatilities in the crude oil and natural gas markets. 
The markets for oil and gas derivatives contracts are becoming increasingly important 
due to the impact of energy on the economy and the high volatility in oil and gas 
prices. Crude oil and natural gas are two of the most essential energy sources in the 
U.S., accounting for about 40% and 25% of the nation’s energy consumption, 
respectively. Since OPEC’s 1973 decision to regulate its oil price independently, crude 
oil prices have been subject to dramatic volatility and this large oil price fluctuation 
tendency has continued in recent years. For example, the crude oil market experienced 
dramatic volatility in 2008 as prices reached an all-time high level of $145 per barrel 
in July and then fell sharply to $50 per barrel in November. Natural gas is also one of 
the most volatile markets, particularly since its evolution from a highly regulated 
market in which government regulations prescribed everything from prices to who 
could buy, sell, and transport natural gas and under what conditions to a largely 
deregulated market in which prices are driven by supply and demand. For example, in 
2008, natural gas prices rose sharply from $7.8 per mmBtu in early January to $13.5 
per mmBtu in July, which was the highest price level for that time of year. Then 
starting around the end of July, natural gas prices fell almost as sharply and were 
approximately $5.5 per mmBtu toward the end of 2008. Crude oil and natural gas 
prices are more volatile than those in most financial markets. In 2007, the annualized 
standard deviation of the daily percentage change in prices was 31.33% for crude oil 
and 49.94% for natural gas. By comparison, that number was only 4.08% for the US 
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dollar-Euro exchange rate, 16.37% for the S&P 500 and 19.10% for the 10-year T-
bond interest rate1
The high volatility in crude oil prices is likely due to actual and anticipated 
fluctuations in supply and the short-term inelasticity of demand. Given that crude oil is 
one of the most essential energy sources, it is very difficult for many oil users to 
reduce their consumption within a short period of time following a price increase. On 
the other hand, there is considerable fluctuation in oil supply which depends on a 
variety of macroeconomic and political factors. For example, in 1997, when the world 
economy was already in a recession, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), failing to predict the oil demand correctly, increased its production 
levels which resulted in a huge decrease in oil prices. In June-July 2008, a 
combination of supply uncertainties in oil producing countries and a falling dollar 
caused an unprecedented oil price spike. On the reverse, an appreciation of the dollar 
and signs of worldwide economic slowdown led to a sharp decrease in oil price toward 
the end of 2008. 
.  
The high volatility in the natural gas market is mostly attributable to the short-
term inelasticity of supply and demand. Since natural gas supplies are often 
constrained by storage levels and imports are limited, natural gas suppliers are unable 
to increase production levels in a short period of time. Also, it is difficult for 
consumers to quickly reduce their consumption when a sharp increase in natural gas 
prices occurs, especially during the winter. Since natural gas suppliers cannot rapidly 
                                                     
1The data for the crude oil and natural gas prices are from the Energy Information 
Administration website. The data for the S&P 500, US dollar-Euro exchange rate, and the 10-
year T-bond interest rates are from the CRSP database and the Federal Reserve website 
(http://www.federal reserve.gov). 
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adjust their production levels to match demand changes, supply and demand 
imbalances may result in sharp price changes. 
This high variability in crude oil and natural gas prices makes it extremely 
difficult for consumers to forecast their costs and for producers to forecast their 
profits. The desire to protect market participants against such price fluctuations has led 
to the creation of and active trading in futures, swaps and options where the market 
value of the latter depends on volatility. An understanding of the causes and behavior 
of oil and gas volatility is therefore essential to measuring and managing the risk faced 
by energy producers and major consumers. 
Although it is difficult to forecast the direction of future price changes from 
past price behavior, the absolute magnitude of price changes, i.e. volatility, has been 
proven much more predictable in most financial markets and, consequently, has 
received an immense attention in the literature. However, the vast majority of the 
research on market volatility has focused on the volatility of financial markets such as 
the stock, bond, interest rates and foreign exchange futures markets, etc. Despite the 
fact that crude oil and natural gas markets tend to be more volatile than most financial 
and commodity markets, research into the determinants and properties of actual and 
implied volatilities in these markets is relatively sparse.  
My first two essays, which explore the determinants of oil and natural gas 
price volatilities respectively, are motivated by the limited nature of previous research 
on crude oil and natural gas price volatility. The limited studies on crude oil volatility 
to date focus solely on volatility persistence, i.e., the relation between current and past 
volatility, in this market (see, for example, Wilson, Aggarwal and Inclan, 1996; Yang, 
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Hwang and Huang, 2002; Pindyck, 2004; and Kuper and Soest, 2006). Other possible 
determinants of crude oil volatility, such as a day-of-the-week, levels and 
announcement effects, are neglected in the literature. Previous studies on natural gas 
volatility examine several volatility determinants in isolation. Susmel and Thompson 
(1997), Pindyck (2004) and Murry and Zhu (2004) find that natural gas volatility 
follows an ARCH-GARCH type process, Linn and Zhu (2004) document that the 
release of the Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report announcement causes increased 
natural gas volatility, Murry and Zhu (2004) document that natural gas volatility 
increases on Monday and on days the Storage Report is released, and Mu (2007) 
examines the impact of storage and weather conditions on natural gas volatility.  
As mentioned above, previous studies on oil and gas actual volatility consider 
only one or two possible volatility determinants. In other words, they test for volatility 
persistence, and/or day-of-the-week effects, or announcement effects, or weather 
effects but not all four. Thus it is possible that the determinant they examine is in fact 
proxying for another determinant. For instance a day-of-the-week pattern could be due 
to an announcement pattern. My study extends the research in oil and gas price 
volatility in several dimensions. First, I simultaneously estimate GARCH, volatility 
asymmetry, seasonality, announcement and other effects in a single econometric 
model. This allows me to determine which are the most important volatility 
determinants in these markets. Second, as explained further in the first two essays, my 
model affords a cleaner test of seasonality, announcement and other transitory effects 
than that in previous studies. Third, I test and quantify several possible volatility 
determinants unexplored heretofore, such as a time-of-the-year pattern and bid week 
 5 
 
effects for natural gas and asymmetric volatility, levels and announcement effects, and 
day-of-the-week pattern for crude oil.  
My third essay, which explores the determinants and behavior of implied 
volatilities in both the crude oil and natural gas markets, is also motivated by the fact 
that research on oil and gas options markets has been quite sparse although energy 
prices tend to be more volatile than most other prices and that oil and gas options have 
become more heavily traded. To my knowledge, the only studies to date which include 
oil and gas implied volatilities (IVs) among other IVs they examine are Day and 
Lewis (1993), Szakmary, Ors and Kim (2003), Martens and Zein (2004), Mahar, 
Peterson and Horan (2004), and Doran and Ronn (2006). Day and Lewis (1993), 
Szakmary et al. (2003), Martens and Zein (2004), and Doran and Ronn (2006) 
document the forecasting performance of oil and gas IVs, i.e., testing (1) whether IV is 
an unbiased forecast of future volatility and (2) whether IV predicts future volatility 
better than historical volatility or a GARCH-type forecast. Mahar, Peterson and Horan 
(2004) examine the behavior of crude oil IV surrounding OPEC meetings. None of 
these papers examine other attributes of oil and gas IVs such as whether IVs vary by 
term-to-maturity or by strike price. This limitation is due to the data sets used in 
previous studies which only include IVs calculated from nearby at-the-money options. 
There are also unexplored questions of a possible seasonality pattern in oil and gas IVs 
and whether oil and gas IVs respond differently to positive and negative return shocks 
of the underlying futures contracts. In the third essay, I construct a dataset that 
includes IVs across various strike prices for a range of terms to maturity. This 
comprehensive data set allows me to compare the behavior of IVs across different 
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strike prices as well as across different terms to maturity and also to address other 
unexplored issues concerning the determinants of oil and gas IVs. Consequently, 
results in this study have implications for option traders who need to better understand 
the behavior of oil and gas IVs for valuation purposes.  
As mentioned above, my dissertation consists of three essays. The first two 
essays examine the causes and behavior of price volatility in the US crude oil and 
natural gas markets from January 1997 through December 2008. In these essays, I 
simultaneously test and quantify the hypothesized determinants of actual volatility in 
these markets using a multiplicative GARCH type model. This model, which separates 
volatility into a persistent part and a transitory part, allows me to implement a much 
cleaner study of the determinants of volatility than that used in several previous 
studies. The third essay explores the structure, characteristics, and determinants of 
implied volatilities calculated from crude oil and natural gas call options from 
September 1999 through June 2006.  
My most important results and contributions to the literature include the 
following. One, crude oil and natural gas markets are characterized by volatility 
persistence where volatile periods are followed by volatile periods and stable periods 
are followed by stable periods. Two, in the natural gas market, there is evidence of 
asymmetric volatility in that an unexpected increase in price increases predicted 
volatility (according to a GARCH type model) more than an equal unexpected 
decrease in price. Consistent with this evidence, natural gas implied volatility, which 
supposedly represents the market’s expectation of future volatility, also increases more 
following a positive return shock. This asymmetry pattern which, to my knowledge, is 
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unique to natural gas is likely caused by the hypothesized shape of the supply and 
demand curves in this market. At low volume and prices, natural gas supply is highly 
elastic, but once storage limits are reached, supply becomes quite inelastic as natural 
gas producers, due to infrastructure constraints, are unable to increase their production 
levels within a short period of time (Krichene, 2002; Burns, 2008). The demand curve 
for natural gas also contains an elastic portion when prices are low and an inelastic 
portion when prices are high (Krichene, 2002; Burns, 2008). Given the hypothesized 
shape of the natural gas supply and demand curves, the same fluctuation in demand 
when prices are low should cause a smaller change in prices than when prices are 
high. Thus, a positive price shock which moves the natural gas market up the supply 
and demand curves is likely to presage higher future volatility than a negative shock 
moving the market down the curves. To a lesser extent and in an opposite pattern, 
there is also an asymmetric volatility in the crude oil market where an unexpected 
decrease in price increases predicted volatility and implied volatility more than an 
unexpected increase in price of similar magnitude.  
Three, oil and gas implied volatilities tend to increase as the options approach 
expiration and the increasing pattern is consistent across strike prices. This term 
structure pattern is opposite to that observed for the stock index, T-bond and foreign 
exchange options markets where IVs tend to decrease as expiration approaches. While 
inconsistent with the pattern for IV in those financial options markets, the oil and gas 
IV term structure pattern is consistent with the actual volatility pattern for different 
maturity futures contracts. Given this term structure pattern, if a financial engineer 
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uses the IV from nearby options, the IV that would normally be calculated, to value 
longer term options, the latter will tend to be overvalued. 
Four, oil and gas IVs tend to differ by strike price. Natural gas IVs exhibit a 
positive skew pattern in that IVs are higher for out-of-the-money calls than for at- and 
in-the-money calls. This upward sloping pattern is unique to natural gas options since, 
to my knowledge, all smile patterns documented to date are either U-shaped or 
downward sloping. There is no evidence that this positive skew pattern is caused by 
the characteristics of the underlying futures return distribution. It is apparent that the 
hedging pressure in this market is at least partly responsible for this pattern. While the 
skew pattern is consistent across terms to maturity for natural gas, the shape of the 
cross-sectional pattern changes with term-to-maturity for crude oil. For nearby and 
second-month crude oil options, IVs are highest for deep in- and out-of-the-money 
calls and lowest for moderately in-the-money calls. For third- and fourth-month 
options, IVs are lowest for deep in-the-money calls and increase monotonically with 
strike prices. 
Five, there is a day-of-the-week volatility pattern in oil and gas markets. In 
both markets, Friday-close-to-Monday-close returns tend to be more volatile than any 
other weekday return, implying that these markets are impacted by sorts of news 
occurring during the weekend such as weather news or geo-political events. There is 
evidence that oil and gas actual volatilities increase on Wednesday and Thursday, 
respectively, which is attributable to the weekly release of the Petroleum Status Report 
and the Natural Gas Storage Report on these days. The oil and gas implied volatilities 
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also exhibit a day-of-the-week pattern which is consistent with the pattern in actual 
volatilities.  
Six, there is an announcement effect in oil and gas markets. As mentioned 
above, crude oil volatility tends to increase on days the Petroleum Status Report is 
released. There is also significant evidence that news from the OPEC meetings cause 
an increase in crude oil volatility. In the natural gas market, surprises in storage report 
news has a significant impact on volatility. In addition, there is strong evidence that 
natural gas volatility increases during and immediately after the “bid week”, the last 
five trading days of a month, as news about prices and volumes being set in the spot 
market becomes public.  
Seven, both actual and implied volatilities in the natural gas market exhibit a 
time-of-the-year pattern in which volatility tends to be higher on contracts expiring in 
the winter months. Consequently, if a financial engineer uses the yearly average 
volatility to value natural gas options, he or she will tend to overestimate the values of 
options expiring in summer and underestimate the values of options expiring in winter. 
Eight, natural gas actual volatility tends to increase on winter days when the 
temperature is lower than normal. Nine, crude oil volatility tends to be high when oil 
prices are historically low and low when prices are historically high. Ten, there is 
strong evidence of a time-varying conditional correlation between crude oil prices and 
the value of the dollar. Eleven, although the unbiasedness of oil and gas IVs depends 
on term-to-maturity and moneyness of the options, IV is a fairly efficient forecast of 
future volatility in these markets. Twelve, I develop and use a variant of the 
multiplicative GARCH type model outlined in Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998) 
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and show that a GARCH model which fails to control for seasonality, announcement, 
and other transitory effects tends to overestimate the impact of a surprise return shock 
on subsequent volatility.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II examines the ex-ante 
determinants of price volatility in the US crude oil market. Chapter III studies the 
determinants of price volatility in the natural gas market. Chapter IV explores the 
structure, characteristics, and determinants of oil and gas implied volatilities. As the 
dissertation consists of separate essays in the format of journal articles, several 
hypotheses, data descriptions, and analyses in Chapters II, III and IV are similar and 
overlapping.  
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Chapter II. Price Volatility in the Crude Oil Market 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the causes and behavior of price volatility in the US crude 
oil market from January 1997 through November 2008. Crude oil is one of the most 
essential energy sources in the U.S., accounting for about 40% of the nation’s energy 
consumption. Since OPEC’s 1973 decision to regulate its oil price independently of 
large oil companies, crude oil prices have been subject to dramatic volatility. Oil 
prices increased from less than $3 per barrel in mid-1973 to $36 in early 1981.  This 
large oil price fluctuation tendency has continued in recent years. From less than $11 
per barrel in the beginning of 1999, oil prices increased to $38 per barrel in September 
2000, decreased to $18 per barrel in January 2002 and went up to $77 per barrel in 
July 2006. The crude oil market has experienced an unprecedented dramatic volatility 
in 2008 as crude oil prices reached an all-time high level of $145 per barrel in July and 
then fell sharply to $50 per barrel in November.  
Crude oil prices are more volatile than those in most financial markets. In 
2007, the annualized standard deviation of the daily percentage change in prices was 
31.33% for crude oil. By comparison, that number was only 4.08% for the US dollar-
Euro exchange rate, 16.37% for the S&P 500 and 19.10% for the 10-year T-bond 
interest rates2
                                                     
2The data for the S&P 500, US dollar-Euro exchange rate, and the 10-year T-bond interest 
rates were collected from CRSP database and the Federal Reserve website 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov). 
. Figure 1 depicts crude oil prices and historical volatilities from January 
1997 through November 2008 wherein historical volatilities are measured as the 
annualized rolling 30-day standard deviation of returns. As shown in these graphs, the 
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crude oil market has undergone notable price fluctuations during the sample period 
and volatility tends to cluster over time.  
The high volatility in crude oil prices is likely due to actual and anticipated 
fluctuations in supply and the short-term inelasticity of demand. Given that crude oil is 
one of the most essential energy sources, it is very difficult for most oil users to reduce 
their consumption within a short period of time following a price increase. On the 
other hand, there is considerable fluctuation in oil supply which depends on a variety 
of macroeconomic and political factors. For example, in 1997, when the world 
economy was already in a recession, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), failing to predict the oil demand correctly, increased its production 
levels which resulted in a huge decrease in oil prices. In June-July 2008, a 
combination of supply uncertainties in oil producing countries and a falling dollar 
caused an unprecedented oil price spike. On the reverse, an appreciation of the dollar 
and signs of worldwide economic slowdown led to a sharp decrease in oil price toward 
the end of 2008. This high variability in crude oil prices makes it extremely difficult 
for consumers to forecast their costs and for producers to forecast their profits. The 
desire to protect market participants against such price fluctuations has led to the 
creation of and active trading in futures, swaps and options where the market value of 
the latter depends on volatility.  
Although it is difficult to forecast the direction of future price changes from 
past price behavior, the absolute magnitude of price changes, i.e. volatility, has been 
proven much more predictable in most financial markets. It is generally found that 
highly volatile markets tend to be followed by volatile markets whereas stable markets 
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tend to be followed by stable markets. The vast majority of the research on market 
volatility has focused on the volatility of financial markets such as the stock, bond, 
interest rates and foreign exchange futures markets, etc. Despite the fact that crude oil 
prices, like any other energy prices, tend to be more volatile than most financial prices, 
research into the cause and behavior of volatility in the crude oil market is limited. For 
instance, in a well-known and comprehensive study of the volatility literature, Poon 
and Granger (2003) surveyed 93 articles examining volatility in all sorts of markets; 
only three of these included crude oil among the markets examined (Day and Lewis, 
1993; Szakmary, Ors and Kim, 2003; and Martens and Zein, 2004).  
An understanding of the causes and behavior of crude oil volatility is essential 
to measuring and managing the risk faced by energy producers and major consumers, 
such as airlines. Also the market value of risk management products such as options 
depends largely on volatility. However, most research on the crude oil market has 
focused on the behavior of oil prices rather than on volatility. The limited studies on 
crude oil volatility to date focus solely on volatility persistence, i.e., the relation 
between current and past volatility, in this market (see, for example, Wilson, 
Aggarwal and Inclan, 1996; Yang, Hwang and Huang, 2002; Pindyck, 2004; and 
Kuper and Soest, 2006). Other possible determinants of crude oil volatility are 
neglected in the literature. In this study, I attempt to fill this gap in our understanding 
by simultaneously testing and quantifying several hypothesized ex-ante determinants 
of crude oil volatility. These determinants consist of volatility persistence, volatility 
asymmetry, oil price levels, announcement, and seasonality effects.  
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My most important results and contributions to the literature include the 
following. One, crude oil volatility is asymmetric in that an unexpected decrease in 
price increases predicted volatility more than an unexpected increase in price of 
similar magnitude. Two, crude oil volatility tends to be high when oil prices are 
historically low and low when prices are historically high. Three, crude oil volatility 
tends to increase on days the OPEC meetings announcements are released. Four, crude 
oil volatility is significantly higher on Monday, implying that the crude oil market is 
impacted by news occurring during the weekend and on Wednesday, possibly because 
Wednesday is the release day of the Weekly Petroleum Status Report. Five, a model 
which fails to control for levels, announcement, and seasonality effects tends to 
overestimate the impact of an unexpected price decrease on predicted volatility. Six, 
there is strong evidence of a time-varying conditional correlation between crude oil 
prices and the value of the dollar.  
I develop and use a variant of the multiplicative GARCH type model outlined 
in Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998). This model, which separates volatility into a 
persistent part and a transitory part, allows me to implement a much cleaner study of 
the determinants of volatility than that used in several previous studies on other 
markets.  
To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first comprehensive study of the 
ex-ante determinants on volatility within a GARCH framework for the crude oil 
market and also the first study of the time-varying conditional covariance between 
crude oil prices and the value of the dollar. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I propose and develop my 
hypotheses. The data is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, I analyze the 
multiplicative GARCH type model to quantify the determinants of crude oil volatility 
and the bivariate GARCH model for the conditional covariance between crude oil 
prices and the value of the dollar. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
2. Hypotheses  
In this study, I attempt to answer the following questions:  
1. Are crude oil prices characterized by volatility persistence as has been 
documented in other markets? It has been observed that in many other markets volatile 
periods tend to follow volatile periods whereas stable periods tend to follow stable 
periods. Among numerous studies documenting volatility persistence are: Adrian, 
Pagan and Schwert (1990), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Ebens (2001), Wu 
(2001) and Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) for the stock market, Ederington and 
Lee (1993, 1995 and 2001) for interest rates, Harvey and Huang (1991), Ederington 
and Lee (1993, 1995 and 2001), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Low and Zhang 
(2005) for the foreign exchange market and Jones et al. (1998) for the Treasury bond 
market. I hypothesize that similar volatility persistence exists in the crude oil market.  
2. Is there volatility asymmetry in the crude oil market? That is, do equal 
positive and negative shocks have different impacts on future volatility? It is generally 
documented that asymmetric volatility exists in a number of financial markets. French 
and Roll (1986), French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987), Campbell and Hentschel 
(1992), Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), Veronesi (1999), Bekaert and Wu 
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(2000) and Wu (2001) and others found that in the stock market, an unexpected 
decrease in price has a bigger impact on predicted volatility than an unexpected 
increase in price of equal magnitude. The asymmetric volatility in the stock market is 
generally attributed to either a leverage effect and/or a volatility feedback effect3
While in the stock market negative shocks tend to have more impact on 
predicted volatility than equal positive shocks, the hypothesized reasons, i.e., leverage 
and/or volatility feedback effects, would not apply to the crude oil market. There are 
reasons to expect that due to the elasticity of the supply and demand curves, a positive 
shock in the energy market could have more impact on predicted future volatility than 
an equivalent negative shock. The supply and demand curves for crude oil are likely to 
be more elastic at low prices than at higher prices. Given the hypothesized shape of 
the supply and demand curves, the same fluctuation in demand when prices are low 
should cause a smaller change in prices than when prices are high. Thus, a positive 
price shock which moves the market up the supply and demand curves is likely to 
presage higher future volatility than a negative shock moving the market down the 
curves.  
. To a 
lesser extent, Brunner and Simon (1996) and Simon (1997) found similar evidence for 
the Treasury bond futures and options markets.  
3. Is there levels effect in crude oil volatility? High oil prices which indicate 
that the supply and demand curves become inelastic should cause an increase in 
volatility. However, as depicted in Figure 1, periods of high volatility tend to be 
associated with low prices and periods of low volatility tend to be associated with high 
                                                     
3Wu (2001) provides a survey on the determinants of asymmetric volatility in the stock 
market. 
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prices. Therefore, the price levels effect on crude oil volatility is an empirical issue to 
be explored. 
4. Do the OPEC meetings cause increased volatility in the crude oil market? 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), founded in 1960, 
produces about 40 percent of the world’s crude oil. OPEC nations control 
approximately 78% of known reserves and export about 55% of the oil traded 
internationally4
Disagreement exists in the literature about the OPEC’s influence on crude oil 
prices. Loderer (1985) and Gullen (1996) find that OPEC influenced crude oil prices 
in the eighties and nineties but not during the seventies and early eighties. Alhajji and 
Huettner (2000) reject the hypothesis that OPEC has a significant impact on crude oil 
prices. Conversely, Deaves and Krinsky (1992) find that crude oil prices under-react 
to bullish outcomes of OPEC meetings and efficiently react to bearish outcomes. 
Despite the controversial evidence of the OPEC’s influence on oil price levels, there 
are reasons to expect that OPEC news impact crude oil volatility. On days the OPEC 
decisions are coming to the market, market participants adjust prices according to new 
information and thus, the crude oil market should become more volatile. Since the 
OPEC meetings are generally not open to the press and most valuable news are not 
. The Organization is required by its charter to hold a minimum of two 
conferences per year, at which each member nation is to be represented. In addition to 
these regularly scheduled conferences, OPEC holds “extraordinary meetings” on an 
as-needed basis. During these meetings, the OPEC delegates often consider and ratify 
future production levels and therefore OPEC meetings are usually the subject of 
intense media attention.  
                                                     
4What is OPEC? (OPEC, 2006)  
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made known to the public until after the meetings5
5. Are there seasonal effects in crude oil volatility?  
, I hypothesize that volatility will be 
higher on days following the OPEC meetings.  
5.1 Day-of-the-week pattern 
Some academic studies find that the volatility of financial asset returns varies 
across days of the week.6
5.2 Time-of-the-year pattern 
 In some financial markets, the volatility from Friday close to 
Monday close is higher than that of a normal one-day period but not as high as that of 
a three-weekday period presumably because there is not much information coming out 
during the weekend. In this study, I hypothesize that crude oil volatility tends to be 
high on Monday (including weekend) since the crude oil market is likely to be 
affected by news that occurs during the weekend, such as weather or geo-political 
events. I also hypothesize higher crude oil volatility on Wednesday since this is the 
release day of the Weekly Petroleum Status Report. This Report, which is compiled 
and issued by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, is widely considered to be 
one of the most important news in the crude oil market since it provides timely 
information on supply and inventory data of crude oil and principal petroleum 
products in the context of historical information and forecasts.  
                                                     
5 Platts (2002) 
6The literature on day-of-the-week effect on volatility includes French and Roll (1986), 
Berument and Kiymaz (2001) for the stock market, Harvey and Huang (1991), Ederington and 
Lee (1993) for interest rates and the foreign exchange futures market and Jones et al. (1998) 
for the Treasury bond market. 
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It has been documented that returns in some markets differ by month of the 
year7 but little attention has been given to a seasonal pattern in volatility. In this study, 
I investigate the possibility of a time-of-the-year pattern in volatility in the crude oil 
market where part of the demand supposedly depends on weather conditions. For 
example, the demand for gasoline often increases during the summer driving season 
and similarly, the demand for heating oil may increase sharply in the winter season. 
Since gasoline and heating oil are two of the most important products distilled from 
crude oil8
6. Is there evidence of a time-varying conditional covariance between crude oil 
prices and the value of the dollar? It is often argued that because oil prices are 
denominated in dollars, oil prices and the value of the dollar should be negatively 
correlated. An appreciation (depreciation) of the U.S. dollar would tend to make oil 
more (less) expensive in non-dollar currencies and would reduce (increase) demand 
for crude oil thereby possibly lowering (increasing) oil prices in dollars.  
, an increase in product demand supposedly results in an increase in crude oil 
demand and if crude oil supply is essentially fixed in the short run, volatility would 
increase.  
The relationship between crude oil prices and the value of the dollar has been 
examined in prior academic research (see, for example, Amano and Norden, 1998; 
Sadorsky, 2000; Benassy-Quere, Mignon and Penot, 2007). However, while numerous 
studies document strong evidence of 
                                                     
7See, for instance, Keim (1983), Lakonishok and Smidt (1984) for the stock market and Jordan 
and Jordan (1991) for the corporate bond market 
heteroskedastic covariances among other 
8A 42-U.S. gallon barrel of crude oil provides slightly more than 20 gallons of finished motor 
gasoline and 10 gallons of heating oil and diesel fuel. 
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financial assets9, none of the previous studies on the correlation between crude oil 
prices and the value of the dollar have explored whether that correlation is constant or 
time-varying. I hypothesize a time-varying conditional correlation between crude oil 
prices and the value of the dollar. While an increase (decrease) in the dollar’s value 
implies more (less) expensive oil prices in non-dollar currencies which should result in 
a downward (upward) pressure on oil demand and hence lower (increase) oil prices in 
dollars, 
3. Data and preliminary analysis 
oil prices are also impacted by international supply-demand shifts not caused 
by changes in the dollar’s value in which case there should be no correlation between 
oil prices and the dollar’s value. Occasionally, there may be forces that simultaneously 
increase or decrease oil prices and the value of the dollar, resulting in a positive 
correlation between the two. Hence, I test whether the covariance and correlation 
between the value of the dollar and oil prices in dollars vary over time.  
These hypotheses are tested using daily closing prices for crude oil futures 
contracts traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). Crude oil futures 
contracts, which began trading on the NYMEX on March 30, 1983, trade in units of 
1,000 U.S. barrels. My sample period is January 1, 1997 to November 28, 2008 
totaling 2,981 daily observations. Crude oil prices are from the Energy Information 
Administration10
Futures prices are used in place of spot prices for the following reasons. First, 
futures prices are the major prices in the crude oil market. The NYMEX crude oil 
. Details on the OPEC meetings are collected from Dow Jones 
Factiva database.  
                                                     
9See, for example, Bollerslev et al. (1988), Harvey (1989), Bodurtha and Mark (1991). 
10http://tonto.eia.doe.gov 
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futures contract is the world's most liquid forum for crude oil trading and is used as a 
principal international pricing benchmark. Crude oil futures prices are also the prices 
reported in newspapers. Second, the futures market for crude oil is liquid and 
centralized while spot markets are localized and illiquid. Third, futures prices are the 
prices normally used in most oil risk management contracts such as swaps and 
options. 
To examine volatility in a GARCH type framework, I utilize daily log returns11 
defined as rt=ln(Pt/Pt-1) wherein Pt is the price of the futures contract on day t and Pt-1 
is the price of the same contract the previous day. As traders often cover their 
positions on the last trading day of a contract’s life, trading volume and open interest 
decline and price volatility increases substantially. To avoid this “thin market” 
problem, I replace the return of the nearest contract on the last trading day of each 
month with that of the second nearest contract in constructing the rt 
To proxy for the value of the dollar, I use a trade-weighted average of the 
foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against a subset of the broad index 
currencies that circulate widely outside the country of issue, including the Euro Area, 
Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden. The exchange 
index data is from the Federal Reserve Statistical releases.
series.  
12
                                                     
11The daily crude oil “returns” are used to measure price changes only. These “returns” are not 
investment returns since no money is actually invested.    
  
12The index value is set 100 in March 1973 and calculated using the formula:  
,
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Table I provides summary statistics for daily crude oil returns on nearby, 
second- and third-month contracts. The annualized standard deviation of the daily 
percentage change in nearby crude oil prices over the January 1997-November 2008 
period is 38.26%, indicating that this market is characterized by very high volatility. 
There is evidence that volatility decreases with time-to-maturity of the futures 
contracts, from 38.26% for the nearby to 34.79% for the second-month and 32.57% 
for the third-month contracts.  
Table I shows preliminary evidence of volatility persistence in that the first-
order autocorrelation coefficients for absolute returns are positive and significant at 
the 0.01 level. For squared returns (not reported), the first-order autocorrelation 
coefficients are also significantly positive at the 0.001 level. Clearly, the crude oil 
market, like many others, is characterized by volatility persistence.  
4. Model Specification and Analysis 
4.1. Ex-ante determinants of crude oil volatility 
In order to test and quantify the determinants of crude oil volatility as 
discussed in section 2, I estimate a model in which the conditional variance follows a 
multiplicative GARCH type process:  
rt = μ + φ1rt -1 + εt
where: 
      (1) 
 εt 2tσ ~N(0, ) and 2t t th sσ = ⋅       (2) 
ht = Var(ζt) = ω+ αζt-12+βht-1+ γζt-12It-1, where ζt =  εt .5ts /  (3) 
4
t i,t
i=1
s s=∏        (4) 
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s1,t κt[AP /AP ] =       (4.a)  
s2,t = (1+ δ-1DAt-1)(1+ δ0DAt)(1+ δ1DAt+1
s
)   (4.b) 
3,t
4
,
i=1
(1+ )i i tDWλ∏ =       (4.c) 
s4,t = (1+ θ1DSUMi,t)(1+ θ2DWINi,t
r
)    (4.d) 
t is the log percentage change in price of the futures contract on day t, It-1=1 if ζt-1 >0 
and 0 otherwise. My main interest is in the ex-ante determinants of the variance of the 
surprise oil return, εt
4.1.1 Volatility Persistence and Asymmetric Volatility 
. I model this variance as a multiplicative function of an 
asymmetric GARCH function (equation 3), price levels (equation 4.a), announcement 
effects (equation 4.b), day-of-the-week pattern (equation 4.c) and seasonal effects 
(equation 4.d).  
Equation 3 is the asymmetric GARCH model due to Glosten et al. (1993) often 
referred to as the GJR or TGARCH model.  If volatility persistence is an attribute of 
the crude oil market, α and β should be significantly positive, implying that predicted 
volatility depends on both unexpected price changes and the previous day’s forecast 
volatility. Asymmetric volatility implies γ ≠ 0 in equation (3); γ >0 implies that a 
positive shock increases conditional volatility more than an equivalent negative shock. 
4.1.2 Levels, Announcement and Seasonality effects  
  
Equation 4, the transitory effects equation, estimates the impact of other 
determinants on volatility. Equation 4(a) tests the hypothesis that volatility is sensitive 
to price levels. APt is the inflation-adjusted price = (Pt/CPIT)100 where Pt is the crude 
oil price on day t and CPIT AP is the Consumer Price Index for that month. represents 
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the average inflation-adjusted price over the sample period. κ >0 implies that volatility 
is higher at high price levels and κ <0 implies that volatility is lower at high price 
levels.  
Equation 4(b) estimates the impact of OPEC meetings announcements on 
volatility. DAt is 1 on OPEC meeting days and 0 otherwise. I also include DAt-1 and 
DAt+1 as dummies for the days before and after OPEC meeting days because (1) it is 
often reported in the media that market participants speculate on the OPEC decisions 
and adjust prices prior to the meetings and (2) important OPEC meetings news are 
usually not released to the public until the following day. In equation 4(b), δi
Equations 4(c) and 4(d) estimate the day-of-the-week and time-of-the-year 
patterns in crude oil volatility. DW
 
represents the estimated log percentage increase in volatility normally caused by 
OPEC meetings.  
i,t are zero-one dummies for Monday (which 
includes the weekend), Wednesday, Thursday and Friday with Tuesday being the left-
out day. λi estimates the average percentage difference between volatility on day i and 
volatility on Tuesday. In other words, assuming that s1,t=s2,t=s4,t=1, then the estimated 
variance on Tuesday is ht. On Monday, the estimated variance is ht(1+λM). On 
Wednesday, the estimated variance is ht(1+λW) and so on for other days. If the crude 
oil market is impacted by news occurring over the weekend, Monday return (which is 
a three-day return including the weekend) should be more volatile than any normal 
weekday return and λM >0. I also expect that λW > 0 because Wednesday is the release 
day of the Weekly Petroleum Status Report.  
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DSUMi,t=1 if the futures contract expires in the summer months (from May 
through August); DWINi,t=1 if the futures contract expires in the winter months (from 
November through February). θ1 and/or θ2
4.1.3 Comparison with Previous Models 
 ≠ 0 imply a time-of-the-year pattern in 
crude oil volatility.  
My model improves on that used in several previous studies for non-oil 
markets which seek to simultaneously estimate both GARCH and other determinants 
of volatility. The introduction of a transitory volatility equation st into the 
specification enables me to implement a much cleaner study of the determinants of 
volatility than when announcement and/or day-of-the-week dummies are added to the 
variance equation. For instance, Hsieh (1989), Berument and Kiymaz (2001), 
Ederington and Lee (2001) and Lee (2002) use GARCH type models to examine day-
of-the-week effects on volatility in other markets. In those studies, weekday dummies 
are in the ht equation (equation 3) and the coefficient estimates reflect how conditional 
volatility changes across weekdays. Thus, using their model, there is no st
h
 equation 
(equation 4) and equation (3) becomes: 
t = ω + αεt-12 + βht-1 + λMDWM,t + λWDWW,t + λRDWR,t + λFDWF,t
In equation 5, since weekday dummies are in the h
,                               
(5) 
t equation, the dummy for any day 
of the week impacts volatilities on all days of the week through the ht-1 term on the 
right hand side of the equation. Suppose, for instance, that day t is Monday. 
∂ht/∂DWM,t = λM. Now consider the impact of the Monday dummy on volatility on 
Tuesday (day t+1). Since 
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 ht+1 = ω + αεt2 + βht + λMDWM,t+1 + λWDWW,t+1 + λRDWR,t+1 + λFDWF,t+1
∂h
,                  
(5) 
t+1/∂DWM,t = (∂ht+1/∂ht)(∂ht/∂DWM,t) = βλM. Likewise, the Monday dummy impact 
on the Wednesday’s volatility is ∂ ht+2/∂DWM,t = β2λM.  Therefore, when weekday 
dummies are in the ht equation, as in equation (5), λM does not measure how much 
higher volatility is on Monday than on the omitted day (Tuesday).  Indeed, depending 
on the coefficient pattern, day X which has the highest λX
In contrast, a specification which separates the variance of returns into a 
persistent part, equation (3), and a non-persistent part, equation (4), allows me to 
estimate a model in which any weekday dummy impacts that day’s volatility only. For 
example, λ
 coefficient may not be the 
day with the highest volatility.   
M measures how much higher (or lower) in percentage terms the volatility is 
on Monday than on the omitted day (Tuesday) and λW 
To estimate the announcement impacts on volatility in other markets, several 
previous studies, for example, Hsieh (1989), Berument and Kiymaz (2001), 
Ederington and Lee (2001), De Goeij and Marquering (2006), add an announcement 
dummy to the h
measures how much higher (or 
lower) the volatility is on Wednesday and so on.  
t equation and do not include the st
h
 equation. Thus, the variance 
equation becomes:  
t =  ω+ αεt-12+βht-1+ δ0DAt,                
In equation (6), an unscheduled shock on day t-1 impacts volatility on day t 
through the term αε
(6) 
t-1
2. However, since an announcement impact is forced to persist 
on the subsequent days (∂ ht/∂DAt = δ0, ∂ht+1/∂DAt = (∂ ht+1/∂ht)(∂ht/∂DAt) = βδ0, 
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∂ht+2/∂DAt = β2δ0 and so on), the impact of a shock due to scheduled announcement 
on day t-1 on volatility on day t includes not only αεt-12 but also βδ0
2
tσ∂
. Consequently, 
models like equation (6) impose much higher persistence for shocks due to scheduled 
announcements than for equivalent shocks due to unscheduled announcements. In 
contrast, in my model, the impact of a shock due to scheduled announcement does not 
persist on the following days ( /∂DAt = δ0 2t+1σ∂and /∂DAt
4.2. Bivariate GARCH model of the conditional covariance between crude 
oil prices and the value of the dollar 
 =0) and therefore, the 
estimated impact of a shock on day t-1 on volatility on subsequent days t is the same 
for scheduled and unscheduled announcements.  
I utilize a multivariate GARCH model to test for a time-varying covariance 
between crude oil prices and the value of the dollar. The development of multivariate 
GARCH models represents a major step forward in the modeling of volatility. Among 
various multivariate GARCH models in the literature, the Diagonal VECH model 
introduced by Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) is one of the most popular. In 
the general Diagonal VECH model, the conditional covariance follows a multivariate 
GARCH (1,1) process:  
'
1 1 1 (7)t t t tH A B H− − −= Ω+ ⊗ + ⊗ε ε
  
where the coefficient matrices , andA B Ω  are NxN  symmetric matrices, and 
the operator ⊗  is the element by element (Hadamard) product.  
I hypothesize that the conditional covariance matrix of crude oil and exchange 
index returns follows a bivariate GARCH process and estimate the following Diagonal 
VECH model:  
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(8)
~ (0, )
t t
t tN H
= +rμ ε
ε
 
'
1 1 1 (7)t t t tH A B H− − −= Ω+ ⊗ + ⊗ε ε  
where 1, 2,( , ) 't t tr r=r is a (2x1) vector containing crude oil and exchange index returns 
and tH is a (2x2) conditional covariance matrix. Let tH  follow the most unrestricted 
process among all Diagonal VECH models where the parameters in the matrices 
, , andA BΩ  are allowed to vary without any restriction, the model may be written in 
single equation format as:  
, 1 , 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (9)t ij ij ij j t i t i j t ijH A B Hε ε− − −= Ω + +  
where, for instance, ( )t ijH is the i-th row and j-th column of matrix .tH Ω is a (3x1) 
parameter vector; A and B are (3x3) diagonal parameter matrices. 
5. Results 
5.1. Ex-ante determinants of crude oil volatility 
Estimates of the specification (1-4) for returns on nearby futures contracts are 
presented in the third column of Table II.  
5.1.1 Volatility Persistence and Asymmetric Volatility  
As expected, there is evidence of volatility persistence in the crude oil market. 
The estimates of α and β are positive and significant at the 0.001 level, implying that 
predicted volatility depends on both previous shocks and previous volatilities. Hence, 
highly volatile periods in the crude oil market tend to be followed by volatile periods 
in the future and this finding is robust when I control for levels, announcement and 
seasonality effects. There is also evidence of asymmetric volatility in the crude oil 
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market. The estimated γ is significantly negative, indicating that volatility increases 
considerably more following a sudden decline in oil prices than following an equal 
sudden increase in prices.  
Figure 2 presents the impact of a two-standard deviation oil return shock on 
subsequent predicted volatilities. Suppose the conditional variance, ht-1 t-1( )ζ=Var is at 
its steady-state level and suppose there is a shock such that 2t-1ζ = 4Var t-1( )ζ . Figure 2 
demonstrates the percentage difference in expected volatility on day t+x and on day t-
1, t+x
t-1
Var ( ) -1
Var ( )
ζ
ζ
 
 
 
, assuming E( 2t+xζ ) = Var( t xζ + ) for x > -1 and that negative and 
positive return shocks are equally likely. For example, the conditional volatility is 
about 14% higher the day after the shock and 7% a week later.  
In the second column of Table II, I present estimates of a GJR model without 
levels, announcement and seasonality effects. In other words, I estimate a model 
consisting of equations (1-3) assuming that st=1. A comparison of the estimates of the 
GJR model (in the second column) and those of the full model (in the third column) 
indicates that determinants of volatility other than volatility persistence and 
asymmetry are important when modeling volatility in the crude oil market. The 
likelihood ratio test statistics is 58.72 with 10 degrees of freedom and therefore, the 
null hypothesis that there are no levels, announcement and seasonality effects is 
rejected at the 0.001 level. The estimate of α in the GJR model is significantly higher 
than that in the full model while the estimates of (α+γ) are not significantly different 
from each other. Figure 3 plots different impacts of equal positive and negative shocks 
on predicted volatility according to the estimates from the GJR and the full models. 
 30 
 
Again, suppose the conditional variance, ht-1 t-1( )ζ=Var is at its steady-state level. 
According to the estimates in both the GJR and the full models, the conditional 
variance for day t falls 8% if there was no price change on day t-1 and rises about 
17.50% if the price increased 15%. However, if the price fell 15% on day t-1, the 
conditional variance for day t increases 43.06% in the GJR model and only 28.52% in 
the full model. Apparently, failing to control for levels, announcement and seasonality 
effects leads to an overestimation of the impact of a negative oil shock on predicted 
volatility and the overestimation is approximately 41.13%13
To test whether the omission of levels, announcement or day-of-the-week 
effects is responsible for this overestimation, I estimate specifications consisting of 
equations (1-3) and either equation 4(a), 4(b) or 4(c). Results (not reported) indicate 
that the overestimation caused by a model which fails to control for announcement and 
day-of-the-week effects is just 2.73% while the overestimation caused by a model 
which fails to control for levels effects and either announcement or day-of-the-week 
effects is approximately 40%. Apparently, failing to control for levels effects is the 
main cause of the overestimation of the impact of a negative oil shock on predicted 
volatility.  
.  
5.1.2 Levels effect 
Somewhat consistent with the evidence that a positive oil shock has less 
impact on predicted volatility than an equivalent negative shock, the estimate for κ, the 
levels effect, is significantly negative, indicating that volatility is high when oil prices 
                                                     
13This is measured as 1-(Ewo/Ew) where Ewo represents the estimate of α from the GJR model 
where I do not control for seasonality, announcement and levels effects and Ew that from the 
full model where I do.  
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are low and low when prices are high. As shown in Figure 1, crude oil volatilities were 
especially high during the periods 02-07/1998; 11/1998-01/1999; 10/2000-01/2001, 
10-12/2001, and 10-11/2008 which were accompanied by low prices. In contrast, the 
periods 02/2007-07/2007 and 06-08/2008 are characterized by both high prices and 
low volatilities.  
This finding for the crude oil market is opposite to the evidence in the interest 
rates market that volatility is high (low) when interest rates are high (low). One 
possible explanation for this difference is that in most studies on interest rates market, 
the measure of interest rate volatility is the volatility of the rate change while in this 
study, the measure of crude oil volatility is the volatility of the log percentage change 
in price.  
5.1.3 OPEC meetings  
As indicated by the parameter estimates in Table II, decisions made at the 
OPEC meetings tend to contain important information for the crude oil market. On the 
day after OPEC meetings, the standard deviation of crude oil returns increases by 
24.29%14
5.1.4 Seasonality 
. This concurs with the observation that news from OPEC meetings are not 
made known to the market until the following days. Contrary to media assertions that 
market participants adjust prices in speculation of OPEC decisions, there is apparently 
no significant evidence that crude oil volatility increases on or before the OPEC 
meeting days.  
5.1.4.1 Day-of-the-week pattern 
                                                     
14This is calculated as: (1+.5447)1/2-1= 24.29% 
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Since Tuesday is the left-out dummy, the coefficients in Table II measure the 
difference between average volatility on each weekday and on Tuesday. Contrary to 
the findings in some other markets15
As expected, the Monday returns (including weekend) tend to be more volatile 
than any normal weekday return. The standard deviation of the Friday-close-to-
Monday-close return is 18.49%
, there is no significant evidence that crude oil 
volatility increases on Friday. This may be due to the fact that in other markets, 
important economic news is often released on Friday whereas this is not the case in the 
crude oil market.  
16
Crude oil volatility tends to increase on Wednesday in that the standard 
deviation of Wednesday return is 15.15% higher than that of Tuesday return and the 
difference is significant at the 0.001 level. The higher Wednesday volatility is likely 
caused by the release of the Weekly Petroleum Status Report which is widely 
considered as one of the most important announcements in the petroleum market. This 
report provides timely information about current supply and demand conditions in the 
petroleum market and is therefore followed closely by market participants.  
 higher than that on Tuesday and the difference 
between Monday and Tuesday volatilities is significant at the 0.001 level.  
5.1.4.2 Time-of-the-year pattern 
Contrary to my earlier hypothesis, there is no significant evidence that crude 
oil volatility increases during either the summer driving season or the winter heating 
                                                     
15For example, Harvey and Huang (1991) reported higher volatility in interest rate and foreign 
exchange futures market on Friday. Ederington and Lee (1993) further supported these results. 
Jones et al. (1998) and Berument and Kiymaz (2001) found similar evidence for the bond and 
stock markets. 
16This is calculated as: (1+.3663)1/2-1= 16.88% 
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season.17
To further explore a month-of-the-year pattern in crude oil volatility, I re-
estimate specification (1-4) with equation 4(d) expanded to include 11 monthly 
dummies. Results from this expanded specification
 Apparently crude oil volatility is less likely to be determined by the 
fluctuations in demand for petroleum products.  
18
5.1.5 Ex-ante determinants of volatility across terms to maturity  
 indicate that September and 
October are the two least volatile months in a year. As the summer driving season 
ends and the winter does not arrive, this is the period of low crude oil demand. This 
slowdown in demand is often coupled with an increase in supply as numerous oil 
producing countries increase production and shipping of oil before their ports ice over 
during the winter.  
The last two columns of Table II report estimation results of the specification 
(1-4) for returns on second- and third-month futures contracts. There is evidence of 
volatility persistence for returns on these contracts. However, there is no evidence of 
asymmetric volatility for returns on third-month futures contracts.  
The impact of OPEC announcements on crude oil volatility is more 
pronounced for longer term-to-maturity contracts than for nearby contract. On the 
days following OPEC meetings, the standard deviation of nearby returns increases by 
24.29% while the increases for second- and third-month are 30.77% and 29.51%. 
Since announcements from OPEC meetings mostly contain information regarding 
                                                     
17I also estimate the specification (1-4) using gasoline and heating oil data during the sample 
period and find significant evidence that gasoline volatility increases during the summer 
months and heating oil volatility increases during the winter months.   
18Results are available upon request. 
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crude oil production levels, this sorts of information is likely to have more impact on 
prices of longer term-to-maturity contracts than on nearby contracts.  
There also exists a day-of-the-week pattern in volatilities for longer term 
contracts. The increase in Monday volatility (including weekend) is less sizable for 
third-month returns than for nearby and second-month. Apparently, news which 
occurs during the weekend such as weather or geo-political events tends to have more 
implication for crude oil prices in the short term than in the long term. In contrast, the 
increases in Wednesday volatility do not significantly differ across terms to maturity, 
implying that the Petroleum Status Report is viewed by the market as having similar 
impact on crude oil prices in the short run and in the long run. 
5.2. Bivariate GARCH model for crude oil and exchange index returns 
It is often argued that oil prices in dollars and the value of the dollar should be 
negatively correlated. An appreciation (depreciation) of the U.S. dollar would tend to 
make oil more (less) expensive in non-dollar currencies and would reduce (increase) 
demand for crude oil thereby possibly lowering (increasing) oil prices in dollars.  
I hypothesize that the correlation between crude oil prices and dollar value 
varies over time. While an increase (decrease) in the dollar’s value implies more (less) 
expensive oil prices in non-dollar currencies which should result in a downward 
(upward) pressure on oil demand and hence lower (increase) oil prices in dollars, oil 
prices are also impacted by international supply-demand shifts not caused by changes 
in the dollar’s value in which case there should be no correlation between oil prices 
and the dollar’s value. Occasionally, there may be forces that simultaneously increase 
or decrease oil prices and the value of the dollar, resulting in a positive correlation 
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between the two. Hence, I test whether the covariance and correlation between the 
value of the dollar and oil prices in dollars vary over time. 
Estimation results from specification (7-8) are presented in the fourth column 
of Table III. In order to provide some intuition on the bivariate model parameters, I 
present the estimates of the univariate GARCH(1,1) specification for exchange index 
and crude oil volatilities in the second and third columns of Table III. Results from 
Table III indicate that the bivariate GARCH estimates of volatility persistence for 
exchange index and crude oil returns are close to, and not significantly different from, 
the univariate GARCH (1,1) estimates.  
The estimate of Ω (1,2), the unconditional mean of the covariance between 
crude oil and exchange indices returns, is negative and significant at the 0.05 level, 
which is consistent with the observation of a negative correlation between crude oil 
prices and the value of the dollar. The estimates of A(1,2) and B(1,2) (the ARCH and 
GARCH terms in the covariance equation) are both positive and significant at the 0.01 
level, implying that the covariance between crude oil prices and the value of the dollar 
tends to cluster over time.  
The positive estimate for A(1,2), the ARCH term, means that shocks to oil 
prices and exchange rates of the same sign affect the conditional covariance positively, 
while shocks of opposite signs affect the forecasted covariance negatively. Given that 
the unconditional mean of the covariance, Ω(1,2), is significantly negative, two shocks 
of the same sign would decrease and two shocks of opposite signs would increase the 
predicted covariance in absolute value terms. A significantly positive estimate of 
A(1,2) also indicates that causes of the correlation between oil prices and the dollar’s 
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value tend to persist. If on one day the change in the dollar price of oil is largely due to 
a change in the dollar’s value, there is a tendency for the next day’s change in oil 
prices to be primarily caused by changes in the dollar’s value as well. On the other 
hand, if on one day the change in the dollar price of oil is caused primarily by factors 
other than the dollar’s value, there is a tendency for those to be the primary causes of 
changes in the dollar price of oil on subsequent days. 
To examine whether the time variability in the covariance of crude oil and 
exchange index returns is solely due to variation in the two variances, I calculate the 
conditional correlation coefficient at time t+1, 12, 1 :tρ +  
1, 1 2, 1
12, 1
1, 1 2, 1
{ , )
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Figures 4 and 5 present the plots of the conditional covariance forecasts and 
the estimated correlation coefficient over time, based on the estimation results of the 
diagonal VECH model as presented in Table III. The figures show that the conditional 
covariance and the correlation coefficient vary considerably over time.  
 is constant over time, the variability in covariance is solely due to 
variation in variances. To test the null hypothesis of a constant correlation coefficient, 
I estimate the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) model and test the Diagonal 
VECH model against the CCC model. The likelihood ratio test statistics is 9.8 with 2 
degrees of freedom and significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, the Constant 
Conditional Correlation hypothesis is rejected, implying that the correlation between 
oil prices and the value of the dollar tends to change over time.  
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
The contribution this study makes is to provide an empirical examination of 
the causes and behavior of price volatility in the crude oil market.  Daily returns data 
from January 1997 through November 2008 are used to estimate a multiplicative 
GARCH type model. The crude oil market is characterized by volatility persistence 
where highly volatile periods are followed by highly volatile periods and stable 
periods are followed by stable ones. I find that a negative crude oil shock has more 
impact on predicted volatility than an equivalent positive shock. A somewhat 
surprising result is that crude oil volatility is low when prices are high and high when 
prices are low. The OPEC meetings cause increased crude oil volatility on days the 
meetings announcements are released. There is a day-of-the-week pattern in the crude 
oil market in that Monday return (including weekend) is more volatile than any normal 
weekday return. The high weekend/Monday volatility is mainly due to the 
accumulation of information over the weekend. Crude oil volatility tends to increase 
on Wednesday since this is the announcement day of the Petroleum Status Report. In 
contrast to the findings for some financial markets, there is no evidence of higher 
Friday volatility in this market. I also document time-varying conditional covariance 
and correlation between crude oil prices and the value of the dollar. 
In this study, I use a multiplicative asymmetric GARCH type model which 
separates volatility into a persistent part and a non-persistent part. This model allows 
me to implement a much cleaner study of the ex-ante determinants on volatility than 
that used in some previous studies.    
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Chapter III. Price Volatility in the Natural Gas Market 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the causes and behavior of price volatility in the US 
natural gas market from January 1997 through December 2008. Natural gas is one of 
the most essential energy sources in the U.S., accounting for about 25% of the nation’s 
energy consumption. Trading activity in the natural gas market has increased 
significantly in recent years. In October 2006 the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) reported that the daily trading of natural gas futures reached 54,213 
contracts. By December 2007, the number had nearly tripled to 158,525 and 
subsequently increased to a record high of 403,106 contracts on July 24, 200819
The natural gas market has undergone revolutionary changes since the early 
1990s. From a highly regulated market in which government regulations prescribed 
everything from prices to who could buy, sell, and transport natural gas and under 
what conditions, the natural gas market has evolved into a largely deregulated market 
in which prices are driven by supply and demand. Since then, natural gas has been one 
of the most volatile markets. For example, from less than $2.5 per million British 
thermal units (mmBtu) in July 2002, natural gas prices increased to $9.5 per mmBtu in 
February 2003. This large price fluctuation tendency has continued in recent years. In 
2008, natural gas prices rose sharply from $7.8 per mmBtu in early January to $13.5 
per mmBtu in July, which was the highest price level for that time of year. Then 
starting around the end of July, natural gas prices fell almost as sharply and were 
approximately $5.5 per mmBtu toward the end of 2008. According to the U.S. Energy 
.  
                                                     
19Natural Gas Year-In-Review 2007, Energy Information Administration and NYMEX 
Holdings releases.  
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Information Administration (EIA), this decline in natural gas price resulted from a 
combination of a larger-than-expected increase in domestic gas production and a drop 
in oil prices.   
Natural gas prices are more volatile than those in most financial markets. In 
2007, the annualized standard deviation of the daily percentage price change was 
49.94% for natural gas.  By comparison, that number was only 4.08% for the US 
dollar-Euro exchange rate, 16.37% for the S&P 500, 19.10% for the 10-year T-bond 
interest rates, and 31.33% for crude oil20
The high volatility in natural gas prices is likely due to the short-term 
inelasticity of supply and demand. Since natural gas supplies are often constrained by 
storage levels and imports are limited, natural gas suppliers are unable to increase 
production levels in a short period of time. Also, it is difficult for consumers to 
quickly reduce their consumption when a sharp increase in natural gas prices occurs, 
especially during the winter. As natural gas suppliers cannot rapidly adjust their 
production levels to match demand changes, supply and demand imbalances may 
result in sharp price changes. This high variability in natural gas prices makes it 
extremely difficult for consumers to forecast their costs and for producers to forecast 
. Figure 6 depicts prices and historical 
volatilities of the nearby natural gas futures contract from January 1997 through 
December 2008 wherein historical volatilities are measured as the annualized rolling 
30-day standard deviation of returns. As shown in these graphs, the natural gas market 
has undergone notable price fluctuations during the sample period and there is a time-
of-the-year pattern in which volatility tends to increase in winter. 
                                                     
20The data for the S&P 500, US dollar-Euro exchange rate, and the 10-year T-bond interest 
rates were collected from CRSP database and the Federal Reserve website 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov). 
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their profits. The desire to protect market participants against such price fluctuations 
has led to the creation of and active trading in futures, swaps and options where the 
market value of the latter depends on volatility. An understanding of the causes and 
behavior of natural gas volatility is therefore essential to measuring and managing the 
risk faced by market participants.  
Although it is difficult to forecast the direction of future price changes from 
past price behavior, the absolute magnitude of price changes, i.e. volatility, has been 
proven much more predictable in most financial markets. It is generally found that 
highly volatile periods tend to be followed by volatile periods whereas stable periods 
tend to be followed by stable periods. The vast majority of the research on market 
volatility has focused on the volatility of financial markets such as the stock, bond, 
interest rates and foreign exchange futures markets, etc. Despite the fact that natural 
gas prices tend to be more volatile than most financial and commodity prices, research 
into the causes and behavior of volatility in the natural gas market is limited.  
The limited studies on natural gas volatility to date examine several 
determinants of natural gas volatility in isolation. Susmel and Thompson (1997), 
Pindyck (2004) and Murry and Zhu (2004) find that natural gas volatility follows an 
ARCH-GARCH type process, Linn and Zhu (2004) document that the release of the 
Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report announcement causes increased natural gas 
volatility, Murry and Zhu (2004) document that natural gas volatility increases on 
Monday and on days the Storage Report is released, and Mu (2007) examines the 
impact of storage and weather conditions on natural gas volatility. In this study, I 
combine these volatility determinants into a single econometric model and also test 
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and quantify other hypothesized determinants of natural gas volatility such as 
asymmetric volatility, bid week effect and month-of-the-year volatility pattern.  
My most important results and contributions to the literature include the 
following. One, natural gas volatility is asymmetric in that an unexpected increase in 
price increases predicted volatility more than an unexpected decrease in price of 
similar magnitude. To my knowledge, this asymmetry pattern is unique to natural gas. 
Two, natural gas volatility is significantly higher on Monday, implying that the natural 
gas market is impacted by news occurring during the weekend and on Thursday, 
which is attributable to the fact that Thursday is the release day of the Natural Gas 
Weekly Update. Three, surprises in the change in natural gas in storage tend to cause 
increased volatility. Four, there is a month-of-the-year pattern in natural gas volatility 
in that volatility tends to increase in the winter months. Five, volatility tends to be 
high on winter days when the temperature is lower than normal. Six, volatility tends to 
increase during bid week, the last five trading days of a month, and on days 
immediately following bid week. Seven, a model which fails to control for seasonality, 
announcement, weather and bid week effects tends to overestimate the impact of a 
surprise return shock on subsequent volatility.  
I develop and use a variant of the multiplicative GARCH type model outlined 
in Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998). This model, which separates volatility into a 
persistent part and a transitory part, allows me to implement a much cleaner study of 
the determinants of volatility than that used in several previous studies on other 
markets as well as on the natural gas market. To the best of my knowledge, my paper 
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is the first comprehensive study of the determinants of volatility within a GARCH 
framework for the natural gas market. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the most relevant 
literature and develop additional hypotheses. The data is presented in Section 3. I 
analyze the multiplicative GARCH type model to quantify the determinants of natural 
gas volatility in Section 4 and present the results in Section 5. Section 6 presents 
results from the robustness check. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. Hypotheses and other research on natural gas volatility  
Several of the natural gas volatility determinants that I consider have been 
examined before individually. Susmel and Thompson (1997), Murry and Zhu (2004), 
and Mu (2007) have estimated ARCH-GARCH type models of natural gas volatility 
and have consistently found evidence of volatility persistence - that volatile periods 
tend to follow volatile periods whereas stable periods tend to follow stable periods.  
Susmel and Thompson (1997) find that a negative shock in the natural gas 
market has more impact on predicted volatility than a positive shock of the same 
magnitude while Murry and Zhu (2004) and Mu (2007) find no evidence of 
asymmetric volatility in this market. Contrary to the findings in Susmel and 
Thompson (1997), Murry and Zhu (2004), and Mu (2007), there are good reasons to 
expect that a positive shock in the natural gas market could have more impact on 
predicted future volatility than an equivalent negative shock. My reasoning for this 
hypothesis is based on the likely shape of the natural gas supply and demand curves. 
At low volume and prices, natural gas supply is highly elastic, but once storage limits 
are reached, supply becomes quite inelastic as natural gas producers, due to 
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infrastructure constraints, are unable to increase their production levels within a short 
period of time (Krichene, 2002; Burns, 2008). The inelasticity of natural gas supplies 
is also caused by the fact that the U.S. gas market, although tightly integrated with the 
Canadian gas market, is relatively isolated from overseas natural gas supplies21
Regarding the day-of-the-week volatility pattern, Murry and Zhu (2004) find 
higher volatility on Monday which is attributable to the accumulation of information 
over the weekend, and on Wednesday which is explained by the fact that the American 
Gas Association (AGA) released its Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report on 
Wednesday throughout most of their sample period from November 1997 to August 
2003. The Storage Report, which “provides an estimate of the change in inventory 
levels for working gas in storage facilities across the United States”
. The 
demand curve for natural gas also contains an elastic portion when prices are low and 
an inelastic portion when prices are high (Krichene, 2002; Burns, 2008). Given the 
hypothesized shape of the natural gas supply and demand curves, the same fluctuation 
in demand when prices are low should cause a smaller change in prices than when 
prices are high. Thus, a positive price shock which moves the natural gas market up 
the supply and demand curves is likely to presage higher future volatility than a 
negative shock moving the market down the curves.  
22
                                                     
21U.S. Natural Gas Markets: Mid-Term Prospects for Natural Gas Supply, EIA, 2001.  
, is widely 
considered to be one of the most important information for the natural gas market 
(Linn and Zhu, 2004). Linn and Zhu (2004) find that the release of the Storage Report 
causes increased volatility in the natural gas market for about 30 minutes following the 
announcement. In this study, I attempt to simultaneously test for the day-of-the-week 
22 Issue Brief 2001-03, Policy Analysis Group, American Gas Association. 
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effect and storage announcement effect on volatility. If an increase in volatility on a 
certain day of the week is caused by the storage announcement, that pattern should 
disappear when I control for the impact of the storage surprise on volatility (Andersen 
and Bollerslev, 1998).  
Although it is generally argued that natural gas prices are weather-sensitive, 
(Fleming, Kirby and Ostdiek, 2006; Chiou-Wei, Linn and Zhu, 2007; Mu, 2007), to 
my knowledge, a possible time-of-the-year natural gas volatility pattern has not been 
explored in the literature. I expect natural gas volatility to display a time-of-the-year 
pattern which is possibly caused by periodic imbalances between supply and demand 
during the winter months. The demand for natural gas often displays a substantial 
fluctuation in winter and occasionally spikes during a cold snap. At the same time, 
however, the supply of natural gas is essentially fixed in winter due to storage capacity 
and limited imports (EIA Publication, 2007). Therefore, possible supply and demand 
imbalances in winter may cause large price swings in the natural gas market. This 
observation motivates my hypothesis of high natural gas volatility in the winter 
months.  
Consistent with the argument that natural gas prices are weather-sensitive, Mu 
(2007) finds that weather surprise (the deviation of temperatures from normal) has a 
significant effect on the conditional volatility of natural gas prices. In this study, I 
hypothesize that the impact of weather on natural gas volatility is still robust after 
controlling for the time-of-the-year volatility pattern.  
Another seasonality pattern that I examine is the behavior of volatility during 
the last five trading days of a month, which is known as “bid week” in the natural gas 
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market. Although the daily spot market is active for natural gas and gas transactions 
are done in terms of volume per day, the standard market practice is to deal for a 
month at a time and the majority of gas trading occurs during the bid week. During 
these five trading days, buyers and sellers arrange for the purchase and sale of physical 
natural gas to be delivered throughout the coming month and the average prices set 
during bid week are commonly the prices used in spot contracts over the coming 
month.23
I anticipate that during bid week, as the bids of marketers for natural gas to be 
delivered for the coming month are revealed and spot contracts are signed, this sort of 
news will contain information which is relevant to the futures market. This is akin to 
an announcement effect as documented in Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) for the T-
bond, interest rates and foreign exchange markets, in Flannery and Protopapadakis 
(2002) for the stock market, and in Linn and Zhu (2004) for the natural gas market, 
among others. However, “bid week” information is different from scheduled 
announcements in that while the latter arrives in the market at the same time, news 
about prices and volumes being set tends to leak out from many spot contract signings. 
I hypothesize that natural gas volatility will be higher during bid week. As 
documented in Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) and others, volatility tends to 
increase when lots of new information is coming to the market. In addition, the first 
three trading days of the bid week is the period when the nearby futures contract is 
expiring and traders are having to reverse their positions and therefore, could be 
characterized by high volatility.  
  
                                                     
23Understanding Natural Gas Markets, API, 2006. 
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I hypothesize that volatility will continue to increase for the day following bid 
week. Previous studies on scheduled announcement effect (Ederington and Lee, 1993, 
1995; Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine, 1998, Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2002, Linn 
and Zhu, 2004, among others) have consistently found evidence that prices tend to 
complete adjusting to new information within the announcement day and 
subsequently, volatility tends to fall back to near normal level the following day. 
However, as mentioned above, information about prices and volumes being set in the 
spot market differs from that in scheduled announcements in that while the latter is 
available to all market participants at the same expected time, part of “bid week” 
news, which leak from contract signings, is not public knowledge until the following 
day. Therefore, volatility could increase on the day following bid week as all “bid 
week” news becomes public.  
As noted above, previous studies on natural gas volatility consider only one or 
two possible determinant types. In other words, they test for volatility persistence 
and/or day-of-the-week, for announcement effect or weather effect but not all four. 
My study extends the research in natural gas volatility in several dimensions. First, I 
simultaneously estimate GARCH, seasonality, announcement and weather effects as 
well as testing for a possible volatility asymmetry in one single econometric model. 
Second, as explained further in Section 4, my model affords a cleaner test of 
seasonality, announcement and weather effects than that in previous studies. Third, I 
test and quantify several unexplored determinants of natural gas volatility such as a 
time-of-the-year and bid week volatility patterns. 
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3. Data and preliminary analysis 
3.1 Natural gas prices  
This study examines natural gas volatility using daily prices of the NYMEX 
nearby futures contracts from January 02, 1997 to December 31, 2008. The daily 
trading data is obtained from the Commodity Research Bureau. Natural gas futures 
contracts, which began trading on the NYMEX on April 3, 1990, trade in units of 
10,000 million British thermal units (mmBTu).  
Futures prices are used in place of spot prices for the following reasons. First, 
the NYMEX natural gas futures price is widely used as a national benchmark price. 
Natural gas futures prices are also the prices reported in newspapers. Second, the 
futures market for natural gas is liquid and centralized while spot markets are localized 
and illiquid. Third, futures prices are the prices normally used in most risk 
management contracts such as swaps and options. 
I use two measures of daily natural gas volatility in this study. The first 
volatility measure is based on a GARCH type model. In this framework, I use daily 
log returns24 defined as rt=ln(Pt/Pt-1) wherein Pt is the closing price of the nearby 
futures contract on day t and Pt-1 is the price of the same contract the previous day. As 
traders often cover their positions on the last trading day of a contract’s life, trading 
volume and open interest decline and price volatility increases substantially on that 
day. To avoid this “thin market” problem, I replace the return of the nearest contract 
on the last trading day of each month with that of the second nearest contract in 
constructing the rt 
                                                     
24The daily natural gas “returns” are used to measure price changes only. These “returns” are 
not investment returns since no money is actually invested.    
series.  
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To check the robustness of the GARCH type estimation results, I utilize a 
second volatility measure which is the extreme value estimator developed by 
Parkinson (1980) and used in numerous studies including Wiggins (1992), Martens 
and Van Dijk (2007) and Cao, Chang and Wang (2008), among others.  In the extreme 
value method, intraday volatility on day t is calculated as:  
( ) ,
)2ln(4
)ln()ln( 2tt
t
LowHighVariance −=  
where tHigh  and tLow  denote the highest and lowest prices of the nearby futures 
contract on day t, respectively. As Parkinson (1980) shows, this measure can be used 
as an estimator of the variance of the price if the latter follows a random walk with 
zero drift.25
Table IV provides summary statistics for daily returns and extreme value 
estimator of volatility on natural gas nearby futures contracts. The annualized standard 
deviation of the daily percentage change in nearby natural gas prices over the January 
1997-December 2008 period is 62.19%, indicating that this market is characterized by 
very high volatility. Table IV shows preliminary evidence of volatility persistence in 
that the first-order autocorrelation coefficients for absolute returns and for extreme 
value estimator of volatility are positive and significant at the 0.01 level. For squared 
returns (not reported), the first-order autocorrelation coefficient is also significantly 
positive at the 0.001 level. Clearly, the natural gas market, like many others, is 
characterized by volatility persistence.  
  
                                                     
25Wiggins (1991, 1992) document that the efficiency of the extreme value estimator 
significantly exceeds that of the close-to-close estimator of volatility. 
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3.2 Natural gas storage data 
I collect the actual storage announcement data from various issues of the 
Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report issued by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). The Storage Report was compiled and released by the 
American Gas Association (AGA) prior to April 10, 2002 and by the EIA since then. 
The report contains the actual level of natural gas in storage and change in the level in 
storage in three regions, consuming east, consuming west, and producing region, as of 
each Friday. The report was released on Wednesday (prior to May 06, 2002) or 
Thursday (after May 06, 2002) of the subsequent week. 
Several years after the first storage report in 1994, analysts from the consulting 
industry, production companies and investment banks began providing their weekly 
forecasts of storage changes and the implied storage levels to be released in the 
storage report. To facilitate the public dissemination of these analyst forecasts, 
Bloomberg, a major market information vendor, solicits forecasts from analysts, 
computes a consensus estimate and publishes this information electronically in 
advance of the release of the storage report26
                                                     
26The Bloomberg survey procedure is summarized in Gay, Simkins and Turac (2007) as 
follows. By Tuesday of each week, a Bloomberg employee calls each analyst or receives an 
email containing the analyst’s forecast. Many analysts provide a range for their estimated 
change in storage. In these cases, Bloomberg uses the midpoint of the range. Bloomberg then 
computes a “consensus estimate” based on the arithmetic average of the analyst forecasts. The 
first Bloomberg estimate of each week is typically prepared and released on Tuesday morning 
when at least one half of the analysts have reported. Updates are released if additional 
forecasts are received.  
. The Bloomberg survey of predicted 
changes in storage is generally regarded as the best available amongst practitioners 
and represents the forecasts that are most readily available to market participants 
(Chiou-Wei, Linn and Zhu, 2007 and Gay, Simkins and Turac, 2007). Following 
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Chiou-Wei et al. (2007) and Gay et al. (2007), I assume that the natural gas market 
participants condition their expectation of the weekly storage change to equal the 
Bloomberg consensus analyst forecast. Consequently, I use the survey data available 
on Thursday morning prior to the release of the EIA report as a proxy for the market’s 
expectation of natural gas storage change before the announcement. 
3.3 Weather data 
Weather data are obtained from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), a 
division of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
Department of Commerce. Following the industry convention I control for weather 
conditions using two measures. A Cooling Degree Day (CDD) is one for which the 
actual temperature minus 65 degrees F is greater than zero. The calendar day is 
assigned the value of the difference when this is the case and 0 otherwise. A Heating 
Degree Day (HDD) occurs when 65 degrees F minus the actual temperature is greater 
than zero. The calendar day is assigned the degree difference when this condition is 
met and 0 otherwise. Therefore, each day receives both a CDD measure and a HDD 
measure. My dataset contains variables measuring daily actual temperature and the 
data on normal condition which is defined as the previous 30 years’ average 
temperature as of the date of relevance. Weather data are obtained from the weather 
reporting stations in the following main consumption regions: Chicago, New York, 
Atlanta, and Dallas.  
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4. Model Specification and Analysis 
In order to test and quantify the determinants of natural gas volatility as 
discussed in section 2, I estimate a model in which the conditional variance follows a 
multiplicative GARCH type process:  
rt = μ +a1Oilrett +a2CddDift + a3HddDift {+}+a4 HddDift {- }+a5SRFEt ∑
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The purpose of equation 10 (the mean equation) is to remove predictable 
changes in natural gas returns thereby obtaining the surprise return ε
)    
 (13.e) 
t whose volatility 
is examined in the study. The specification of the mean equation is motivated by 
Chiou-Wei et al. (2007) and Mu (2007) who find that (1) changes in natural gas prices 
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are statistically significantly and positively related to changes in crude oil prices (2) 
weather shock, which is a proxy for natural gas demand, tends to have some impact on 
natural gas prices, and (3) natural gas prices strongly react to the “surprise” 
component in the natural gas storage report.  
In equation 10, rt is the log percentage change in price of the nearby natural 
gas futures contract on day t; Oilrett is the log percentage change in price of the 
nearby crude oil futures contract on day t; CddDift is the difference between the actual 
Cooling Degree Day measure and the 30-year average CDD measure for day t; 
HddDift is the difference between the actual Heating Degree Day measure and the 30-
year normal HDD measure for day t, HddDift {+} = HddDift if HddDift > 0 and 0 
otherwise, HddDift {-} = HddDift if HddDift <0 and 0 otherwise; SRFEt is the surprise 
in the change in storage which is defined as the actual storage change as reported in 
the EIA storage survey minus the consensus expected storage change as reported by 
Bloomberg prior to the EIA report release; DWi,t
The mean equation is not the focus of the paper. My main interest is in the 
determinants of the variance of the surprise natural gas return, ε
 are zero-one dummies for Monday 
(which includes the weekend), Wednesday, Thursday and Friday with Tuesday being 
the left-out day.  
t. I model this variance 
as a multiplicative function of an asymmetric GARCH function (equation 12), day-of-
the-week pattern (equation 13.a), storage announcement effect (equation 13.b), month-
of-the-year pattern (equation 13.c), temperature impact (equation 13.d), and bid week 
effect (equation 13.e).  
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4.1 Volatility Persistence and Asymmetric Volatility 
Equation 12 is the asymmetric GARCH model due to Glosten et al. (1993) 
often referred to as the GJR or TGARCH model in which It-1= 1 if ζt-1 <0 and 0 
otherwise. If volatility persistence is an attribute of the natural gas market, α and β 
should be significantly positive, implying that predicted volatility depends on both 
unexpected price changes and the previous day’s forecast volatility. Asymmetric 
volatility implies γ ≠ 0 in equation 12; γ < 0 implies that a positive shock increases 
conditional volatility more than an equivalent negative shock. 
4.2 Seasonality patterns, storage announcement, weather, and bid week 
effects  
  
Equation 13, the transitory effects equation, estimates the impact of other 
hypothesized determinants on volatility.  
Equation 13(a) estimates the day-of-the-week pattern in natural gas volatility. 
DWi,t are zero-one dummies for Monday (which includes the weekend), Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday with Tuesday being the left-out day. λi estimates the average 
percentage difference between volatility on day i and volatility on Tuesday. In other 
words, assuming that s2,t= s3,t= s4,t= s5,t= 1, then the estimated variance on Tuesday is 
ht. On Monday, the estimated variance is ht(1+λM). On Wednesday, the estimated 
variance is ht(1+λW) and so on for other days. If the natural gas market is impacted by 
news occurring over the weekend, Monday return (which is a three-day return 
including the weekend) should be more volatile than any normal weekday return and 
λM >0. Also, if the Natural Gas Storage Report contains price moving information, 
volatility should be higher on days the report is released. I do not include a separate 
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dummy variable for storage report announcement days in equation 13 because, since 
this announcement is released weekly, I cannot separate its impact from other possible 
weekly factors. When testing for day-of-the-week volatility pattern, I anticipate that 
this weekly announcement will be part of the reason for the pattern.  
Equation 13(b) tests the hypothesis that natural gas volatility is sensitive to the 
surprise in the change in natural gas in storage. The level of natural gas in storage and 
the change in natural gas in storage often receive a high amount of attention because 
they are widely considered as a measure of supply and demand balance in the market 
(EIA Publication, 2007; Mu, 2007). For example, a low inventory of working gas than 
the market’s expectation may create a perception of supply tightness, which places 
upward pressure on prices. Chiou-Wei, Linn and Zhu (2007) find an inverse relation 
between the change in storage surprise (actual change minus expected change) and 
futures price change on the days of the EIA storage announcement.  
Following Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001), and Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold and Vega (2003), I define the standardized change in storage surprise as: 
SR
t
t s
SRFE
SSRFE =  where SRFEt
SRs
 is the surprise in the change in storage = the actual 
storage change (reported in the EIA report) - the consensus expected storage change 
(reported by Bloomberg prior to the EIA report release) and is the sample standard 
deviation of tSRFE . I do not include separate variables for positive surprise and 
negative surprise because Chiou-Wei et al. (2007) find no evidence that natural gas 
prices respond differently to positive surprises as compared to negative surprises. The 
variable SRt is then defined as: SRt = SSRFEt on days the storage report announcement 
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is released and SRt 
 In equation 13(c), DM
= 1 on other days since Chiou-Wei et al. (2007) find that the 
market’s assessment of the level of natural gas in storage (as measured by the 
difference between the consensus Bloomberg forecast and the 5-year average volume) 
is unrelated to the price change on non-announcement days. If larger storage surprises 
are associated with larger futures price changes, κ should be > 0. 
i,t=1 if the futures contract observed on day t expires in 
month i. θi ≠ 0 imply a month-of-the-year volatility pattern. In equation 13(d), Wt= 1 
if the difference between the actual Heating Degree Day measure and the 30-year 
normal HDD measure for day t (HddDift) is < 0 and Wt= 0 otherwise. I do not include 
dummy variables for days when CddDift ≠ 0 or when HddDift > 0 since results from 
the mean equation do not indicate that CddDift and HddDift {+} 
Equation 13(e) estimates the behavior of natural gas volatility around bid 
week. BW
have significant impact 
on natural gas prices.  
t is 1 if day t is one of the last five trading days in a month and 0 otherwise. 
I hypothesize above that δ0 >0. I also include ABWt as dummy for the day after the bid 
week. If prices and volumes set during bid week leak from contract signings rather 
than being available to market participants at the same time as for scheduled 
announcements, part of the bid week information is not public knowledge until right 
after bid week. Therefore, volatility should increase when all information becomes 
public and δ1 
4.3 Comparison with Previous Models 
>0.  
My model improves on that used in several previous studies for natural gas and 
other markets which seek to simultaneously estimate both GARCH and other 
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determinants of volatility. The introduction of a transitory volatility equation st into 
the specification enables me to implement a much cleaner study of the determinants of 
volatility than when announcement and/or day-of-the-week dummies are added to the 
variance equation. For instance, Hsieh (1989), Berument and Kiymaz (2001), 
Ederington and Lee (2001) and Lee (2002) use GARCH type models to examine day-
of-the-week effects on volatility in the foreign exchange, stock, and interest rates 
markets and Murry and Zhu (2004) in the natural gas market. In those studies, 
weekday dummies are in the ht equation (equation 12) and the coefficient estimates 
reflect how conditional volatility changes across weekdays. Thus, using their model, 
there is no st
h
 equation (equation 13) and equation 12 becomes: 
t = ω + αεt-12 + βht-1 +λMDWM,t +λWDWW,t +λRDWR,t +λFDWF,t
In equation 14, since weekday dummies are in the h
,                                 
(14) 
t equation, the dummy for any day 
of the week impacts volatilities on all days of the week through the ht-1 term on the 
right hand side of the equation. Suppose, for instance, that day t is Monday. 
∂ht/∂DWM,t = λM
h
. Now consider the impact of the Monday dummy on volatility on 
Tuesday (day t+1). Since 
t+1 = ω + αεt2 +βht+λMDWM,t+1+λWDWW,t+1+λRDWR,t+1+λFDWF,t+1
∂h
,                          
(14) 
t+1/∂DWM,t = (∂ht+1/∂ht)(∂ht/∂DWM,t) = βλM. Likewise, the Monday dummy impact 
on the Wednesday’s volatility is ∂ ht+2/∂DWM,t = β2λM.  Therefore, when weekday 
dummies are in the ht equation, as in equation 14, λM does not measure how much 
higher volatility is on Monday than on the omitted day (Tuesday).  Indeed, depending 
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on the coefficient pattern, day X which has the highest λX
In contrast, a specification which separates the variance of returns into a 
persistent part, equation 12, and a non-persistent part, equation 13, allows me to 
estimate a model in which any weekday dummy impacts that day’s volatility only. For 
example, λ
 coefficient may not be the 
day with the highest volatility.   
M measures how much higher (or lower) in percentage terms the volatility is 
on Monday than on the omitted day (Tuesday) and λW 
To estimate the announcement impacts on volatility, several previous studies, 
for example, Hsieh (1989), Berument and Kiymaz (2001), Ederington and Lee (2001), 
De Goeij and Marquering (2006) for other markets and Mu (2007) for the natural gas 
market, add an announcement dummy to the h
measures how much higher (or 
lower) the volatility is on Wednesday and so on.  
t equation and do not include the st
h
 
equation. Thus, the variance equation becomes:  
t =  ω+ αεt-12+βht-1+ δ0DAt,             
In equation 15, an unscheduled shock on day t-1 impacts volatility on day t through 
the term αε
(15) 
t-1
2. However, since an announcement impact is forced to persist on the 
subsequent days (∂ht/∂DAt = δ0, ∂ht+1/∂DAt = (∂ht+1/∂ht)(∂ht/∂DAt) = βδ0, ∂ht+2/∂DAt 
= β2δ0 and so on), the impact of a shock due to scheduled announcement on day t-1 on 
volatility on day t includes not only αεt-12 but also βδ0
κσ =∂∂ )/ln( 2 tt SR
. Consequently, models like 
equation 15 impose much higher persistence for shocks due to scheduled 
announcements than for equivalent shocks due to unscheduled announcements. In 
contrast, in my model, the impact of a shock due to storage announcement does not 
persist on the following days and ln( 2 1tσ +∂ )/∂SRt =0 and therefore, 
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the estimated impact of a shock on day t-1 on volatility on subsequent days t is the 
same for scheduled and unscheduled announcements.  
5. Results 
Since the data of analysts’ forecast of natural gas storage is available in 
Bloomberg starting May 03, 2002, I estimate the specification (10-13) without storage 
surprise variables in the mean and variance equations for the sample period January 
1997-December 2008 and estimate the full specification (10-13) for the sub-period 
May 2002-December 2008. The last three columns of Panel A and Panel B in Table V 
present the results for the 1997-2008, 1997-2002 and 2002-2008 periods, respectively.  
5.1 The mean equation 
Consistent with the findings in Chiou-Wei et al. (2007) and in Mu (2007), 
natural gas returns are statistically significantly and positively related to crude oil 
returns. There is no significant evidence that departure from normal weather 
conditions in the summer (CddDif) and on winter days when the temperature is higher 
than normal (HddDif{+}) have significant impact on natural gas prices. However, 
departure from the norm on winter days when the temperature is lower than normal 
(HddDif{-}) tends to have a negative impact on natural gas prices. For the period 
05/2002-12/2008, the estimated coefficient for SRFEt is negative and significantly 
different from zero at the 0.001 level, implying that natural gas prices tend to increase 
on days the EIA releases news of a lower than expected gas in storage and tend to 
decrease on news of a higher than expected gas in storage. This result is consistent 
with the findings in Chiou-Wei et al. (2007) and in Mu (2007). There is no significant 
evidence of a day-of-the-week effect in natural gas prices for the sample period 1997-
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2008 but for the sub-period 05/2002-12/2008, natural gas prices tend to decline on 
Thursday and Friday.  
5.2 Volatility Persistence and Asymmetric Volatility  
As expected, there is evidence of volatility persistence in the natural gas 
market. The estimates of α and β are positive and significant at the 0.001 level, 
implying that predicted volatility depends on both previous shocks and previous 
volatilities. Hence, highly volatile periods in the natural gas market tend to be 
followed by volatile periods in the future and this is consistent with the findings in 
Murry and Zhu (2004) and Mu (2007). However, while Murry and Zhu (2004) and Mu 
(2007) find no evidence of asymmetric volatility in the natural gas market, the 
estimated γ in my model is significantly negative, indicating that volatility increases 
considerably more following a sudden increase in natural gas prices than following an 
equal sudden decrease in prices. As hypothesized earlier, the behavior of natural gas 
volatility could mostly be explained by the likely shape of the supply and demand 
curves. Since the same fluctuation in demand when prices are low should cause a 
smaller change in prices than when prices are high, a positive price shock which 
moves the natural gas market up the supply and demand curves is likely to presage 
higher future volatility than a negative shock moving the market down the curves.   
Figure 7(a) plots different impacts of equal positive and negative shocks on 
predicted volatility according to the estimates from the model (10-13) presented in the 
third column of Panel B in Table V. Suppose that the conditional variance, ht-
1 -1( )tζ=Var is at its steady-state level. According to the estimates in the model, the 
conditional variance for day t falls 8% if there was no price change on day t-1, 
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increases 5.97% if the price fell 15%, and increases 21.03% if the price increased 
15%.  
Figure 8 presents the impact of a two-standard deviation natural gas return 
shock on subsequent predicted volatilities. Suppose the conditional variance, ht-
1 t-1( )ζ=Var is at its steady-state level and there is a shock such that 
2
t-1ζ = 4Var t-1( )ζ . 
Figure 8 demonstrates the percentage difference in expected volatility on day t+x and 
on day t-1, t+x
t-1
Var ( ) -1
Var ( )
ζ
ζ
 
 
 
, assuming E( 2t+xζ ) = Var( t xζ + ) for x > -1 and that negative 
and positive return shocks are equally likely. For example, the conditional volatility is 
about 14% higher the day after the shock and 7% a week later.  
In the second column of Panel B in Table V, I present estimates of a GJR 
model as it would normally be estimated, i.e., without storage announcement, 
seasonality, bid week and weather effects. In other words, I estimate a model 
consisting of equations (10-12) only. A comparison of the estimates of the GJR model 
(in the second column) and those of the full model (in the third column) indicates that 
determinants of volatility other than volatility persistence and asymmetry are 
important when modeling volatility in the natural gas market. The likelihood ratio test 
statistics is 338.174 with 18 degrees of freedom and therefore, the null hypothesis that 
there are no announcement, seasonality, bid week and weather effects is rejected at the 
0.001 level. In addition, the estimates of α and (α+γ) in the GJR model are 
significantly higher than those in the full model. Apparently, failing to control for 
announcement, seasonality, bid week and weather effects leads to overestimation of 
the impact of a surprise return shock on subsequent volatility, and the estimate of the 
resulting percentage overestimation is 78.76%. (Assuming negative and positive 
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shocks are equally likely, the estimated average impact of a day t return shock on 
volatility on day t+1 is α+.5γ. The overestimation is measured as: (Ewo/ Ew)-1 where 
Ewo represents the estimates of α+.5γ in the second column of Table V where I do not 
control for these effects and Ew
Figure 7(b) plots different impacts of equal positive and negative shocks on 
predicted volatility according to the estimates from the GJR and the full models. 
Again, suppose the conditional variance, h
 those in the third column where I do).  
t-1 t-1( )ζ=Var is at its steady-state level. 
According to the estimates in the GJR model, the conditional variance for day t 
increases 20.25% if the price fell 15%, and increases 25.20% if the price increased 
15% while according to the estimates in the full model, the increase in conditional 
variance for day t are 5.97% and 21.03%, respectively.  
To test whether the omission of announcement, seasonality, bid week or 
weather effects is responsible for this overestimation, I estimate the full model (10-13) 
dropping equation 13.b and just one of the equations (13.a, 13.c, 13.d or 13.e). When I 
estimate the model dropping equation 13.c, the estimates of equation 12 are virtually 
unchanged from those in the second column and the overestimation of the impact of a 
surprise return shock on subsequent volatility is roughly 60%. Therefore, failing to 
control for a month-of-the-year pattern in natural gas volatility is the main cause of the 
overestimation.  
5.3 Day-of-the-week and Storage announcement 
The null hypothesis that λMonday=λWednesday=λThursday=λFriday is rejected at the 
0.01 level with the χ2 test statistics of 108.90 and 3 degrees of freedom, implying a 
significant day-of-the-week pattern in natural gas volatility. Since Tuesday is the left-
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out dummy, the coefficients in Panel B of Table V measure the difference between 
average volatility on each weekday and on Tuesday. Contrary to the findings in some 
other markets27
As expected, Monday return (including weekend) tends to be more volatile 
than any normal weekday return. During the 1997-2008 period, the variance of the 
Friday-close-to-Monday-close return is 87.72% higher than that of Tuesday return at 
the 0.001 level. Apparently, the natural gas market is impacted by sorts of news 
occurring during the weekend such as weather news.  
, there is no significant evidence that natural gas volatility increases on 
Friday. This may be due to the fact that important economic news for other markets is 
often released on Friday whereas this is not the case in the natural gas market. Indeed, 
Friday tends to be the lowest volatility day of the week in this market.  
Thursday has the second-highest coefficient estimate during the 1997-2008 
period. Since the Natural Gas Storage Report was released on Wednesdays before 
May 06, 2002 (by the American Gas Association) and on Thursdays (by the EIA) 
since then, I examine the day-of-the-week volatility pattern before and after May 06, 
2002. Results in the fourth column of Panel B in Table V indicate that during the 
01/1997-05/2002 sub-period, Thursday is associated with the second-highest 
coefficient estimate. The variance of Thursday return is 28.48% higher than that of 
Tuesday at the 0.05 level. Apparently, although Wednesday is the release day of the 
Storage Report in this period, there is no significant evidence that natural gas volatility 
is higher on Wednesday than on other days of the week. This is explained by the fact 
                                                     
27For example, Harvey and Huang (1991) reported higher volatility in interest rate and foreign 
exchange futures market on Friday. Ederington and Lee (1993) further supported these results. 
Jones et al. (1998) and Berument and Kiymaz (2001) found similar evidence for the bond and 
stock markets. 
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that prior to March 2, 2000, the AGA Storage Report was announced after the close of 
NYMEX trading on Wednesday and from March 2000 to May 2002 it was released at 
the interval of 2:00-2:15 pm on Wednesday during NYMEX trading hours. Therefore, 
even though the Storage Report was announced on Wednesday prior to March 2000, 
apparently storage news from the report did not arrive in the market until the 
following day. 
Results in the fifth column of Panel B in Table V indicate that during the 
05/2002-12/2008 sub-period, the variance of Thursday return is 67.60% higher than 
that of Tuesday at the 0.01 level. Linn and Zhu (2004) and Murry and Zhu (2004) find 
that the high Thursday volatility is caused by the Natural Gas Storage Report 
announcement which is released on Thursday (except for holidays) since May 2002. 
However, if the Storage Report is the only cause of the increased volatility on 
Thursday, estimates from specification (10-13) should indicate no evidence of higher 
volatility on Thursday as the specification also controls for the impact of storage 
report on volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). Therefore, evidence of both 
higher Thursday volatility and significant impact of storage report implies that the 
market is impacted by other news on Thursday other than that from the storage report. 
Since May 2002, the EIA releases the Natural Gas Weekly Update at 2:00 pm in 
addition to the Storage Report (which is released at 10:30 am), both on Thursday. The 
Weekly Update summarizes weather conditions, spot and futures prices and other 
market trends over the preceding week. Apparently, certain news in the Weekly 
Update such as rig counts or transportation update is relevant to the natural gas 
market.  
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As mentioned above, the level of working gas in storage often receives a high 
amount of attention in the natural gas market since it is widely considered as a 
measure of supply and demand balance in the market (Linn and Zhu, 2004; Chiou-Wei 
et al., 2007). Consistent with the findings in Chiou-Wei et al. (2007) regarding the 
impact of storage surprises on natural gas prices, results in the last column of Panel B 
in Table V indicate that storage surprise has a significantly positive impact on natural 
gas volatility. During the winter months (withdrawal season), news about a storage 
level which is lower (higher) than the market’s expectation indicates a low (high) 
natural gas supply which causes upward (downward) pressure on market prices. 
During the refill season, news about a storage level which is lower (higher) than the 
market’s expectation may increase (decrease) uncertainty regarding whether storage 
supplies will be sufficient to meet peak demand needs over the following winter. 
While not surprising given the findings in Linn and Zhu (2004) and in Chiou-Wei et 
al. (2007), results in my estimation show a significant evidence of increased natural 
gas volatility in response to storage surprise when I control for the higher Thursday 
volatility often associated with storage announcement.  
5.4 Time-of-the-year pattern and Weather effect 
Consistent with my earlier hypothesis, natural gas volatility exhibits a strong 
seasonality (Figure 9). The null hypothesis that  θJan= θFeb=θMarch=θApril=θMay= 
θJuly= θAugust=θSept=θOctober=θNovember=θDecember is rejected at the 0.01 level with the χ2 
test statistics of 23.93 and 10 degrees of freedom, implying that natural gas volatility 
significantly differs by month of the year.  
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Volatility tends to be highest from October through February. As heating needs 
dominate the market from December through February (Fleming, Kirby and Ostdiek, 
2006), demand for natural gas may rise sharply during these months and at the same 
time, natural gas supply is essentially fixed due to storage constraint. Consequently, 
the inelasticity of natural gas supply and demand can cause large price swings in order 
to balance supply and demand in cold winter. As November is the first month of the 
heating season28
Surprisingly October tends to have the highest volatility in a year. During 
October, the last month of the injection season, storage capacity owners may be 
competing heavily to inject natural gas for the winter season. This increased 
competition from storage facilities looking to meet injection refill goals is often 
coupled with uncertainty regarding whether or not there will be sufficient supplies to 
meet heating needs in the upcoming heating season (EIA’s Publication, 2007). 
, decisions made during this month tend to impact the volumes in 
storage for the rest of the upcoming heating season. Since natural gas suppliers are 
uncertain about the supply and demand later in the winter whose overall severity is 
unknown this early in the withdrawal season, fluctuations in demands are not 
necessarily met readily with working gas in storage (EIA’s Publication, 2007). 
Consequently, price spikes may occur during this month.  
The more mild spring and summer months exhibit the lowest average levels of 
natural gas volatility. During March and April, the peak winter demand is generally 
complete and thus, there is less uncertainty regarding supply and demand imbalance 
(EIA’s Publication, 2007). Although winter-like temperatures sometimes persist into 
                                                     
28Using data reported in the EIA’s Natural Gas Weekly Storage Report (various issues), I 
determine that natural gas withdrawals normally begin in November and end in March.  
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April, it is during this month that natural gas activities tend to switch from storage 
withdrawals towards storage injection29
Overall, there is a strong month-of-the-year pattern in natural gas volatility. 
During the winter months, both supply and demand are relatively inelastic and 
therefore, natural gas prices tend to swing more in order to balance supply and 
demand. Given that natural gas supplies may not keep pace with the increased demand 
or a prediction of high demand may not materialize because of mild weather during 
winter season, months with higher levels of market tightness and/or market 
uncertainty often exhibit higher volatility. 
.  
The coefficient estimate of κ is positive and significant at the 0.01 level 
implying that natural gas volatility tends to be higher on winter days when the average 
temperature in the main consumption regions falls below the 30-year average and this 
result is robust after controlling for month-of-the-year pattern.  
5.5 Bid week effect 
There is strong evidence that volatility in the natural gas futures market 
increases during bid week. For the 1997-2008 period, the estimated average volatility 
increase during the last five trading days of the month relative to other days is 65.92%, 
which is significant at the 0.01 level. As hypothesized above, this increased volatility 
during bid week is attributable to two reasons. First, as the bids of marketers for 
natural gas to be delivered for the coming month are revealed and spot contracts are 
signed, this sort of news contains information which moves prices in the futures 
market. Second, the first three trading days of the bid week could be a high volatility 
                                                     
29Using data reported in the EIA’s Natural Gas Weekly Storage Report (various issues), I 
determine that natural gas injections normally begin in April. 
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period for the futures market as the nearby futures contract is expiring and traders are 
having to reverse their positions.  
There is also significant evidence that natural gas volatility increases on the 
day following bid week (the first trading day of a month). As mentioned above, bid 
week news differs from scheduled announcement in that while the latter is available to 
all market participants at the same expected time, prices and volumes being set during 
bid week leak from contract signings and therefore, part of this information may not 
be public knowledge until the following day. Therefore, volatility could continue to be 
higher following bid week as this information becomes public. Results from an 
expanded specification with dummy variables for both the first and the second trading 
days of a month (not reported) show no significant evidence that volatility continues to 
increase on the second day. Apparently, all bid week news arrive in the futures market 
and market participants complete price adjustments by the end of the first trading day 
of a month. 
6. Robustness check 
The results documented in sections 5 are obtained from the estimation of a 
GARCH-type specification. To test the validity of these results, I use a different 
measure of volatility, the extreme value estimator developed by Parkinson (1980) and 
used in numerous studies including Wiggins (1992), Martens and Van Dijk (2007) and 
Cao, Chang and Wang (2008), among others. The extreme value estimator of volatility 
on day t is calculated as: ( ) ,
)2ln(4
)ln()ln( 2tt
t
LowHighVariance −=  where tHigh and tLow  
denote the highest and the lowest prices on day t, respectively.  
From the hypotheses in Section 2, I develop the following specification: 
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Pt is the price of the nearby futures contract on day t and Pt-1
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 is the price of the same 
contract the previous day. = εt-1 if εt-1 }{ 1−−tε > 0 and 0 otherwise; = εt-1 if εt-1 < 0 and 
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 is the residual from the mean equation, equation 10:  
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SR =
 are zero-one dummies for Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday with 
Tuesday being the left-out day. on days the storage report announcement 
is released and 0 otherwise where SRFEt
SRs
 is the surprise in the change in storage = the 
actual storage change (reported in the EIA report) - the consensus expected storage 
change (reported by Bloomberg prior to the EIA report release) and is the sample 
standard deviation of tSRFE . DMk,t=1 if the futures contract observed on day t 
expires in month k. Wt = 1 if the difference between the actual Heating Degree Day 
measure and the 30-year normal HDD measure for day t (HddDift) is < 0 and Wt= 0 
otherwise. BWt is 1 if day t is one of the last five trading days in a month and 0 
otherwise. ABWt =1 if day t is the first trading day in a month. 
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−
= , tOilHigh and tOilLow  denote the highest and 
the lowest prices of the nearby crude oil futures contract on day t, respectively.  
Equation (16) is estimated by OLS with Newey and West (1987) correction for 
both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Results are presented in Table VI. 
Consistent with the results in Section 5.2, there is significant evidence of volatility 
persistence when volatility is estimated by the extreme-value method. The coefficients 
of the five lagged Std are positive and significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that high 
volatility days tend to be followed by high volatility days and low volatility days tend 
to be followed by low volatility days. There is evidence that a positive return shock 
leads to higher Std at the 0.05 level but there is no significant evidence that a negative 
shock leads to higher Std, indicating that natural gas volatility is more responsive to 
previous positive shocks than to negative shocks.  
The null hypotheses that 'Mondayλ =
'
Wednesdayλ =
'
Thursdayλ =
'
Fridayλ = 0 and 
'
Janθ = 
'
Febθ  
= 'Marchθ =
'
Aprilθ    =
'
Mayθ =
'
Julyθ =
'
Augustθ =
'
Septθ =
'
Octθ =
'
Novθ =
'
Decθ =0 are both rejected at the 
0.01 level, indicating a day-of-the-week and time-of-the-year patterns in natural gas 
volatility as documented in Section 5. There is no significant evidence that Monday is 
the highest volatility day when volatility is measured by the extreme value method. 
Apparently, the high Monday/weekend volatility as documented in Section 5.3 is 
mainly attributable to the accumulation of information over the weekend. Thursday 
tends to be the most volatile day of the week which is consistent with the fact that 
Thursday is the release day of the storage report after May 2002 and was the day news 
about storage report came into the market before April 2000. Over the 1997-2008 
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sample period, there is significant evidence at the 0.05 level that natural gas volatility, 
as measured by the extreme value method, is higher on winter days with a lower than 
normal temperature and on days during the bid week. However, there is no significant 
evidence that volatility is higher on days immediately following the bid week. 
Consistent with the findings in Section 5, natural gas volatility tends to be high for 
futures contracts expiring in the months from September to March. There is significant 
evidence that volatility in the crude oil market has a positive impact on natural gas 
volatility which is consistent with the findings above that crude oil prices is a 
significant predictor of natural gas prices. 
The last two columns in Table VI present the estimation results for the May 
2002- December 2008 sub-period and these results are similar to those for the entire 
sample period. The coefficient estimate of 'κ is positive and significant at the 0.01 
level, which is consistent with the findings above that surprises in the change in 
natural gas in storage has a positive impact on volatility.  
7. Summary and Conclusions 
The contribution this paper makes is to provide an empirical examination of 
the causes and behavior of price volatility in the natural gas market.  Daily returns data 
from January 1997 through December 2008 are used to estimate a multiplicative 
GARCH type model. This model, which separates volatility into a persistent part and a 
non-persistent part, allows me to implement a much cleaner study of the determinants 
of natural gas volatility than that used in some previous studies.  
The natural gas market is characterized by volatility persistence where highly 
volatile periods are followed by highly volatile periods and stable periods are followed 
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by stable ones. I find that a positive shock in the natural gas market has more impact 
on predicted volatility than an equivalent negative shock. There is a day-of-the-week 
pattern in natural gas volatility. Monday return (including weekend) is more volatile 
than any other weekday return. The high weekend/Monday volatility is mainly due to 
the accumulation of information over the weekend. In contrast to the findings for some 
financial markets, Friday is the lowest volatility day in this market. Volatility tends to 
increase on Thursday which is attributable to the announcement of the Weekly Natural 
Gas Storage Report and Natural Gas Update. The “surprise” news about the level of 
natural gas in storage has a significantly positive impact on natural gas volatility.  
There is a strong time-of-the-year volatility pattern in that volatility tends to be 
highest from October through February, which is likely caused by the inelasticity of 
natural gas supply and demand during winter. Volatility also tends to be high on 
winter days when the temperature is lower than normal. Natural gas volatility tends to 
increase during bid week as news on prices and volumes being set in the spot market 
leaks to the futures market and continues to be higher on the day immediately 
following the bid week when all bid week news becomes public.  
To check the robustness of the above findings, I estimate a different 
specification wherein volatility is measured by the extreme-value method. Results 
from the robustness check indicate that (1) natural gas volatility is significantly 
determined by volatility level on previous days, (2) a positive return shock has a 
significantly positive impact on volatility, (3) there are day-of-the-week and time-of-
the-year patterns in volatility, (4) “surprise” news about the change in natural gas in 
storage has a significantly positive impact on volatility, (5) volatility tends to increase 
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during bid week and (6) crude oil volatility has a significantly positive impact on 
natural gas volatility.  
 73 
 
Chapter IV. Implied Volatility in the Crude Oil and Natural Gas Markets 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores the structure, characteristics, and determinants of implied 
volatilities calculated from crude oil and natural gas call options traded on the New 
York Mercantile Exchange (NYME) from September 1999 through June 2006. 
According to financial theory, implied volatility, the volatility that equates the 
theoretical price of an option according to an option pricing formula with the observed 
market price, reflects the market’s expectation of future volatility over the life of the 
option and therefore, an understanding of the cause and behavior of implied volatility 
is essential to market participants.  
The markets for crude oil and natural gas derivatives contracts are becoming 
increasingly important due to the impact of energy on the economy and the high 
volatility in oil and gas prices. Crude oil and natural gas are two of the most essential 
energy sources in the U.S., accounting for about 40% and 25% of the nation’s energy 
consumption, respectively. Since OPEC’s 1973 decision to regulate its oil price 
independently, crude oil prices have been subject to dramatic volatility. Natural gas is 
also one of the most volatile markets, particularly since its evolution from a highly 
regulated market to a largely deregulated market in which prices are driven by supply 
and demand. In 2007, the annualized standard deviation of the daily percentage 
change in prices was 31.33% for crude oil and 49.94% for natural gas. By comparison, 
that number was only 4.08% for the US dollar-Euro exchange rate, 16.37% for the 
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S&P 500 and 19.10% for the 10-year T-bond interest rates30
The empirical properties associated with implied volatility calculated from 
option prices have been a subject of intense research activity in recent decades. The 
vast majority of the research on implied volatility has focused on financial options 
markets such as the stock, stock index, interest rate, Eurodollar, T-Bond futures and 
foreign exchange options markets. In contrast to the literature on equity and other 
financial options, research on crude oil and natural gas options markets has been quite 
sparse despite the fact that energy prices tend to be more volatile than most other 
prices and that oil and gas options have become more heavily traded. For instance, in a 
well-known and comprehensive study of the volatility literature, Poon and Granger 
(2003) survey 52 articles examining implied volatilities in all sorts of options markets; 
only 3 of these include crude oil among the volatilities they examine (Day and Lewis, 
1993; Szakmary, Ors and Kim, 2003 and Martens and Zein, 2004). Szakmary et al. 
(2003) is the only study on natural gas implied volatility in that survey. 
. This high variability in 
crude oil and natural gas prices makes it extremely difficult for consumers to forecast 
their costs and for producers to forecast their profits. The desire to protect market 
participants against such price fluctuations has led to the creation of and active trading 
in oil and gas risk management products such as swaps and options.  
My study is motivated by the limited nature of previous research on crude oil 
and natural gas implied volatilities. Day and Lewis (1993), Szakmary, Ors and Kim 
(2003), Martens and Zein (2004), and Doran and Ronn (2006) focus on the forecasting 
                                                     
30The data for the crude oil and natural gas prices are from the Commodity Research Bureau. 
The data for the S&P 500, US dollar-Euro exchange rate, and the 10-year T-bond interest rates 
are from the CRSP database and the Federal Reserve website (http://www.federal 
reserve.gov). 
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performance of oil and gas IVs, i.e., testing (1) whether IV is an unbiased forecast of 
future volatility and (2) whether IV predicts future volatility better than historical 
volatility or GARCH-type forecast. Mahar, Peterson and Horan (2004) examine the 
behavior of crude oil IV surrounding OPEC meetings. None of these papers examine 
other attributes of crude oil and natural gas IVs such as whether IVs vary by strike 
price, by day-of-the-week or by time-of-the-year. This limitation is due to the data sets 
used in previous studies which only include IVs calculated from nearby at-the-money 
options. On the contrary, in this study, I construct a dataset that includes IVs across 
various strike prices for a range of terms to maturity. This comprehensive data set 
allows me to compare the behavior of IVs across different strike prices and terms to 
maturity and also to address other unexplored issues concerning the determinants of 
oil and gas IVs. Consequently, results in this study have implications for option 
traders who need to better understand the behavior of oil and gas IVs for valuation 
purposes.  
My results and contributions to the literature include the following. One, there 
is a term structure in crude oil and natural gas implied volatilities in that IVs tend to 
increase as the options approach expiration and this pattern is consistent across strike 
prices. This term structure pattern is opposite to that observed for the stock index, T-
bond and foreign exchange options markets where IVs tend to decrease as expiration 
approaches. While opposite to the pattern for IV in those financial options markets, the 
oil and gas IV term structure pattern is consistent with the actual volatility pattern for 
different maturity futures contracts. There is no evidence of a mean-reversion in oil 
and gas futures prices which could cause IVs to decline with maturity. Given this term 
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structure pattern, if a financial engineer uses the IV from nearby options, the IV that 
would normally be calculated, to value longer term options, the latter will tend to be 
overvalued.  
Two, crude oil and natural gas IVs tend to differ by strike price. Natural gas 
IVs exhibit a positive skew pattern in that IVs are higher for out-of-the-money calls 
than for at- and in-the-money calls. While the shape of the cross-sectional pattern is 
consistent across terms-to-maturity for natural gas options, it changes with term-to-
maturity for crude oil. For nearby and second-month crude oil options, IVs are highest 
for deep in- and out-of-the-money calls and lowest for moderately in-the-money calls. 
For third- and fourth-month options, IVs are lowest for deep in-the-money calls and 
increase monotonically with strike prices. The positive skew pattern in natural gas 
options and in longer term-to-maturity crude oil options is a rough mirror image of the 
negative skew pattern in post-1987 stock index options. Contrary to the theory that the 
“smile” and “smirk” patterns observed in Black-Scholes IVs (1973) are due to 
erroneous assumptions in the B-S model regarding the returns distribution, I find that 
the “smile” and positive “skew” patterns in crude oil and natural gas IVs are not 
caused by excess kurtosis or skewness in oil and gas return distribution. The hedging 
pressure hypothesis – in particular, hedgers buying out-of-the-money call options to 
protect against a sharp price increase, could partially explain the positive “skew” 
pattern in natural gas IVs. However, there is no evidence that the cross-sectional IV 
pattern in crude oil options is caused by hedging pressures in that market.  
Three, there is a time-of-the-year pattern in oil and gas IVs. I find that natural 
gas IVs are significantly higher on options expiring in the winter months than on those 
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expiring in other months. This seasonality effect is consistent with the high actual 
volatility in winter when demand for natural gas may increase dramatically and supply 
of natural gas is essentially fixed. Consequently, if a financial engineer uses the yearly 
average volatility to value natural gas options, he or she will tend to overestimate the 
values of options expiring in summer and underestimate the values of options expiring 
in winter. To a lesser extent, crude oil IVs are lower on options expiring in the 
summer months than on those expiring in other months.  
Four, crude oil and natural gas IVs exhibit a day-of-the-week pattern. 
Consistent with the findings for oil and gas actual volatilities, (1) IV significantly 
decreases from Friday close to Monday close indicating that weekend/Monday returns 
is more volatile than any weekday returns, and (2) after May 2002, natural gas IV 
tends to decline from Wednesday close to Thursday close, which is likely caused by 
the release of the Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report on Thursday. Contrary to earlier 
findings for actual volatilities, there is no significant evidence that crude oil IV 
declines following the release of the Petroleum Status Report and that natural gas IV 
declines following the release of the Storage Report prior to May 2002. 
Five, crude oil and natural gas IVs respond asymmetrically to positive and 
negative futures return shocks31
                                                     
31The futures “returns” are used to measure price changes throughout this study. These 
“returns” are not investment returns since no money is actually invested.    
. Crude oil IV tends to increase more following an 
unexpected negative return than a positive return of equal magnitude while natural gas 
IV tends to increase more following an unexpected positive return than an equal 
negative return. While it is left unexplained why crude oil IV increases more 
following a negative return shock, the finding that natural gas IV increases more 
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following a positive return shock is attributable to the hypothesized shape of the 
supply and demand curves which are likely to be inelastic at high volumes and prices. 
Given this inelasticity, the same fluctuation in demand when prices are low should 
cause a smaller change in prices than when prices are high and therefore, a positive 
price shock which moves the market up the supply and demand curves is likely to 
presage higher future volatility than a negative shock moving the market down the 
curves.   
 Six, although the unbiasedness of crude oil and natural gas IVs depends on 
term-to-maturity and moneyness of the options, IV is a fairly efficient forecast of 
future volatility in these markets. While the forecasting performance of oil and gas IVs 
from nearby at-the-money options has been the subject of previous research, I expand 
this strand in the literature by examining IV’s unbiasedness and efficiency across 
strike prices for a range of terms to maturity. This enables me to consequently explore 
the differences in the forecasting power of oil and gas IVs by strike price and maturity. 
Regression results indicate that the common practice of using IVs calculated from at-
the-money options to represent the volatility expectations of market participants is 
justifiable for oil and gas nearby options but not for longer term options.  
The chapter is organized as follows. The hypotheses are developed in the next 
Section. The data and sampling procedure are presented in Section 3. The term 
structure and the smile patterns are documented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the 
time-of-the-year and day-of-the-week patterns in implied volatility. Section 6 
documents the asymmetric impact of positive and negative return shocks on implied 
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volatility. The forecasting performance of implied volatility is reported in Section 7. 
Section 8 concludes the paper.  
2. Hypotheses 
In this study, I attempt to answer the following questions: 
First, is there a term structure pattern in crude oil and natural gas implied 
volatilities and, if so, what is the pattern and why? Several studies have examined the 
term structure of implied volatilities in the stock index, T-bond and currency options 
markets. It has been documented that IVs on stock index futures options generally 
decrease as the options get closer to expiration. Park and Sears (1985) find that IVs on 
NYSE and S&P 500 options generally decline over the lives of the options, yielding 
higher volatilities for longer term-to-maturity options. Becker and Tucker (1991) 
document that IVs on S&P 100 options tend to decrease until the last week before 
expiration and increase thereafter. Consistent with these findings, Dumas, Fleming and 
Whaley (1998) report that IVs on S&P 500 options differ by term-to-maturity where 
IVs for the 17-day options are lower than for the 45-day options which are, in turn, 
lower than for the 80-day options. Xu and Taylor (1994) show that the slope of the 
term structure of IVs on foreign exchange options traded on the Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange changed frequently during the 1985-1989 period. Campa and Chang (1995) 
also find that the term structure of IVs on currency options changes the slope over 
time. On the contrary, Backus, Foresi and Wu (2004) find that IVs on at-the-money 
options on major foreign currencies increase, on average, with maturity. Tompkins 
(2003) finds that for options on T-bond futures, longer term options have higher IVs 
than shorter term options.  
 80 
 
Different hypotheses have been developed to account for the term structure 
pattern in financial options markets. Park and Sears (1985) argue that the longer the 
time to maturity of a given stock index futures contract, the higher the uncertainty and 
hence, volatility, of futures returns which is impounded in option prices. Stein (1989) 
posits that the IV term structure pattern is attributable to a strongly mean-reverting 
process in volatility. Therefore, if IV on a short-term option is higher than the average 
volatility, IV on a longer-term option should be somewhat lower than the average 
volatility and conversely, if IV on a short-term option is lower than the average 
volatility, the longer-term option should have a higher IV. This hypothesis is 
supported by the empirical evidence in the currency options markets as documented in 
Xu and Taylor (1994) and Campa and Chang (1995). However, Backus et al. (2004) 
explain the tendency for average ATM IVs on currency options to rise with maturity 
by the changes in the underlying return distribution by term-to-maturity. They argue 
that as a call option’s maturity approaches infinity, skewness and excess kurtosis 
approach zero and call prices approach the Black-Scholes formula.  
Contrary to the evidence for the stock index, bonds, and foreign exchange 
options markets, there are reasons to expect that average oil and gas IVs increase as 
the options approach expiration. Since IV is generally considered as the forecast of 
actual future volatility, the term structure pattern of IV should be consistent with that 
of the underlying asset’s actual volatilities. Consequently, if actual volatilities of oil 
and gas futures returns increase as the futures contracts approach expiration, there 
should be a similar pattern in IVs. In his seminal article, Samuelson (1965) formulates 
the proposition that the volatility of futures returns increases as the contract 
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approaches expiration. The Samuelson hypothesis (more recently termed the “maturity 
effect”) is predominantly explained by associating futures returns volatility with the 
amount of information available in a market. That is, little information is known 
regarding distant contracts compared to contracts closer to expiration and as maturity 
approaches, the amount of information reflecting the fundamentals of the asset 
increases, causing large changes in the futures prices and consequently intensifying 
volatility. There has been a wide range of research documenting the existence of the 
maturity effect in various commodities markets (see, for example, Castelino and 
Francis, 1982; Milonas, 1986; Galloway and Kolb, 1996). Compared to findings for 
commodity futures, the evidence of the maturity effect in financial futures markets 
seems weaker (see, for example, Grammatikos and Saunders, 1986; Han and Misra, 
1990; Galloway and Kolb, 1996; Han, Kling and Sell, 1999). In the area of energy 
futures, Serletis (1992) finds support for the Samuelson hypothesis in NYMEX energy 
futures for the period 1987 to 1990. Walls (1999) and Mu (2007) also find strong 
evidence of the maturity effect in energy futures.  
An analysis of crude oil and natural gas futures returns indicates that oil and 
gas actual volatilities tend to go up as the futures contracts get closer to expiration. 
The annualized standard deviations of futures daily returns over the 1999-2006 sample 
period are 38.59%, 35.27%, 32.84% and 31.78% for nearby, second-, third-, and 
fourth-month futures contracts, respectively, in the crude oil market. In the natural gas 
market, the numbers are: 63.11%, 57.69%, 53.43%, and 47.45%. Therefore, as IV is 
widely considered the forecast of future volatility, the term structure pattern of IVs 
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should be consistent with that of actual futures volatilities and average IVs on short-
term options should be higher than on long-term options.  
An alternative explanation for the hypothesized declining IVs with maturity is 
the likely mean-reversion in oil and gas prices. The presumption underlying most 
option pricing models, such as Black-Scholes (1973), is that price movements are 
independent so that the annualized volatility should be the same whether return is 
estimated from weekly, monthly, or quarterly data. However, that seems unlikely to be 
the case for oil and gas prices which are found to be mean-reverting. Intuitively, if oil 
or gas price runs up one month, supply tends to go up and demand fall so that price 
tends to decrease the following month. For example, Bessembinder, Coughenour, 
Seguin and Smoller (1995) find that investors anticipate mean reversion in prices of 11 
commodities including crude oil. Indeed, the magnitude of the estimated mean 
reversion is large for crude oil in that 44 percent of a typical oil price shock is 
expected to be reversed over the subsequent eight months. Furthermore, 
Bessembinder, Coughenour, Seguin and Smoller (1996) argue that the maturity effect 
is more likely to be explained by the mean reversion in assets prices than by the 
information clustering towards a futures contract’s expiry date as stated in Samuelson 
(1965). The evidence in Bessembinder et al. (1995) is further supported by 
Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995), Schwartz (1997) and Pindyck (2001). 
Consequently, if oil and gas prices are mean-reverting as found in previous studies, 
volatility of futures returns should decline with term to maturity of the futures 
contracts: Var (A+B)= [ ]B)Var(A)Var(2 Var(B)Var(A) ρ++  < Var(A) + Var(B) as 
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ρ <0 where Var(A) and Var(B) are variances over one-month period and Var (A+B) 
is the variance over two-month period. 
Second, is there a “smile” pattern in crude oil and natural gas implied 
volatilities and, if so, what causes IVs to be different across strike prices? As the 
Black-Scholes IVs calculated from different strike options with the same expiration 
date supposedly represent the market’s expectation of volatility over the same period, 
there should be no significant difference in those IVs. However, contrary to this 
hypothesis, previous studies document sizable and persistent cross-sectional 
differences in IV in various markets. IVs calculated from stock and stock index 
options, for example, form a “smile” pattern prior to the October 1987 market crash 
where options that are deep in the money or out of the money have higher IVs than at-
the-money options. After the crash, a negative skew or “smirk” pattern appears in the 
stock and stock index options where IVs decrease monotonically as the exercise price 
increases (see, for example, Canina and Figlewski, 1993; Rubinstein, 1994; Dumas, 
Fleming and Whaley, 1998; Das and Sundaram, 1999; Ederington and Guan, 2005). 
Many studies on the foreign exchange options market, including Rosenberg (1996), 
Malz (1996), Campa, Chang, and Reider (1997), Backus, Foresi and Wu (2004), and 
Carr and Wu (2007) document that the time-series average of IVs on currency options 
display a smile pattern where IVs are lowest for ATM options. There is also a smile 
pattern for bond futures options (Belongia and Gregory, 1984 and Tompkins, 2003) 
and for interest rate options. (Jarrow, Li, and Zhao, 2007 and Deuskar, Gupta and 
Subrahmanyam, 2008).   
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The most popular explanation of the "smile" or “smirk” pattern observed in 
Black-Scholes IVs is that the pattern is due to erroneous assumptions in the B-S model 
regarding the return distribution. The B-S model makes the parsimonious assumption 
that stock returns are normally distributed with known mean and variance. However, it 
has been documented that stock return distributions are kurtotic (before the 1987 stock 
market crash) and skewed (after the crash) relative to a normal distribution. Hull and 
White (1987), Stein and Stein (1991), and Heston (1993) show that the “smile” or 
other cross-sectional patterns in IVs are caused by the kurtosis and skewness in the 
underlying assets’ return distribution. For bond and currency options, Heston (1993) 
documents that while kurtosis in the return distribution affects the pricing of near-the-
money versus far-from-the-money options, skewness affects the pricing of in-the-
money options relative to out-of-the-money options. Similarly, it is argued that the 
negative skewness in S&P 500 index returns causes the B-S model to overprice low-
strike options and underprice high-strike options (see, for example, Corrado and Su, 
1996). For foreign exchange options, Bates (1996) documents that the “smile” pattern 
results from the leptokurtic unconditional distribution of log-differenced exchange 
rates.  
An alternative explanation for the implied volatility “smile” or “smirk” pattern 
is the hedging pressure hypothesis by Ederington and Guan (2002) and Bollen and 
Whaley (2004). According to Bollen and Whaley (2004), it is the net buying pressure 
of the options market that drives the index options prices to be higher. Hence, the IVs 
calculated from options prices become non-constant across exercise prices. 
Specifically, they contend that, in the S&P 500 index options market, institutional 
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investors usually purchase large quantities of out-of-the-money index put options in 
hedging their underlying cash positions. Since the demand is strong in this segment of 
the index options market, to mitigate risk, the market makers would raise the index put 
options prices (particularly the OTM put) higher. As a result, the IVs increase, which 
results in the inverse relation between IV and exercise price. Bollen and Whaley 
(2004) show that the evidence from the S&P 500 index options is consistent with their 
net buying pressure hypothesis. Subsequently, Chan, Chen and Lung (2004), 
Ederington and Guan (2005), Han (2008) and Deuskar, Gupta and Subrahmanyam 
(2008), among others, document evidence to support the hedging pressure hypothesis 
in Bollen and Whaley (2004).  
Although the literature is replete with studies on the implied volatility “smile” 
or “smirk” pattern for various financial options markets, none of the previous studies, 
to the best of my knowledge, have explored the possible pattern for any commodity, 
including crude oil or natural gas, futures options. Again, this is due to the limited 
dataset in previous studies on commodity options which only examine ATM options 
(see, for example, Szakmary, Ors and Kim, 2003). In this study, I attempt to fill this 
gap in our understanding by exploring whether there is a smile pattern in crude oil and 
natural gas implied volatilities. If a pattern is found, I will explore the reasons.  
Third, is there a month-of-the-year pattern in crude oil and natural gas 
implied volatilities and, if so, why? Fleming, Kirby and Ostdiek (2006) posit that 
natural gas prices are among the most sensitive to weather conditions. The U.S. 
typically consumes twice as much natural gas in winter as in summer (due to space 
heating) while the supply of natural gas is essentially fixed in winter because the U.S. 
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natural gas production is relatively constant throughout the year and imports is very 
limited. Therefore, natural gas prices can spike during peak periods in winter in order 
to balance supply and demand. As noted in Doran and Ronn (2008), natural gas 
volatility displays a pronounced seasonality pattern. Consistent with Doran and Ronn 
(2008), in an earlier paper on actual volatility in the natural gas market, I find that the 
average variance of nearby futures returns is 58.45% higher for futures contracts 
expiring in the winter months (from November through February) than in other 
months.  
Consequently, I hypothesize that average natural gas IVs should be higher on 
options expiring in the winter months than in other months. As the market participants 
expect higher natural gas volatility in winter, that expectation should be impounded in 
IV calculated from options expiring in winter. In addition, given large price swings in 
winter, there may be more natural gas users buying call options to hedge against price 
increases leading to higher prices and IVs on call options expiring in winter. The 
findings of higher IVs for options with winter expiry would be meaningful for option 
valuation. If a financial engineer uses the yearly average volatility to value natural gas 
options, he or she will tend to overestimate the values of options expiring in summer 
and underestimate the values of options expiring in winter.  
While there are reasons to expect higher natural gas IV for options expiring in 
the winter months, the answer is less obvious for crude oil IV. According to Fleming, 
Kirby and Ostdiek (2006), crude oil prices are not typically weather sensitive because 
over 90% of U.S. oil consumption is for transportation and industrial uses which are 
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not sensitive to the weather. Therefore, the issue concerning a seasonal pattern in 
crude oil IV is subject to empirical evidence.  
Fourth, is there a day-of-the-week pattern in crude oil and natural gas implied 
volatilities and, if so, why? Many studies have documented an intraweek pattern in 
various options markets. In a study of the S&P 100 index options, Harvey and Whaley 
(1992) report that the IV (calculated based on calendar days) tends to increase on 
Mondays and decrease on Fridays32
Murry and Zhu (2004) and Mu (2007) document that the natural gas actual 
volatility is higher for Friday-close-to-Monday-close returns than for any other 
 and they hypothesize that the weekday pattern is 
due to buying/selling pressure as traders open position on Monday and close them on 
Friday. Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley (1995) report that although the CBOE Market 
Volatility Index (VIX) calculated using calendar days increases significantly on 
Mondays and decreases throughout the week, this intraweek pattern disappears when 
the VIX is calculated using trading days. Ederington and Lee (1996) also show that in 
the T-Bond and Eurodollar markets, Monday IVs tend to be high when they are 
computed based on calendar days, and this Monday effect disappears with trading-day 
adjusted IVs. In addition, Ederington and Lee (1996) provide evidence that the 
scheduled announcements could explain the IV intraweek pattern in that IVs tend to 
decline on Fridays with scheduled announcements, but not on Fridays without 
announcements. Kim and Kim (2003) document that foreign exchange IVs calculated 
based on trading days tend to be low on Mondays (Friday close to Monday close) and 
high on Wednesdays for all currencies.  
                                                     
32However, it is unclear whether this pattern still holds if trading day is used instead of 
calendar day as the discount factor in calculating the implied volatility using Black-Scholes 
(1973) formula. 
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weekday returns. In my earlier papers, I also document the high volatility of 
weekend/Monday futures returns in both oil and gas markets. In addition, I find that 
actual volatility tends to increase on Wednesday (for crude oil) and on Thursday (for 
natural gas) which is likely caused by the announcements of the Petroleum Status 
Report and the Natural Gas Storage Report. These announcements are reportedly 
among the most important scheduled news influencing the oil and gas markets (see, 
for example, Susmel and Thompson, 1997 and Linn and Zhu, 2004).  
In this paper, I examine whether IV calculated from crude oil and natural gas 
options differs by day of the week. Consistent with the findings in my earlier papers 
on oil and gas actual volatilities, I hypothesize that weekend/Monday actual volatility 
is higher than any other weekday’s volatility and therefore, the IV should decline from 
Friday to Monday. Since Friday’s IV includes the expected weekend/Monday’s 
volatility whereas Monday’s IV does not, Monday’s IV should drop because the 
period over which it is calculated no longer includes the anticipated high 
weekend/Monday volatility. Similarly, if the announcements of the Petroleum Status 
Report and the Natural Gas Storage Report significantly impact oil and gas prices, IV 
should decrease following the release of these announcements. As documented in 
Ederington and Lee (1996), in the T-Bond and Eurodollar markets, IV tends to fall 
following the release of important scheduled announcements. Since the pre-release IV 
impounds the anticipated impact of important releases on volatility, IV will normally 
decline post-release as this uncertainty is resolved.  
Fifth, do positive and negative futures return shocks have an asymmetric 
impact on crude oil and natural gas implied volatilities and, if so, what possibly 
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explains the asymmetry? In the equity markets, as demonstrated by Black (1976), 
Christie (1982), and French et al. (1987), there exists a negative relationship between 
stock returns and changes in volatility. Schwert (1989, 1990) documents the 
asymmetric relationship between stock returns and expected volatility changes in that 
the expected volatility is more sensitive to negative than positive equity returns. Under 
the assumption that implied volatility proxies for future volatility, Fleming et al. 
(1995) show that CBOE Market Volatility Index (VIX), an average of the S&P 100 
option implied volatilities, is inversely related to the contemporaneous S&P 100 index 
returns. They find that both daily and weekly VIX changes are more sensitive to the 
negative than positive stock market moves. Dumas et al. (1998) report the similar 
findings between the implied volatility from the S&P 500 index and the index itself. 
Conditional volatility asymmetry in the equity market is generally attributed to either a 
leverage and/or volatility feedback effect. However, Simon (1997) reports the same IV 
asymmetry in the Treasury bond market, where there is no leverage or volatility 
feedback effect, indicating that conditional volatility asymmetry exists more broadly 
and results from more general factors than financial leverage or volatility feedback. 
Contrary to the findings in the equity and bond markets, Kim and Kim (2003) find no 
evidence of asymmetric IV in the foreign exchange markets.   
Previous studies have explored whether there exists a conditional volatility 
asymmetry in the crude oil and natural gas markets (Susmel and Thompson, 1997; 
Murry and Zhu, 2004; and Mu, 2007) and find no evidence of such asymmetry in 
these markets. To my knowledge, the impact of positive and negative return shocks on 
oil and gas IVs has not been explored in the literature. Contrary to the findings in 
 90 
 
earlier studies, I hypothesize that positive and negative returns in the energy market 
have different impacts on expected future volatility. My reasoning for this hypothesis 
is based on the likely shape of the supply and demand curves in this market. At low 
volume and prices, the supply is highly elastic, but once storage limits are reached, 
supply becomes quite inelastic as producers, due to infrastructure constraints, are 
unable to increase their production levels within a short period of time. The demand 
curve may also have an elastic portion when prices are low and an inelastic portion 
when prices are high. Given the hypothesized shape of the energy supply and demand 
curves, the same fluctuation in demand when prices are low should cause a smaller 
change in prices than when prices are high. Thus, an unexpected price increase which 
moves the market up the supply and demand curves is likely to presage higher future 
volatility than a negative shock moving the market down the curves.  
In my earlier chapters which use an expanded GARCH type model to examine 
oil and gas actual volatilities, I find that positive and negative return shocks tend to 
have asymmetric impacts on forecast volatility in these markets. There is evidence that 
in the crude oil market, predicted volatility increases more following a negative return 
shock than an equal positive return shock while in the natural gas market, predicted 
volatility increases more following a positive return shock than an equal negative 
return shock. Therefore, as IV supposedly represents the market participants’ forecast 
of future volatility, unexpected positive and negative returns should have asymmetric 
impacts on oil and gas IVs.   
Sixth, how well do crude oil and natural gas implied volatilities predict future 
volatility across different strike prices and terms to maturity? Furthermore, I examine 
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whether IV calculated from a moneyness and maturity group is an unbiased and/or 
efficient forecast of actual volatility.  
The volatility implied in an option’s price is widely regarded as the market’s 
forecast of future volatility over the remaining life of the option. If option markets are 
efficient, IV should be an efficient forecast of future volatility, i.e., IV should subsume 
all other information in explaining future volatility. The literature is replete with 
studies on whether IV predicts future volatility and whether it does so efficiently in 
various markets, including the stock and stock index options market33, foreign 
exchange options market34, futures options markets35, Eurodollar options market36
For the energy markets, Day and Lewis (1993) and Martens and Zein (2004) 
find that crude oil IV outperforms historical volatility in forecasting future volatility 
and Szakmary et al. (2003) document that IV calculated from crude oil and natural gas 
options is biased but still efficient forecast of future volatility. However, the results in 
Day and Lewis (1993), Szakmary et al. (2003) and Martens and Zein (2004) are 
limited to IVs calculated from nearby at-the-money options. In this study, I use a 
comprehensive data set to (1) examine the forecasting power of IV across strike prices 
and terms to maturity and (2) explore whether IV from any group is the best forecast 
of future volatility. This study is motivated by the findings in Ederington and Guan 
(2005) who, contrary to the conventional notion of at-the-money IVs being the most 
informative, find significant evidence that for stock index options, IVs calculated from 
, 
etc.  
                                                     
33See, for example, Day and Lewis (1993), Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1993). Canina and 
Figlewski (1993), Christensen and Prabhala (1998), etc.  
34Jorion (1995) 
35See, Day and Lewis (1993), Martens and Zein (2004),  Szakmary, Ors and Kim (2003) 
36Amin and Ng (1997) 
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moderately high strike options are both unbiased and efficient predictors of future 
volatility whereas those from at-the-money options are biased and less efficient.  
3. Data and Sampling procedure 
Actual and implied volatilities are calculated from daily closing prices of crude 
oil and natural gas futures and call options on futures traded on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange from September 01, 1999 through June 30, 2006. An advantage 
of using options on futures is that I can avoid the nonsynchronous data problem. Since 
futures and futures’ options are both traded on the NYME, both closing prices are 
observed at the same time37
Two exclusionary criteria are applied to the data. First, I eliminate options with 
less than one week or more than 4 months to expiration. The shorter-term options have 
relatively small time premiums, so a one-tick change (perhaps due to bid-ask bounce) 
leads to a jump in IVs calculated from very short term options imparting noise in the 
IVs. Second, I exclude options with {C - [F-PV(X)]} ≤ 10 cents where C is the call 
price, F is the underlying futures price and PV(X) is the present value of the strike 
price. If, for an option, {C - [F-PV(X)]} ≤ 10 cents, trading in that option is likely light 
and its IV is sensitive to a minimal change in its price, especially for short time-to-
expiration options. Since the price changes in 1-cent increments, if {C - [F-PV(X)]} ≤ 
10 cents, the price and IV either change by more than 10% or not at all whereas they 
should be continuous. Also, when {C - [F-PV(X)]} ≤ 10 cents, if the equilibrium price 
. The trading volumes of crude oil and natural gas options 
are extracted from the Dow Jones Factiva database. 
                                                     
37Hentschel (2003) documents that for stock index options, a large error typically comes from 
using closing prices for the options and index that are measured 15 minutes apart.  
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and IV are unchanged but the transaction price changes by 1 cent due to bid-ask 
bounce, the IV will appear to change by more than 10%.  
This exclusion process left a total of 74,604 observations for crude oil call 
options and 79,162 observations for natural gas call options. For each market, the 
sample is broken into four maturity groups corresponding to options’ term-to-
maturity: near-, second-, third- and fourth- month. Each maturity group is then divided 
into “moneyness” bins corresponding to the amount the options are in or out of the 
money. The extent to which the options are in or out of the money is represented by 
the “moneyness” which is defined as X/F-1, where X is the call option’s strike price 
and F is the underlying futures price on any given day.  
I denote the “moneyness” bin as GIk or GOk, where “I” or “O” indicates 
whether the option is in or out of the money and k reports the moneyness where 1 is 
the closest to the money and 15 is the furthest in- or out-of-the-money. GOk represents 
out-of-the-money options whose strike prices are in the interval, 4( 1)1
100
kF − ⋅ + 
 
, 
41
100
kF  ⋅ + 
 
 and closest to 4( 1)1
100
kF − ⋅ + 
 
 where F is the underlying futures price 
that day. Thus GO1 represents the options whose strike prices are just above the 
current underlying futures prices but not more than 4% higher than F. GO5 represents 
the options whose strikes are at least 16% and not more than 20% above F.  Similarly, 
GIk indicates in-the-money options whose strikes are in the interval 4( 1)1
100
kF − ⋅ − 
 
, 
4( 1)1
100
kF − ⋅ − 
 
 and closest to 4( 1)1 .
100
kF − ⋅ − 
 
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I do not necessarily have a price observation in each “moneyness” group each 
day, because (1) trading is light in far in- and out-of-the-money options and (2) 
exclusionary process has eliminated options whose implied volatilities are very 
sensitive to price changes. 
 
Using Black’s (1976) model for options on futures, day t closing prices for 
both the futures and futures’ call options, and 3-month T-bill rates, I solve for the 
implied standard deviation, CtjiISD ,,,  on each option (i,j) observed on day t, where i 
denotes the maturity group and j denotes the “moneyness” bin in each maturity group, 
and C is the number of calendar days to expiration.38
As pointed out by Ederington and Lee (1996), if Friday’s ISD is calculated 
using C calendar days, Monday’s ISD is calculated using C-3 calendar days. This 
assumes that the variance of returns from Friday’s close to Monday’s close is three 
times the normal weekday close-to-close variance. The evidence in financial markets 
such as stock, stock index, T-Bond, Eurodollar does not support this assumption (see, 
for example, French and Roll, 1986; Fleming et al., 1995, Ederington and Lee, 1996). 
In my previous studies on oil and gas actual volatilities, I find that the three-day 
weekend return variances are 18.32% and 46.56% higher than the average weekday 
variance for crude oil and natural gas, respectively, which is still not as large as the 
calendar day assumption implies. 
  
                                                     
38While Black’s (1976) model is for European options, crude oil and natural gas futures 
options are American. However, like the S&P 500 futures options, early exercise is rare for 
crude oil and natural gas options. Also the bias in implied volatility due to the use of a 
European option model for American options is small (Jorion, 1995).  
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Consequently, I adjust CtjiISD ,,,  to a trading day basis. In particular, I follow 
Ederington and Lee (1996) and calculate TtjiISD ,,, = mcCtji TTISD /,,, where 
TtjiISD ,,, and CtjiISD ,,,  are the trading-day and calendar-day ISDs, cT and mT are 
calendar days and trading days to expiration. As noted in Fleming et al. (1995), this 
trading-day adjustment of ISD is more appropriate than simply using the number of 
trading days in valuing the option. The time-to-expiration parameter affects an 
option’s value not only through total volatility, but also through the expected rate of 
appreciation in the underlying asset’s value and through the length of time over which 
the option’s expected payoff is discounted to the present. Both of these latter factors 
are more appropriately measured using calendar days. I use TtjiISD ,,, throughout this 
study and omit the subscript T for simplicity.  
Table VII reports the summary statistics of crude oil and natural gas ISDs for 
the entire sample and for each year from 1999 through 2006. 
I measure the actual realized volatility over the life of the option observed on 
day t, , ,i j tσ , as the annualized standard deviation of returns over the period from day t 
through the expiration date t τ+ for option i,j. 
,
2
, ,
1,
1252 ( ) . (17)
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∑
 
where 1ln( / )s s sR F F −= , sF is the closing price of the underlying futures contract on day 
s, 1sF − is the closing price of the same futures contract on day s-1, and ,i jt τ+ is the 
expiration date of option i,j.  
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4. The implied volatility surface 
4.1. The implied volatility term structure 
I hypothesized above that average oil and gas implied volatilities increase as 
the options approach expiration either due to the likely mean reversion in oil and gas 
prices or because the actual oil and gas volatility is greater for shorter than for longer 
term futures. Results in Table VIII are consistent with this term structure pattern 
hypothesis. As indicated in the second and the third columns of Panel A in Table VIII, 
all-strike average IVs (across all options with .2 ( / 1) .2X F− ≤ − ≤  where X is the 
option’s strike price and F is the underlying futures price39
As presented in Panel B of Table VIII and Figure 10, the declining IV term 
structure pattern is consistent across all moneyness groups (the only exception is the 
natural gas GI6 group). This term structure pattern is opposite to that in the stock 
index options as documented in Park and Sears (1985), Becker and Tucker (1991) and 
Dumas, Fleming and Whaley (1998) and in the foreign exchange and bond futures 
options as documented in Xu and Taylor (1994), Campa and Chang (1995), Tompkins 
) and average at-the-money 
IVs on nearby options tend to be higher than those on second-month options which are 
higher than those on third-month options, etc. Apparently oil and gas IVs tend to 
increase as the options approach expiration, yielding lower IVs from options at longer 
term to maturity. This findings would be meaningful for option valuation. Since the 
IVs that are normally reported are IVs from nearby options, if a financial engineer 
uses these nearby IVs to value options, he or she will tend to overestimate the value of 
longer-term options.  
                                                     
39Deep in- and out-of-the-money options are not actively traded in the market so even a small 
change in call price may result in a big variation in the option’s IV. 
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(2003), and Backus, Foresi and Wu (2004). In each moneyness group, the difference 
in average IV from nearby, second-, third-, and fourth-month options is significant at 
the .01 level. As can be seen in Figure 10, while the slope of the IV term structure 
pattern is consistent across strike prices for natural gas, it tends to be steepest for in- 
and out-of-the-money call options than for near-the-money options for crude oil.  
IVs across different terms to maturity do not represent the market’s expectation 
of future volatility over the same period of time. For example, IV from nearby options 
represents the market’s forecast of future volatility over an average 15-day period 
whereas IV from second-month options represents the forecast of future volatility over 
an average 45-day period. To compare IVs on a more consistent basis, I calculate 
forward IVs on options expiring in two, three and four months. On a given day, if the 
ISD from an option expiring in t1 days is x, and that from an option in the same 
“moneyness” group maturing in t2 days is y (t2 > t1), the forward implied standard 
deviation over the period from day t1+1 through day t2  
1 2 1
2 2
t t ty x
t t
   −
−   
   
is calculated as 
. In the “Forward ISD” column of Panel A in Table VIII, the 
second-month forward ISD, which is the average of forward ISDs calculated from 
ISDs on nearby and second-month options with [ .2 ( / 1) .2X F− ≤ − ≤ ], represents the 
market’s expectation of future volatility over the period from the nearby option’s 
expiry to the second-month option’s expiry. Likewise, the third-month forward ISD, 
which is the average of forward ISDs calculated from ISDs on second-month and 
third-month options with [ .2 ( / 1) .2X F− ≤ − ≤ ], represents the market’s expectation 
of future volatility over the period from the second-month option’s expiry to the third-
month option’s expiry.  
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As indicated in the “Forward ISD” column of Panel A in Table VIII, the 
average forward volatility from oil and gas options consistently decreases with time to 
maturity, and the declining slope in the forward ISD pattern is steeper than in the ISD 
pattern. Consider the natural gas forward ISDs. According to these forward IVs, the 
market expects that average natural gas volatility is 57.2% for the first month, 51.5% 
for the second month, 46.25% for the third month and 41.8% for the fourth month 
where the first month ends on the nearby option’s expiry, the second month is from 
the nearby option’s expiry to the second month option’s expiry and so on. 
As hypothesized above, the declining pattern in IV term structure may be 
attributable to two possible reasons. First, if oil and gas prices are mean-reverting as 
documented in Bessembinder et al. (1995), Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995), 
Schwartz (1997) and Pindyck (2001), returns in successive periods should be 
negatively correlated and therefore, volatility over a 2-month period will be less than 
the sum of volatilities over the first and the second months; Var(A+B) = Var(A) + 
Var(B) + 2ρ B)Var(A)Var( < Var(A) + Var(B) as ρ <0. However, in the oil and gas 
futures markets, as shown in Panel C of Table VIII, the relation between monthly 
returns over different periods of time is more complicated where monthly returns tend 
to be positively correlated at the lag of one but negatively at some other lags, although 
the coefficient estimates are not significant.  
Panel D of Table VIII presents the volatility of returns on nearby futures 
contracts when returns are measured over different periods of time. The “1-month 
returns” row presents the annualized standard deviations of returns on nearby futures 
contracts over the 1-month period (from the day the contract becomes the nearby 
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contract to the day the contract expires). The “2-month returns” row presents the 
annualized standard deviations of returns on the same futures contracts over the 2-
month period (from the day the contract becomes the second-month contract to the day 
the contract becomes the nearby contract) and so on for other rows. As shown in this 
Panel, volatility of the nearby futures returns generally increases with length of the 
period over which the returns are measured, implying that Var(A+B) = Var(A) + 
Var(B) + 2ρ B)Var(A)Var( > Var(A) + Var(B) and therefore, there is no evidence 
that ρ <0 in these markets.  
The results in Panels C and D of Table VIII are somewhat consistent with 
Geman (2007) who shows statistical evidence that there is a mean-reversion in crude 
oil and natural gas prices before 1999 but since 2000, prices in both markets follow a 
random walk (arithmetic Brownian motion) model. Consequently, with no significant 
evidence of a mean-reversion in oil and gas prices as indicated in Panels C and D of 
Table VIII and in Geman (2007), it is unlikely that the declining IV term structure 
pattern is caused by a mean-reversion in oil and gas prices. 
Since oil and gas options are options on futures and not on cash prices, there 
would seem to be another possible explanation for the declining IV term structure 
pattern. As IV is widely considered as the forecast of future actual volatility, the term 
structure pattern of IVs from futures options should be consistent with that of actual 
futures volatilities. Therefore, if volatility of oil and gas futures returns goes up as the 
futures contracts get closer to expiration, that tendency could explain the IV term 
structure pattern. As reported in the “Different futures contracts volatility” column in 
Panel A of Table VIII, the volatility of oil and gas futures returns tends to increase as 
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the contract approaches expiration. Volatility of nearby futures returns tends to be 
higher than that of the second-month futures returns which is higher than that of the 
third-month futures returns and so on. As the IV on an x-month futures option should 
be consistent with the actual volatility of the x-month futures contract and there is 
evidence of an increase in actual volatility when the futures contracts get closer to 
expiration, this would explain the term structure pattern in oil and gas IVs.  
This term structure pattern in the oil and gas futures markets is consistent with 
the “maturity effect” hypothesis in Samuelson (1965) which is supported by the 
findings in Serletis (1992) and Walls (1999). Samuelson (1965) argues that as the 
futures contract approaches expiration, the amount of information reflecting the 
fundamentals of the asset increases, causing large changes in futures prices and 
consequently increasing volatility. In addition, certain news in futures markets is likely 
to have more impact on near-term contracts than on longer-term ones, causing larger 
price changes for the former. For example, in the previous paper on natural gas futures 
volatility, I find that sorts of news occurring over the weekend such as weather news 
tends to have more impact on nearby contracts than on longer-term ones in this 
market.  
Backus et al. (2004) argue that the tendency for average at-the-money IVs 
from currency options to rise with maturity is attributable to the changes in the 
underlying return distribution by term-to-maturity. Specifically, they argue that as the 
maturity of an option approaches infinity, the skewness and excess kurtosis of the 
underlying return distribution approach zero and the option’s price approaches the 
value given by the Black-Scholes formula. However, this hypothesis does not hold for 
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oil and gas futures return distribution. As indicated in Panel B of Table IX, there is no 
evidence that the skewness and kurtosis of oil and gas return distributions consistently 
decline by term to maturity.  
As mentioned in Section 2, many studies find that IVs from stock index, bonds 
and foreign exchange options generally decrease as the options get closer to 
expiration, which is opposite to the evidence regarding the term structure pattern in oil 
and gas IVs. This difference is likely explained by two possible reasons. First, oil and 
gas options are options on futures and futures price volatility may differ from spot 
price volatility. Second, as stated in Grammatikos and Saunders (1986), Han and 
Misra (1990), Galloway and Kolb (1996), and Han, Kling and Sell (1999), the 
evidence of a maturity effect is weaker for financial futures than for commodity 
futures.  
4.2. The implied volatility smile 
Since an implied volatility supposedly represents the market’s expectation of 
likely volatility over the life of an option, the calculated IVs should be the same for all 
options expiring on the same date and observed at the same time if the option pricing 
model is correct. In many markets, however, IVs calculated from options with the 
same expiration date according to Black-Scholes (1973) model tend to differ across 
exercise prices, often displaying a persistent “smile” or “skew” pattern on a graph. 
These “smile” or “skew” patterns are documented in, among others, Canina and 
Figlewski (1993), Rubinstein (1994), Dumas, Fleming and Whaley (1998), Das and 
Sundaram (1999) and Ederington and Guan (2005) for stock index options markets, in 
Rosenberg (1996), Malz (1996), Campa, Chang, and Reider (1997), Backus, Foresi 
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and Wu (2004), and Carr and Wu (2007) for currency options market, in Belongia and 
Gregory (1984) and Tompkins (2003) for options on bond futures, and in Jarrow, Li, 
and Zhao (2007) and Deuskar, Gupta and Subrahmanyam (2008) for interest rate 
options market. To my knowledge, all cross-sectional patterns documented in the 
literature to date are either U-shaped or downward-sloping.  
The oil and gas IV cross-sectional patterns are reported in Table IX and Figure 
11. For each option j in maturity group i on day t, I calculate both the implied standard 
deviation ISDi,j,t
( ), , ,/ 1i j t i tX F −
, and the relative percentage “moneyness” of option j measured as 
where , ,i j tX  is option j’s strike price and ,i tF is the underlying futures 
price on day t. The ISDs are then grouped into different bins according to the option’s 
“moneyness”. Each bin is denoted GIk or GOk, where “I” or “O” indicates whether 
the option is in or out of the money and k reports the option’s “moneyness” where 1 is 
the closest to the money and the higher k is, the further the option is in or out of the 
money. Thus GO1 represents call options whose strike prices are just above the 
current underlying futures prices but no more than 4% higher than F. GO2 represents 
call options whose strikes are at least 4% and not more than 8% above F. Similarly, 
GI1 contains options whose lowest strike is 4% lower than F and highest strike is F. 
To obtain a complete shape of the smile, I include options in all “moneyness” bins 
across terms to maturity until a bin’s trading becomes too light, i.e., a “moneyness” 
bin is not included if the number of observations in that bin falls below 50.  
Time series means of ISDs across all “moneyness” bins are reported in Panel A 
of Table IX. Since the number of observations in each bin varies, the mean ISDs for 
different bins could differ because they are calculated over different samples. To 
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correct for this, I follow Ederington and Guan (2005) and calculate the mean ISD ratio 
for each “moneyness” bin. For each day t, I calculate the average ISD, ISDa,i, of the 
two nearest-the-money bins GO1 and GI1 in the maturity group i. For each moneyness 
bin observed on day t, I then calculate the ratio: Ri,j,t = ISDi,j,t / ISDa,i,t
As shown in Figure 11, the cross-sectional pattern in natural gas options is 
consistent across all four maturity groups in that IVs are lowest when strikes are low 
and increase monotonically with strikes. To my knowledge, this upward-sloping 
pattern is unique to natural gas options since, as mentioned above, all cross-sectional 
patterns documented in the literature to date are either U-shaped or downward-sloping. 
For example, this positive “skew” pattern is opposite to the “sneer”, or “smirk” pattern 
in the stock and stock index options markets where IVs monotonically decrease with 
strikes.  
. Time series 
means of this ratio are reported in the “Mean ISD Ratio” columns of Panel A in Table 
IX and graphed against each maturity in Figure 11. 
 It is worth noting that the curvature of the “skew” pattern in natural gas IVs 
tends to be consistent across terms to maturity. For most financial options markets, the 
degree of curvature of the IV “smile” or “skew” pattern varies by options’ maturity. 
As noted in Das and Sundaram (1999), it appears indisputable that the IV smile in 
most markets is deepest at short maturities and flattens out monotonically as maturity 
increases. In the post-1987 stock index options market, the IVs decrease 
monotonically as the exercise price rises, with the rate of decrease increasing for 
options with shorter time to expiration (see, for example, Dumas et al., 1998 and 
Doran, Peterson and Tarrant, 2007). Similarly, for foreign exchange and bond futures 
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options markets, Bates (1996), Tompkins (2003) and Backus et al. (2004), among 
others, document that the degree of curvature in volatility smile is more extreme when 
the options are closest to expiration. 
While the cross-sectional pattern is consistent across terms to maturity for 
natural gas, it varies by term to maturity for crude oil. For crude oil nearby group, IVs 
are lowest when options are near the money and increase as call options become 
increasingly in or out of the money. For the second-month group, IVs are lowest for 
moderately low strike (ITM calls) options (GI1 to GI5) and increase for out-of-the-
money (OTM) and deep in-the-money (ITM) call options. The IVs in the third- and 
fourth-month groups exhibit a positive skew pattern where IVs are lowest for deep 
ITM calls and increase as the option strikes increase. The only other options market 
that displays a change in the shape of the IV smile pattern, to my knowledge, is the 
interest rates options market. Deuskar, Gupta and Subrahmanyam (2008) show that 
long-term options in this market display more of a ‘smirk’’ than a smile as in short-
term ones.   
The most popular explanation of the "smile" or “smirk” pattern observed in 
Black-Scholes IVs is that the pattern is due to the B-S model’s assumption that returns 
are normally distributed with known mean and variance. Hull and White (1987), Stein 
and Stein (1991), and Heston (1993) show that the smile or “smirk” patterns in IVs are 
often attributed to the kurtosis and skewness in the underlying assets return 
distribution. While kurtosis affects the pricing of near-the-money versus far-from-the-
money options, skewness affects the pricing of in-the-money relative to out-of-the-
money options. For example, there is evidence that the negative skewness in the S&P 
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500 index returns causes the B-S model to overprice low-strike options and underprice 
high-strike options (Corrado and Su, 1996). Similarly, the “smile” pattern in foreign 
exchange options is attributable to the leptokurtic unconditional distribution of log-
differenced exchange rates (Bates, 1996 and Backus et al., 2004). Moreover, Bates 
(1996) and Backus et al. (2004) document that the excess kurtosis of log-differenced 
exchange rates increases rapidly as the option approaches expiration which results in a 
less sharply curved smile in long term options.  
If the “smile” and “skew” patterns in oil and gas IVs are mainly caused by the 
excess kurtosis and skewness in the underlying return distributions, I expect to find the 
following. First, since natural gas options display a positive skew pattern in all 
expiries, natural gas futures returns should be positively skewed across terms to 
maturity. Second, as the slope of the cross-sectional pattern in crude oil IVs differs by 
term to maturity, the skewness in oil futures returns distribution should differ across 
terms to maturity.  
Panel B in Table IX reports descriptive statistics for crude oil and natural gas 
daily returns from September 01, 1999 to June 30, 2006. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
D-statistics all exceed 0.026 and therefore, the null hypothesis of normality is rejected 
at the 0.01 level for oil and gas returns across all maturities. Oil and gas daily return 
series show leptokurtic behavior in that the level of kurtosis differs from the level of 
normal kurtosis by approximately five times the standard error (under the assumption 
of asymptotic normality) across all maturities. Sample statistics for skewness (two-
tailed) also indicate the presence of significant skewness at the 5 percent level for oil 
and gas returns at all maturities.  
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While the crude oil IV pattern changes from a “smile” pattern for nearby and 
second-month series to a positive “skew” pattern for third- and fourth-month series, 
the existence of significant excess kurtosis and negative skewness is consistent across 
maturities for crude oil returns. Moreover, the significant negative skewness in longer-
term crude oil futures returns would imply a negative skew pattern in oil IVs 
(similarly to the argument for the “sneer” pattern in the stock index options market) 
while, in fact, the opposite pattern is observed. For natural gas options, while the 
positive “skew” pattern and the degree of curvature in gas IVs are consistent across 
maturities, the underlying return statistics show a significant positive skewness for 
nearby and second-month series and a significant negative skewness for third- and 
fourth-month series. Therefore, there is no evidence that the excess kurtosis and 
skewness in oil and gas return distribution are responsible for the “smile” and “skew” 
patterns observed in oil and gas IVs.  
An alternative explanation for the “smile” or “smirk” pattern is the hedging 
pressure hypothesis by Bollen and Whaley (2004) and Ederington and Guan (2002) 
who argue that it is the net buying pressure of the options market that drives the index 
options prices to be higher. Specifically, they contend that, in the stock index options 
market, demand for out-of-the-money puts to hedge against stock market declines 
pushes up implied volatilities on low strike options.  
The positive skew pattern across terms to maturity in natural gas options may 
be attributable to hedging pressures in this market. Given that demand for natural gas 
can increase dramatically in winter while natural gas production is essentially fixed, 
there are often large price swings in winter. However, it is extremely difficult for 
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consumers to quickly reduce their consumption when a sharp increase in natural gas 
prices occurs. Therefore, there may be more natural gas users hedging against a 
natural gas increase than there are natural gas sellers hedging against a price decrease, 
leading to higher prices and implied volatilities on high strike call options. If this 
hedging pressure theory holds for the natural gas market, IVs of high strike call 
options whose prices are supposedly impacted heavily by hedging pressures should be 
less representative of the market’s volatility expectation than IVs calculated from 
options with lower strikes whose prices should be less subject to hedging pressures.  
Panel C in Table IX and Figure 12 present the average daily trading volume of 
crude oil and natural gas call and put options during the sample period. For natural 
gas, the average daily OTM call volume is higher than the average daily OTM put 
volume across terms to maturities, indicating that there tends to be more natural gas 
users hedging against a price increase by buying OTM calls than natural gas sellers 
hedging against a price decrease by buying OTM puts.  
The regression results regarding the information content of IVs, which are 
presented in detail in Section 7, are somewhat consistent with the view that hedging 
pressures are largely responsible for the skew pattern in natural gas IV. While natural 
gas IVs calculated from near-the-money options, specifically strikes ranging from 8% 
below to 4% above the underlying futures price, are both unbiased and efficient 
predictors of future volatility, IVs calculated from high strikes (OTM calls) are biased 
predictors of future volatility and significantly less informative. This pattern implies 
that prices of high strike options are heavily determined by demand for those options 
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for hedging purposes in the natural gas market and that IVs at high strikes are partially 
influenced by factors other than the market’s expectation of future volatility.  
However, there is no evidence that the smile pattern in crude oil options is 
consistent with the hedging pressures argument. As presented in Figure 11, crude oil 
IVs, except for nearby options, tend to be lowest for low strike options and increase 
monotonically with strike prices. If the positive skew pattern in longer term crude oil 
options is caused by hedging pressures in this market, IVs of high strike options 
whose prices are supposedly impacted heavily by hedging pressures should be less 
representative of the market’s volatility expectation than IVs calculated from lower 
strike options whose prices should be less subject to hedging pressures. Conversely, 
the regression results regarding the information content of crude oil IVs in Section 7 
are opposite to this prediction. For second-, third-, and fourth-month groups, high 
strike IVs are the best forecast of future volatility while low strike IVs are the least 
informative. In addition, Panel C in Table IX shows that for crude oil options, there is 
no evidence that trading is higher in OTM calls than in OTM puts across terms to 
maturity.  
5. Seasonality 
5.1. Month-of-the-year IV pattern 
A unique winter effect likely exists in the natural gas market due to the 
dependence of gas prices on weather conditions. The demand for natural gas may 
increase dramatically in winter, especially when the weather is severe. At the same 
time, the supply of natural gas may not increase accordingly because gas supplies are 
constrained by storage capacity and imports are limited. Consequently, supply and 
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demand imbalances in the natural gas market during winter may cause large price 
swings. I hypothesized above that the average natural gas IV is higher for options 
expiring in the winter months than for those expiring in other months because (1) the 
market expects higher volatility in winter, and (2) there may be more users buying call 
options to hedge against a price spike in winter which could result in higher prices and 
IVs on options expiring in the winter months.    
Results in Table X and Figure 13 are consistent with the winter effect 
hypothesis. The average natural gas ISDs display a U-shaped curve in which ISDs are 
significantly higher on options expiring in the winter months than in other months and 
this time-of-the-year pattern is consistent across all maturities. Consequently, if a 
financial engineer uses the yearly average volatility to value natural gas options, he or 
she will tend to overestimate the values of options expiring in summer and 
underestimate the values of options expiring in winter. The IV time-of-the-year pattern 
documented in Table X is consistent with the evidence in my earlier paper that the 
average variance of natural gas nearby futures returns increases by 58.45% in the 
winter months (from November through February). 
While there are reasons to expect a strong seasonality pattern in natural gas 
IVs, it is interesting that there is also a month-of-the-year effect in crude oil IVs, 
although the pattern in the oil market is less pronounced than in the gas market. For 
example, the all-strike average IVs (across all options with .2 ( / 1) .2X F− ≤ − ≤  where 
X is the option’s strike price and F is the underlying futures price) from nearby natural 
gas options expiring in the winter peak (January) is approximately 63.75% higher than 
that in the summer trough (May) whereas for crude oil options, the peak (February) is 
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19.21% higher than the trough (September). Apparently IV tends to be lower on crude 
oil options expiring in the summer months despite the fact that the demand for 
gasoline, a distilled product from crude oil, often increases during the summer driving 
season.  
The null hypothesis that average ISDs from options expiring each month are 
equal is rejected at the 0.01 level for both crude oil and natural gas markets. For the 
natural gas market, there is significant evidence that the average ISD is higher on 
options expiring in the winter months than on options expiring in other months 
wherein winter is defined as the period from November through February40
5.2. Day-of-the-week IV pattern 
. Similarly, 
for the crude oil market, there is significant evidence that the average ISD is lower on 
options expiring in the summer (from May through September) than on options 
expiring in other months.  
Table XI reports the mean values of the log percentage change in the ISDs, 
ln(ISDa,t/ISDa,t-1), where ISDa,t
In both markets, there is a significant tendency for the ISD to decline from 
Friday close to Monday close. This evidence likely implies the market’s expectation 
that the volatility of nearby futures returns from Friday close to Monday close is 
higher than that of a normal weekday returns. Consider the change in the ISD from the 
 is the average of the two nearest-the-money options 
GO1 and GI1 in the nearby group on day t and the sample is stratified by day-of-the-
week. As mentioned earlier, the ISDs are calculated based on a trading-day basis.  
                                                     
40My definition of winter months is based on the months in which natural gas is withdrawn 
from storage and therefore supply is constrained. Using data reported in various issues of the 
Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report, I determine that natural gas withdrawals normally start in 
November and end in early March.   
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close on Friday to the close on Monday. On Friday, it is known that the market is more 
volatile over the three days ending on Monday and therefore, the anticipated 
weekend/Monday volatility is impounded in Friday’s ISD. However, this anticipated 
weekend/Monday volatility is dropped from Monday’s ISD since Monday’s ISD 
reflects the market’s expectation of volatility from Tuesday to the options’ expiration 
date. Consequently, the ISD will tend to decline from Friday close to Monday close 
because the period over which Monday’s ISD is calculated will no longer include the 
(anticipated) high weekend/Monday volatility.  
The result that the ISDs decline from Friday close to Monday close in the 
crude oil and natural gas options markets is consistent with the findings in my earlier 
papers for oil and gas actual volatilities. In these papers, I find that Friday-close-to-
Monday-close returns are more volatile than any other weekday returns for crude oil 
and particularly for natural gas.  
I hypothesized earlier that oil and gas IVs fall following the release of the 
Petroleum Status Report and the Natural Gas Storage Report, which are considered 
one of the most important announcements impacting these markets (see, for example, 
Susmel and Thompson, 1997 and Linn and Zhu, 2004). As documented in Ederington 
and Lee (1996), in the T-Bond and Eurodollar markets, IV tends to fall following the 
release of important scheduled announcements. Ederington and Lee (1996) argue that 
since the pre-release IV impounds the anticipated impact of important releases on 
volatility, IV declines post-release as this uncertainty is resolved.  
The Natural Gas Storage Report was released on Wednesdays before May 06, 
2002 and on Thursdays since then. Consequently, I examine the behavior of natural 
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gas ISDs before and after May 06, 2002. Results are in the last two columns of Table 
XI. There is evidence that the behavior of Thursday natural gas ISD differs before and 
after May 2002. After May 06, 2002, when Thursday became the release day of the 
Storage Report, the mean percentage change in Thursday ISD is negative and 
significantly lower than that for other weekdays at the 0.01 level while not significant 
before. However, there is no significant evidence that before May 2002, natural gas 
ISD declines from Tuesday close to Wednesday close although Wednesday is the 
release day of the Storage Report during this period. These results imply that the 
release of the Storage Report has a stronger impact on natural gas prices after May 
2002. For crude oil ISD, contrary to the evidence in my earlier paper that actual 
volatility tends to increase on Wednesday, the release day of the Petroleum Status 
Report, there is no significant evidence that oil ISD declines from Tuesday close to 
Wednesday close.  
6. Implied Volatility Asymmetry  
I hypothesized above that positive and negative return shocks have an 
asymmetric impact on oil and gas IVs. This hypothesis is motivated by the findings 
that IVs from stock index and Treasury bond futures options have an asymmetric 
response to returns of the underlying assets (see, for example, Fleming et al., 1995; 
Simon, 1997 and Dumas et al., 1998) and by the findings in my earlier papers that 
positive and negative return shocks have asymmetric impact on predicted volatility in 
the oil and gas markets.  
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To explore the impact of positive and negative return shocks on oil and gas 
IVs, I examine the times series of ISDs from the nearby nearest-the-money options. 
Specifically, I use the following model:  
( ) ( )
4 0 0
{ } { }
, 0 , 1 , 1
1 1 1
/ 252 / 252
(19)
a t i i j t j a t j j t j a t j
i j j
t
ISD D R ISD R ISD
u
α α δ κ+ −+ + − + + −
= =− =−
   ∆ = + + +   
+
∑ ∑ ∑
 
where ΔISDa,t is the change in average ISDs of the two nearby nearest-the-money 
options, GI1 and GO1. Rt = ln(Ft/Ft-1) where Ft is the price of the nearby futures 
contract on day t and Ft-1 is the price of the same contract on day t-1.
 {+}
 and 
{-}
 denote 
positive and negative returns, and ut
In this model, the change in ISD from the close of day t-1 to the close of day t 
is driven by day-of-the-week effects, separate variables for positive and negative 
scaled returns from day t-1 to day t and lagged of those variables. Separate variables 
for positive and negative returns are included to determine whether ISD responds 
differently to positive and negative returns. R
 is an error term. The positive and negative returns 
are scaled by lagged ISD on the previous days, expressed on a daily basis by dividing 
the lagged ISD by the square root of 252 (the number of trading days in a year). 
Equation (19) is specified similarly to the asymmetric GARCH model due to Glosten 
et al. (1993) (often referred to as the GJR model) which is used in my earlier papers on 
oil and gas price volatility.  
t
{+} (Rt{-}) can be thought of as the actual 
returns times a dummy variable =1 if the return is positive (negative) and 0 otherwise. 
As stated in Simon (1997), the reason for scaling returns, Rt, is that market 
participants should revise their forecasts of volatility more, and, consequently, ISD 
changes should be greater when the magnitude of returns diverges from that predicted 
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by ISD the previous day. For example, a larger-than-expected return of a given size 
should result in greater ISD increases when smaller absolute price changes, reflected 
by low ISD, are expected. Also noted by Simon (1997), if the daily returns are 
normally distributed with a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to 
estimated ISD expressed on a daily basis, then Rt/(ISDa,t-1 252/ ) ~ N(0,1). If a 
contemporaneous unexpected increase in both positive and negative returns (in 
absolute value) causes a higher ISD, δ0 should be significantly positive and κ0 should 
be significantly negative. If ISD increases more in response to contemporaneous 
unexpected positive returns than to unexpected negative returns, |δ0 |>|κ0
Equation 19 differs from that in Simon (1997) in that I include dummy 
variables to control for the day-of-the-week effects discussed in Section 5 and lagged 
values of scaled returns since Kim and Kim (2003) document that IVs also respond to 
lagged returns.  
|.  
Equation 19 is estimated using an ARMA (2,1) model. Results in Table XII 
indicate that unexpected positive and negative futures returns lead to higher ISD at the 
0.05 significance level in both crude oil and natural gas markets. Consistent with my 
hypothesis above, unexpected positive and negative returns have asymmetric impacts 
on oil and gas ISDs. Crude oil ISD is more responsive to unexpected negative returns 
than to positive returns of equal magnitude while natural gas ISD is more responsive 
to unexpected positive returns than to negative returns of equal magnitude. The null 
hypotheses that δ0+κ0 = 0 and δ0-κ0 = 0 are both rejected at the 0.01 level. In addition, 
|κ0|> |δ0|  for crude oil| and |δ0 |>|κ0| for natural gas, both at the 0.01 significance level. 
For crude oil, a 1% unexpected positive return results in a 0.27% increase in ISD 
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while a 1% unexpected negative return results in a 0.81% increase in ISD. For natural 
gas, a 1% unexpected positive return causes a 2.7% increase in ISD while a 1% 
unexpected negative returns only causes a 0.74% increase in ISD. The null hypothesis 
that (δ0+ δ1) + (κ0+κ1
The results regarding the asymmetric impact of unexpected positive and 
negative returns on IV are consistent with the findings in my earlier papers. Using the 
GJR model, I find that a negative return shock in the crude oil market tends to have 
more impact on predicted volatility than an equal positive shock. On the contrary, a 
positive shock in the natural gas market tends to have more impact on predicted 
volatility than an equal negative shock. While it is left unexplained why crude oil 
volatility increases more following a negative return shock, the findings that natural 
gas volatility increases more following a positive return shock is likely attributable to 
the inelasticity of the supply and demand curves at high prices in this market. 
Consequently, as the same fluctuation in demand when prices are low should cause a 
smaller change in prices than when prices are high, a positive price shock which 
moves the natural gas market up the supply and demand curves is likely to presage 
higher future volatility than a negative shock moving the market down the curves.   
) =0 is rejected at the 0.001 level for natural gas and at the 0.1 
level for crude oil.  
To test the possibility that the pronounced IV asymmetry with respect to 
unexpected positive and negative returns may be caused by extreme returns, I re-
estimate the model in Equation 19 with separate variables for positive and negative 
scaled returns that are more than two standard errors from the mean absolute scaled 
returns. 
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The expanded model is:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
4 0
{ } { }
, 0 , 1 1 , 1
1 1
0
{ } { }
, 1 1 , 1
1
/ 252 / 252
/ 252 / 252 (20)
a t i i j t j a t j t a t
i j
t j t j a t j t a t t t
j
ISD D R ISD R ISD
Tail R ISD R ISD Tail u
α α δ δ
κ κ
+ +
+ + − −
= =−
− −
+ + − −
=−
   ∆ = + + +   
   ∗ + + ∗ +   
∑ ∑
∑
 
where Tailt is a dummy variable =1 when the absolute magnitude of scaled return is 
more than 2 standard errors away from the mean, and 0 otherwise. If the asymmetric 
impact of positive and negative returns on ISD is caused by the tails of the return 
distributions, (1) positive and negative scaled returns in the central part of the 
distribution should have the same effect on ISD, and therefore δ0 should be > 0, κ0 
should be < 0, and these coefficients should be of the same magnitude; (2) positive 
and negative scaled returns in the tails of the distribution have an incrementally greater 
effect on ISD than those that are not, and therefore δ1 should be significantly positive 
and κ1
The results from this expanded specification (not reported) indicate that while 
δ
 should be significantly negative.  
0 is significantly positive and κ0 is significantly negative, the estimates of δ1 and κ1
7. The Forecasting Performance of Implied Volatility 
 
are insignificantly different from 0, implying that the asymmetric impact of 
unexpected positive and negative futures returns on IV is not caused by extreme 
returns.  
If markets are efficient and the option pricing model is correct, then the 
implied volatility calculated from an option’s price should represent the average 
forecast of the underlying asset’s future volatility over the remaining life of the option. 
Consequently, IVs should be unbiased forecasts of future volatility and should fully 
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impound all available information, including the asset’s price history. The information 
content of IV is typically determined by estimating one or both of the following 
specifications, which are known as the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (Mincer and 
Zarnowitz, 1969) in the forecasting literature (see, for example, Canina and Figlewski, 
1993; Jorion, 1995; Christensen and Prabhala, 1998; Szakmary et al., 2003; 
Ederington and Guan, 2005).  
, 1 , , , (21) andj t j t j tISD uσ α β= + ⋅ +  
' '
, 1 , 2 , ,' , (22)j t j t j t j tISD HIS uσ α β β= + ⋅ + ⋅ +  
where ,j tσ denotes the realized volatility from day t through the expiration of option j, 
ISDj,t
,j tHIS
 denotes the implied volatility (normally the standard deviation) on option j 
observed on day t, and is a measure of historical volatility (usually either the 
standard deviation of returns over some recent period or a forecast based on GARCH-
type estimation). 
If IV is an unbiased forecast of realized volatility, we should find that α = 0 
and 1β =1 in Equation 21 and 'α = 0, 
'
1β =1 in Equation 22. If IV efficiently impounds 
all available information included in historical volatility, '2β should be zero in 
Equation 22. Virtually all studies find that 0< 1β <1 and 0<
'
1β <1 and most find that 
α >0 (Ederington and Guan, 2005). Thus, the evidence in most options markets 
implies that IV is a biased predictor of realized volatility. There is mixed evidence on 
whether IV is efficient, i.e., on whether '2β  is significant in Equation 22
41
                                                     
41Canina and Figlewski (1993), Day and Lewis (1993), Ederington and Guan (2002) and 
Martens and Zein (2004) observe significant values for 
.  
'
2β  in Eq. (3) in at least some data sets 
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I estimate the following specifications on each “moneyness” bin across all four 
maturity groups.  
, 1 , , , ,( ) , (21)i t i j t i j tISD uσ τ α β= + ⋅ +        and 
' '
, 1 , , 2 , , , ,( ) ' , (22)i t i j t i j t i j tISD HIS uσ τ α β β= + ⋅ + ⋅ +  
where , ,i j tISD is the implied standard deviation computed on day t from the option in 
maturity group i  and “moneyness” group j , and , ,i j tu  represents the regression error. I 
include ISDs from all “moneyness” bins across terms to maturity until a bin’s number 
of observations falls below 500. , ( )i tσ τ is the realized volatility of log returns over the 
period between t and t τ+ , the option’s expiration date, annualized by multiplying the 
standard deviation calculated per day by 252.  Log return is defined as: 
1
Ln tt
t
FR
F −
 
=  
 
 
where Ft is the price of the underlying futures contract on day t and Ft-1 
A common problem in most studies on the forecasting power of implied 
volatility is that due to considerable overlap in the data set, the forecast errors 
is the price of 
the same futures contract on day t-1.  
, ,i j tu  are 
serially correlated. On any day ,t , ,i j tISD  represents expected volatility from day t+1 to 
day t+τ, the day the option expires. Likewise, on day t+1, , , 1i j tISD +  represents 
expected volatility from day t+2  to day t+τ. Observations on realized volatility ( )tσ τ  
and 1( )tσ τ+  have 1τ −  days in common, observations on ( )tσ τ  and 2 ( )tσ τ+  have 
2τ −  days in common, etc. which cause serious autocorrelation. When the data set 
                                                                                                                                                         
while Christensen and Prabhala (1998), Fleming (1998), Blair et al. (2001), Szakmary et al. 
(2003), and Corrado and Miller (2003) find no evidence that historical volatility or GARCH 
forecasts contain additional information.  
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contains overlapping observations, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficient 
estimates are still unbiased but OLS estimates of the coefficients’ standard errors are 
biased downward. To correct for serial correlation, I employ Hansen’s correction, the 
most common procedure in the literature42
Define 
.  
nX as the row vector of the independent variables for observation n in 
the sample; that is (1 IV)n nX =  [ (1 IV HIS)n nX =  for regressions based on 
Equation 22]. X  is the 2N ×  matrix of the nX . [ X  is the 3N ×  for regressions based 
on Equation 22].  Let nu  be the regression error for observation n, and let u denote the 
N vector of the un
 
. Following Hansen (1982) and others, I compute 
2
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ' ( , ) ( ' ' ), (23)
N N N
n n n n n nk k k
n k n k
u X X Q k n u u X X X X
= = = +
Ψ= + +∑ ∑ ∑  
where uk and un
( , )Q k n
 are the regression residuals for observations k and n from the OLS 
regression. is an indicator function taking the value 1 if there is an overlap 
between the periods to expiration for the two options, and 0 otherwise.  
The corrected variance-covariance matrix for the estimated coefficients is 
1 1ˆ ˆ( ' ) ( ' ) , (2 4)X X X X− −Ω= Ψ  
7.1. Bias and information content differences across maturities and 
moneyness 
Estimations of Equation 21 for oil and gas IVs are reported in Table XIII and 
Figures 14 and 15. Apparently, the patterns of the parameter estimates differ by time 
to expiration. Consider the results for crude oil ISDs. For the nearby group, the 
                                                     
42Examples are Canina and Figlewski (1993), Jorion (1995), Ederington and Guan (2005) and 
others.  
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intercepts, ˆ 'sα , are not significantly different from zero for all “moneyness” bins 
except for the deep ITM call options. For the second- and third-month groups, ˆ 'sα  are 
only indistinguishable from zero for deep OTM call options. 
Of more interest are the ISD coefficients. For the nearby group, 1ˆ 'sβ , the ISD 
coefficients,  are close to and insignificantly different from 1.0 for all “moneyness” 
bins except for the deep ITM calls. For the second-, third- and fourth-month groups, 
1ˆ 'sβ are significantly less than 1.0.  
I plot 1ˆβ  for crude oil options as a function of “moneyness” in Figure 14. For 
the nearby group, 1ˆ 'sβ  display a “frown” image
43
1ˆ 'sβ
 that is approximately a reverse 
image of the volatility smile where are highest for near-the-money options. 
However, for longer term groups, 1ˆβ  pattern is not a reverse image of the volatility 
smile as 1ˆ 'sβ  are generally highest for deep OTM calls. 
For natural gas options, the intercepts, ˆ 's,α are not significantly distinguishable 
from zero in most “moneyness” bins of the nearby and second-month groups. ˆ 'sα  are 
significantly different from zero for the third-month group and ITM calls in the fourth-
month group. The slope coefficients 1ˆ 'sβ  are close to and insignificantly different 
from 1.0 for near-the-money nearby options and for most options in the second-month 
subsamples. 
As exhibited in Figure 14, the ISD coefficients for natural gas nearby options 
also displays a “frown” pattern where 1ˆβ  is highest for the near-the-money groups.  1ˆβ  
                                                     
43The information “frown” is first explored in Ederington and Guan (2005). 
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is less variable in the second-month group. For the third- and fourth-month 
subsamples, 1ˆβ  is generally higher for OTM options.   
As shown in Table XIII, adjusted R2 statistics pattern also varies by time to 
expiration. Adjusted R2 statistics for nearby crude oil options display a frown pattern 
in that they are small at deep ITM or OTM calls and peak at near-the-money calls. For 
the longer term crude oil options, adjusted R2 generally increases with strike price. For 
natural gas nearby and second-month options, adjusted R2 statistics are generally 
higher for ITM options and decreases with strike prices. For natural gas third- and 
fourth-month groups, adjusted R2
As noted in Ederington and Guan (2005), comparing R
 is highest for ATM options.  
2 across different 
“moneyness” groups is problematic in that the samples differ somewhat. On a given 
day there might be an observation for ATM group but not for ITM or OTM so R2 
could be different because one “moneyness” group is observed on a day with small 
error and another on a day with a large error. To compare the information content of 
ISDs from different “moneyness” groups on a more consistent basis, I follow 
Ederington and Guan (2005) and calculate the relative forecasting power for each 
“moneyness” group. First I form an un-weighted average ISDai,t
, ( )i tσ τ
 of the ISDs for the 
two ATM subsamples: GI1 and GO1 in maturity group i on day t. is then 
regressed on ISDai,t. Let u(ATMa)i,t  be the residual from this regression on day t and 
ui,j,t
2 2
, , , ,(ATMa)i j i t i j tY u u=∑ ∑
 be the residual from one of the individual “moneyness” regressions in Table XIII, 
I then form the ratio  where both summations are over only 
those daily observations where both u(ATMa)i,t and ui,j,t are observed. So Yi,j measures 
the relative explanatory power of an individual ISD from “moneyness” group j versus 
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the average ISD of the two ATM options. If Yi,j <1, the average ATM ISDs predicts 
future volatility over the life of the option better than the individual ISD. If Yi,j
As reported in Table XIII and graphed in Figure 15, Y pattern varies by time-
to-maturity. For crude oil nearby options, relative R
 >1, the 
individual ISD predicts future volatility better than the ATM average.  
2’s are highest for ATM options. 
However, for longer term crude oil options, R2’s are generally higher for OTM 
options. For natural gas nearby options, relative R2’s are highest for moderately low 
strike options in the “moneyness” bins GI1, GI2 and GI3. For longer term natural gas 
options, relative R2
In summary, the information content in oil and gas IVs varies considerably by 
time-to-maturity and by options’ “moneyness”. For crude oil options, the most 
informative in terms of predicting future volatility are ISD’s calculated from the prices 
of nearby group, except for deep ITM options. For natural gas options, the most 
informative in terms of forecasting future volatility are ISD’s calculated from the 
prices of near-the-money options in the nearby group and of most options in the 
second-month group. For these “most informative” options, the regression evidence in 
Table XIII is consistent with the hypothesis that IVs are unbiased predictors of actual 
volatility in that the slope coefficients, 
’s are higher for ATM options than for ITM or OTM options.  
1ˆ 'sβ  are close to and insignificantly different 
from 1.0 and the intercepts, ˆ 'sα  are close to and insignificantly different from zero. 
For other options groups, the hypothesis that the ISD’s are unbiased predictors of 
future volatility is rejected. Thus, ISDs on other options are influenced by something 
other than the market’s volatility expectation.  
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Both academic researchers and market participants normally use IV calculated 
from ATM options to represent the volatility expectations of market participants. 
However, results in Table XIII indicate that while that practice is justifiable for natural 
gas options and for nearby crude oil options, it is problematic for longer term crude oil 
options.  
7.2. Efficiency 
Next I test whether oil and gas IVs efficiently impound all the historical 
information by estimating Equation 22 where a measure of historical volatility is 
added to the equation. For historical volatility, I use the volatility forecast over the life 
of the options generated by the GJR model44
'
2
ˆ sβ
. Results are reported in Table XIV. For 
the three far ITM crude oil nearby groups (GI3, GI4, GI5), , the coefficients of 
historical volatility forecast, are significantly different from zero and relatively 
sizable, implying that the ISDs for these groups are influenced by factors other than 
the market’s volatility expectation. Except for these three groups, '2ˆ sβ  are 
insignificantly different from zero across all other options groups, implying that crude 
oil and natural gas implied volatilities generally impound information in historical 
volatility fairly efficiently.  
The evidence that IV from oil and gas options is a fairly efficient forecast of 
future volatility is consistent with the findings in Christensen and Prabhala (1998), 
                                                     
44I use a GJR model to forecast historical volatility over the life of the option. The GJR 
specification is 2 21 1 2 1 3 1 where(26),t t t t th hω γ ε γ γ η ε− − −= + + +  1if and 0 otherwise1 0 .t tη ε −= <  
The regression estimates from (26) are used to generate ht+1, volatility forecast for the next 
day. ht+1 is then substituted back into the equation to generate a volatility forecast for the 
following day, ht+2. This substitution continues for each day through the life of the option.  
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Fleming (1998), Blair et al. (2001), Szakmary et al. (2003), Corrado and Miller (2003) 
and Ederington and Guan (2005).  
8. Summary 
This paper explores the structure, characteristics, and determinants of crude oil 
and natural gas implied volatilities. Using the IVs calculated from crude oil and 
natural gas futures and futures’ call options prices from September 1999 through June 
2006, I find that the behavior of IV in these two markets is much different from that in 
most financial options markets that we are more familiar with.  In both markets, IVs 
tend to increase as the options approach expiration, yielding lower IVs on options at 
longer terms to maturity. This term structure pattern is opposite to that in the stock, 
stock index, currency and T-bond futures options markets. While inconsistent with the 
pattern for IV in those financial options markets, the oil and gas IV term structure 
pattern is consistent with the actual volatility pattern for different maturity futures 
contracts. 
The cross-sectional pattern in crude oil options varies by term to maturity. For 
the nearby group, IVs are lowest when options are near the money and increase as call 
options become increasingly in or out of the money. For the second-month group, IVs 
are lowest for moderately low strike options and increase for out-of-the-money and 
deep in-the-money call options. The IVs in the third- and fourth-month groups exhibit 
a positive “skew” pattern where IVs are lowest for deep ITM calls and increase as the 
option strikes increase. The “smile” pattern in natural gas options is consistent across 
all maturity groups in that IVs are lowest when strikes are low and increase 
monotonically with strikes. This “smile” or positive “skew” pattern is opposite to the 
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“sneer”, or “smirk” pattern in the stock and stock index options markets where IVs 
monotonically decrease with strikes. The hedging pressure hypothesis – in particular, 
hedgers buying out-of-the-money call options to protect against a sharp price increase, 
could partially explain the positive “skew” pattern in natural gas IVs. However, there 
is no evidence that the cross-sectional IV pattern in crude oil options is caused by 
hedging pressures in that market.  
There is evidence of a winter effect in natural gas IVs in that IVs are 
significantly higher on options expiring in the winter months than on those expiring in 
other months. This seasonality effect is consistent with the high actual volatility in 
winter during which demand for natural gas may increase dramatically while supply of 
natural gas is essentially fixed. To a lesser extent, crude oil IVs are significantly lower 
on options expiring in the summer months than on those expiring in other months.  
Oil and gas IVs tend to decrease from Friday close to Monday close, implying 
that volatility tends to be high over the three-day weekend in both markets. This is 
consistent with the findings for oil and gas actual volatilities. There is evidence that 
the Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report has significant impact on gas IV after May 
2002. Contrary to earlier findings for actual volatilities, there is no significant 
evidence that crude oil IV declines following the release of the Petroleum Status 
Report and that natural gas IV declines following the release of the Storage Report 
prior to May 2002. 
There is evidence that oil and gas IVs have an asymmetric response to positive 
and negative futures returns. Crude oil IV tends to increase more following an 
unexpected negative return than a positive return of equal magnitude while natural gas 
 126 
 
IV tends to increase more following an unexpected positive return than an equal 
negative return. While it is left unexplained why crude oil IV increases more 
following a negative return shock, the finding that natural gas IV increases more 
following a positive return shock is likely attributable to the hypothesized shape of the 
supply and demand curves which are likely to be inelastic at high volumes and prices. 
Oil and gas IVs are efficient forecast of future volatility across terms to 
maturity. For crude oil options, the most informative in terms of predicting future 
volatility are IVs on nearby group, except for deep ITM options. For natural gas 
options, the most informative are IVs calculated from the near-the-money options in 
the nearby group and in the second-month group.  
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Table I. Summary Statistics: Crude oil returns 
This table presents summary statistics for crude oil returns where rt=ln(Pt/Pt-1); Pt is 
the price of the futures contract on day t and Pt-1 is the price of the same futures 
contract on the previous day. The third, fifth and seventh columns present summary 
statistics for absolute values of daily returns. (**) and (*
 
) on Rho designate estimates 
significantly different from zero at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. The sample 
extends from January 1, 1997 to November 28, 2008.  
 Nearby Second-month Third-month 
 
Returns Absolute 
Returns 
Returns Absolute 
Returns 
Returns Absolute 
Returns 
Mean (x102 0.0249 ) 1.8033 0.0243 1.6534 0.0283 1.5486 
Maximum 0.1454 0.1654 0.1379 0.1572 0.1166 0.1216 
Minimum -0.1654 0.0000 -0.1572 0.0000 -0.1216 0.0000 
Std Dev 0.0242 0.0162 0.0220 0.0145 0.0206 0.0136 
Annualized Std 
Dev 
0.3826 0.2561 0.3479 0.2293 0.3257 0.2150 
Skewness -0.2598 0.2283 -0.2512 0.2104 -0.2398 0.1972 
Kurtosis 6.3969 12.9479 5.8826 11.9163 5.4104 10.0491 
Rho (First order  
Autocorrelation 
coefficient) 
-0.0114 0.0529 -0.0279 ** 0.0340 0.0043 * 0.0492* 
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Table II. The multiplicative GARCH-type model of volatility determinants 
Estimates of the model:  
 
  
rt = μ + φ1rt -1 + εt
where: 
     (1) 
 εt 2tσ ~N(0, ) and 2t t tσ h s= ⋅      (2) 
ht = Var(ζt) = ω+ αζt-12+βht-1+ γζt-12It-1, where ζt =  εt .5ts /  (3) 
4
t i,t
i=1
s s=∏       (4) 
s1,t κt[AP /AP ] =       (4.a)  
s2,t = (1+ δ-1DAt-1)(1+ δ0DAt)(1+ δ1DAt+1
s
)  (4.b) 
3,t
4
i i,t
i=1
(1+λ DW )∏ =      (4.c) 
s4,t = (1+ θ1DSUMi,t)(1+ θ2DWINi,t
 
)   (4.d) 
are presented where rt is the log percentage change in price of the futures contract on 
day t, εt is a normally distributed random variable with conditional mean zero and 
conditional variance ht. It-1=1 if εt-1 >0 and 0 otherwise. APt
AP
 is the inflation-adjusted 
price,  represents the average inflation-adjusted price over the sample period. DAt 
is 1 on OPEC meeting days and 0 otherwise. DAt-1 (DAt+1) is 1 on the day before 
(after) the OPEC meeting days. DWi,t are zero-one dummies for Monday (including 
weekend), Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. SUMt =1 if the contract expires in 
summer months (from May through August) and 0 otherwise; WINt =1 if the contract 
expires in winter months (from November through February) and 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. (***), (**), (*
 
) designate estimates 
significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. The 
sample extends from January 01, 1997 to November 28, 2008.  
 
GJR 
model 
 Full model 
   Nearby Second-month Third-month 
 
  futures contract futures contract futures 
contracts 
ω 0.1847  *** 0.2114 0.2639*** 0.2361*** 
 
*** 
(0.0387)  (0.0629) (0.0791) (0.0719) 
α 0.0829  *** 0.0586 0.0700*** 0.0656*** 
 
*** 
(0.0089)  (0.0123) (0.0136) (0.0129) 
β 0.9066  *** 0.8974 0.8681*** 0.8636*** 
 
*** 
(0.0111)  (0.0220) (0.0296) (0.0306) 
γ -0.0413  *** -0.0179 -0.0318* -0.0182 * 
 (0.0107)  (0.0089) (0.0137) (0.0148) 
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Level   -0.5354 -0.3960*** -0.3095*** 
 
** 
  (0.1134) (0.1035) (0.1040) 
OPEC meetings   0.0605 0.1132 0.1251 
   (0.2014) (0.2145) (0.2143) 
OPEC meetings (+1)   0.5447 0.7101* 0.6772* 
 
* 
  (0.2619) (0.2858) (0.3023) 
OPEC meetings (-1)   0.4663 0.4471 0.4513 
   (0.2919) (0.2930) (0.2845) 
Monday   0.4040 0.3902*** 0.3293*** 
 
*** 
  (0.0936) (0.0968) (0.0981) 
Wednesday   0.3260 0.3282*** 0.3169** 
 
** 
  (0.0902) (0.0982) (0.0964) 
Thursday   0.0474 0.1084 0.1042 
   (0.0774) (0.0899) (0.0893) 
Friday   -0.0525 0.0370 0.0555 
   (0.0681) (0.0815) (0.0831) 
Summer   -0.0467 -0.1226 -0.1148 
   (0.0885) (0.0816) (0.0815) 
Winter   0.0629 0.0684 0.1259 
   (0.0931) (0.0933) (0.0979) 
      
Log-likelihood -6716.549  -6687.190 -6423.765 -6219.350 
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Table III. The Diagonal VECH model of the crude oil and exchange index 
covariance matrix 
Estimates of the model 
 
, 1 , 1 , 1
~ (0, )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (7)
t t
t t
t ij ij ij j t i t i j t ij
N H
H A B Hε ε− − −
= +
= Ω + +
rμ ε
ε
 
are presented where 1, 2,( , ) 't t tr r=r is a (2x1) vector where r1 and r2
tH
 are crude oil and 
exchange index returns, respectively and is a (2x2) conditional covariance matrix. 
tH  is presumed to follow the most unrestricted Diagonal VECH process where the 
parameters in the matrices , , andA BΩ  are allowed to vary without any restriction. Ω  
is a (3x1) parameter vector; A and B are (3x3) diagonal parameter matrices. For 
comparison, the estimates from univariate GARCH(1,1) model are presented in the 
first column. Returns are expressed in log percent. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. (***), (**) and (*
 
) designate estimates significantly different from zero at 
the 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. The sample extends from January 01, 
1997 through November 28, 2008. 
 Univariate GARCH (1,1) Diagonal VECH 
 Exchange index Crude oil  
Ω(1,1) 0.0015  ** 0.0015** 
 (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
Ω(1,2)   -0.0035
 
* 
  (0.0020) 
Ω(2,2)  0.2051 0.1935*** 
 
*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0421) 
A(1,1) 0.0376  *** 0.0362
 
*** 
(0.0053)  (0.0050) 
A(1,2)   0.0268
 
*** 
  (0.0074) 
A(2,2)  0.0693 0.0651*** 
 
*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0064) 
B(1,1) 0.9549  *** 0.9563
 
*** 
(0.0074)  (0.0071) 
B(1,2)   0.9290
 
*** 
  (0.0275) 
B(2,2)  0.8968 0.9026*** 
 
*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0118) 
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Table IV. Summary Statistics: Natural gas returns and extreme value estimators 
This table presents summary statistics for natural gas returns, absolute returns and 
extreme value estimators of volatility. The second column presents summary statistics 
for daily returns, rt, where rt=ln(Pt/Pt-1); Pt is the price of the nearby futures contract 
on day t and Pt-1  is the price of the same futures contract on the previous day. The 
third column presents summary statistics for absolute values of daily returns. The 
fourth column presents summary statistics for extreme value estimators of volatility, 
Stdt
)2ln(2
)ln()ln( tt
t
LowHigh
Std
−
=, where , tHigh and tLow  denote the highest and the lowest 
prices of the nearby natural gas futures contract on day t, respectively. (**
 
) on Rho 
designates estimates significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. The sample 
extends from January 02, 1997 to December 31, 2008.  
Returns Absolute 
Returns 
Extreme 
value 
estimator 
Mean (x102 0.0340 ) 2.7597 2.8610 
Maximum 0.3244 0.3244 0.1950 
Minimum -0.1990 0.0000 0.0012 
Std Dev 0.0382 0.0264 0.0148 
Annualized Std Dev 0.6219 0.4298  
Skewness 0.4570 2.6122 2.7047 
Kurtosis 8.0764 16.6902 21.9202 
Rho (First order  
autocorrelation coefficient) 
-0.0614 0.1151 0.3941** ** 
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Table V. The multiplicative GARCH-type model of volatility determinants 
Table V presents the estimates of the following model:  
rt = μ + a1Oilrett + a2CddDift + a3HddDift {+} + a4 HddDift {- }+ a5SRFEt ∑
=
4
1
,
i
tiiDWϑ+  + ε t 
ε
    (10) 
t
2
tσ ~N(0, ) and 
2
t t th sσ = ⋅      (11) 
ht = Var(ζt) = ω+ αζ t-12+βh t-1+ γζ t-12It-1, where ζ t = ε t .5ts /  (12) 
5
,
i=1
t i ts s=∏       (13) 
s1,t
4
,
i=1
(1+ )i i tDWλ∏ =      (13.a) 
s2,t ( )tSR
κ =        (13.b) 
s3,t
11
,
i=1
(1+ )i i tDMθ∏ =                                        (13.c) 
s4,t =  (1+ ψW t
s
)      (13.d) 
5,t = (1+ δ0BWt)(1+ δ1ABWt
 
)    (13.e) 
rt is the log percentage change in price of the nearby natural gas futures contract on 
day t, εt
2
tσ
 is a normally distributed random variable with conditional mean zero and 
conditional variance . Oilrett is the log percentage change in price of the nearby 
crude oil futures contract on day t. CddDift is the difference between the actual 
Cooling Degree Day measure and the 30-year average CDD measure for day t; 
HddDift is the difference between the actual Heating Degree Day measure and the 30-
year normal HDD measure for day t, HddDift {+} = HddDift if HddDift > 0 and 0 
otherwise, HddDift {-} = HddDift if HddDift <0 and 0 otherwise; SRFEt is the surprise 
in the change in storage = the actual storage change as reported in the EIA storage 
survey - the consensus expected storage change as reported by Bloomberg prior to the 
EIA report release; DWi,t are zero-one dummies for Monday (which includes the 
weekend), Wednesday, Thursday and Friday with Tuesday being the left-out day. It-
1=1 if εt-1
SR
t
t s
SRFE
SR = <0 and 0 otherwise.  on days the storage report announcement 
is released and 1 otherwise where SRs is the sample standard deviation of tSRFE . 
DMi,t=1 if the futures contract observed on day t expires in month i. Wt= 1 if the 
difference between the actual Heating Degree Day measure and the 30-year normal 
HDD measure for day t (HddDift) is < 0 and Wt= 0 otherwise. BWt is 1 if day t is one 
of the last five trading days in a month and 0 otherwise. ABWt is 1 if day t is the first 
trading day in a month and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
(***), (**), (*
 
) designate estimates significantly different from zero at the 0.001, 0.01 
and 0.05 levels, respectively. The sample extends from January 02, 1997 to December 
31, 2008.  
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Panel A. Mean equation 
 
 1997-2008  1997-2002  2002-2008 
µ 0.1580  -0.003   0.2398 
 (0.1565)  (0.2324)  (0.1648) 
Oilret 0.4632  *** 0.3320  *** 0.5329
 
*** 
(0.0304)  (0.0416)  (0.0502) 
CddDif 0.0443  0.0145  0.0870 
 (0.0435)  (0.0307)  (0.0715) 
HddDif 0.0016 {+}  -0.0023  0.0060 
 (0.0221)  (0.0309)  (0.0304) 
HddDif -0.0362{- }  * 0.0216  -0.0559
 
* 
(0.0188)  (0.0269)  (0.0230) 
Monday -0.1523  0.06262  -0.3291 
 (0.2269)  (0.3369)  (0.2803) 
Wednesday -0.2572  -0.4183  -0.0500 
 (0.2214)  (0.3284)  (0.2261) 
Thursday -0.2759  0.17503  -0.6216
 
** 
(0.2225)  (0.3299)  (0.2453) 
Friday -0.0356  0.34631  -0.4796
 
** 
(0.2248)  (0.3336)  (0.2037) 
SRFE     -0.0636
  
*** 
        (0.0148) 
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Panel B. Variance Equation 
 
 
GJR 
model Full model 
  1997-2008  1997-2002  2002-2008 
ω 0.3673 0.1668**  *** 0.1677  * 0.1677* 
 (0.0652) (0.0483)  (0.0742)  (0.0660) 
α 0.0995 0.0691**  *** 0.0681  *** 0.0714
 
** 
(0.0077) (0.009)  (0.0159)  (0.0137) 
β 0.8869 0.9235***  *** 0.9244  *** 0.9007
 
** 
(0.0104) (0.0119)  (0.0193)  (0.0235) 
γ -0.0158 -0.0359*  ** -0.0239  -0.0396
 
* 
(0.0088) (0.0125)  (0.0214)  (0.0174) 
Monday  0.8772  *** 0.7047  *** 0.8201
 
*** 
 (0.1434)  (0.1914)  (0.1839) 
Wednesday  0.1080  0.1678  -0.0422 
  (0.0843)  (0.1288)  (0.0967) 
Thursday  0.4752  *** 0.2848  * 0.6760
 
*** 
 (0.1187)  (0.1462)  (0.2016) 
Friday  -0.2575  *** -0.2640  ** -0.2740
 
* 
 (0.0576)  (0.0849)  (0.0742) 
January  1.2836  ** 1.2888  * 1.5620
 
** 
 (0.3979)  (0.5925)  (0.5736) 
February  1.0768  ** 0.8148  * 1.5867
 
** 
 (0.3663)  (0.4635)  (0.5825) 
March  0.4082  * 0.1985  1.7769
 
** 
 (0.2371)  (0.3270)  (0.6602) 
April  -0.1847  -0.1062  0.9597
 
* 
 (0.1277)  (0.2351)  (0.4115) 
May  -0.3292  -0.3109  * 0.0804 
  (0.1031)  (0.1758)  (0.2203) 
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July  -0.2519  ** -0.1702  -0.0954 
  (0.0946)  (0.1779)  (0.1753) 
August  0.0157  -0.1635  0.3141 
  (0.1455)  (0.1705)  (0.2302) 
September  0.3961  * 0.1688  0.9475
 
* 
 (0.2178)  (0.2564)  (0.4355) 
October  1.5795  *** 1.3393  * 1.8148
 
** 
 (0.3985)  (0.5977)  (0.6055) 
November  1.2622  *** 1.2646  * 3.4377
 
*** 
 (0.3626)  (0.5809)  (0.8879) 
December  0.6336  * 0.7675  2.0524
 
** 
 (0.2926)  (0.5106)  (0.6494) 
W  0.3158  ** 0.1051  0.3032
 
** 
 (0.1093)  (0.1629)  (0.1067) 
BW  0.6592  *** 0.3065  ** 0.8004
 
*** 
 (0.0925)  (0.1190)  (0.1292) 
ABW  0.4802  ** 0.6451  * 0.4595
 
* 
 (0.1829)  (0.2789)  (0.2525) 
SR  t     0.2167
 
** 
     (0.0774) 
Log-Likelihood -7116.32 -6947.23   -3560.01  -4277.48 
 
 146 
 
Table VI. Robustness check 
Table VI presents the estimates of the following model:  
5 4 11
' { } { } ' ' ' ' '
1 1 2 1 , , 0
1 1 1
'
1 (16)
t i t i t t j j t t k k t t t
i j k
t t t
Std Std DW SR DM W BW
ABW OilStd e
ω α γ ε γ ε λ κ θ ψ δ
δ ρ
+ −
− − −
= = =
= + + + + + + + +
+ + +
∑ ∑ ∑  
)2ln(2
)ln()ln( tt
t
LowHigh
Std
−
= , tHigh and tLow  denote the highest and the lowest prices of 
the nearby natural gas futures contract on day t, respectively. rt = ln(Pt/Pt-1) where Pt 
is the price of the nearby futures contract on day t and Pt-1
}{
1
+
−tε
 is the price of the same 
contract the previous day. = εt-1 if εt-1 ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise; }{ 1
−
−tε = εt-1 if εt-1 < 0 and 
0 otherwise and εt
r
 is the residual from the mean equation: 
t = μ + a1Oilrett + a2CddDift + a3HddDift {+} + a4 HddDift {- }+ a5SRFEt ∑
=
4
1
,
i
tiiDWϑ+  
+ εt 
 DW
    (10) 
j,t
 
 are zero-one dummies for Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.  
SR
t
t s
SRFE
SR =  on days the storage report announcement is released and 0 otherwise 
where SRFEt
SRs
 is the surprise in the change in storage = the actual storage change 
(reported in the EIA report) - the consensus expected storage change (reported by 
Bloomberg prior to the EIA report release) and is the sample standard deviation of 
tSRFE . DMk,t =1 if the futures contract observed on day t expires in month k. Wt = 1 if 
the difference between the actual Heating Degree Day measure and the 30-year 
normal HDD measure for day t (HddDift) is < 0 and Wt= 0 otherwise. BWt is 1 if day t 
is one of the last five trading days in a month and 0 otherwise. ABWt
)2ln(2
)ln()ln( tt
t
OilLowOilHigh
OilStd
−
=
 =1 if day t is the 
first trading day in a month. , tOilHigh and tOilLow  
denote the highest and the lowest prices of the nearby crude oil futures contract on day 
t, respectively. (**) and (*
 
) designate estimates significantly different from zero at the 
0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. The sample extends from January 02, 1997 to 
December 31, 2008.  
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 1997-2008 1997-2002 2002-2008 
  Estimate 
Std. 
error Estimate 
Std. 
error Estimate 
Std. 
error 
 
ω' (x102
 
) 0.2922 0.1331 * -0.0442 0.2326 0.4472 0.1803 * 
Std(-1) 0.1828 0.0546 ** 0.1929 0.0637 ** 0.1083 0.0417 ** 
Std (-2) 0.1379 0.0324 ** 0.0937 0.0411 * 0.1724 0.0325 ** 
Std (-3) 0.0604 0.0291 * 0.0732 0.0349 * 0.0588 0.0329 * 
Std (-4) 0.1119 0.0265 ** 0.0929 0.0387 * 0.1148 0.0323 ** 
Std (-5) 0.0805 0.0299 ** 0.0830 0.0345 * 0.0599 0.0319 * 
}{+
tε  0.0862 0.0428 * 0.0913 0.0715 0.0874 0.0223 ** 
}{−
tε  -0.0009 0.0222 0.0084 0.0371 -0.0261 0.0247 
Monday (x102 0.3482) 0.1172 ** 0.4871 0.1768 ** 0.2512 0.1161 * 
Wednesday (x102 0.1761) 0.0877 * 0.1845 0.1195 0.1945 0.1122 * 
Thursday (x102 0.5971) 0.0924 ** 0.7274 0.1298 ** 0.2243 0.1335 * 
Friday (x102 -0.2200) 0.0863 * -0.2812 0.1136 * -0.1311 0.1134 
W (x102 0.1227) 0.0721 * 0.1512 0.1133 0.1057 0.0923 
January (x102 0.2617) 0.1375 * 0.5075 0.2221 * 0.3099 0.1738 * 
February (x102 0.4132) 0.1322 ** 0.5651 0.2062 ** 0.1803 0.1875 
March (x102 0.4182) 0.2471 * 0.6282 0.4563 0.3499 0.1885 * 
April (x102 -0.0693 ) 0.0929 -0.0672 0.1382 0.0287 0.1786 
May (x102 0.0918 ) 0.0866 -0.0253 0.1166 0.0654 0.1696 
July (x102 0.1477 ) 0.0954 0.2673 0.1288 * 0.1178 0.1719 
August (x102 0.2414) 0.1132 * 0.1937 0.1496 0.3945 0.1767 * 
September (x102 0.4985) 0.1201 ** 0.3825 0.1312 ** 0.8041 0.1797 ** 
October (x102 0.6022) 0.1352 ** 0.5978 0.1667 ** 0.8272 0.1947 ** 
November (x102 0.2732) 0.1261 * 0.4056 0.1571 ** 0.2815 0.1738 
December (x102 0.3724) 0.1219 ** 0.6243 0.1862 ** 0.3424 0.1766 * 
BW (x102 0.1658) 0.0736 * 0.2661 0.1116 * 0.1177 0.0848 
ABW (x102 0.2039 ) 0.1363 0.0482 0.1669 0.2653 0.1739 
OilStd 0.1431 0.0337 ** 0.2943 0.0591 ** 0.1265 0.0298 ** 
SRt (x102  )    0.4746 0.1542 ** 
Adjusted R 0.3221 2   0.3334   0.3562 
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Table VII. Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of crude oil and natural gas implied standard 
deviations calculated from daily closing prices of nearby, second-, third-, and fourth-month 
futures and call options on futures from September 01, 1999 to June 30, 2006.  
 
Crude Oil 
1999-
2006 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
          
Mean 0.329 0.351 0.315 0.350 0.370 0.359 0.341 0.320 0.247 
Median 0.323
 
0.357
 
0.311
 
0.315
 
0.361
 
0.329
 
0.344
 
0.320
 
0.252
 Maximum 1.222
 
0.545
 
0.579
 
0.983
 
0.858
 
0.796
 
1.222
 
1.184
 
0.344
 Minimum 0.063
 
0.109
 
0.121
 
0.084
 
0.191
 
0.192
 
0.063
 
0.085
 
0.085
 Std. Dev. 0.065
 
0.042
 
0.050
 
0.098
 
0.049
 
0.079
 
0.049
 
0.032
 
0.028
 Skewness 1.297 -.692 0.334 1.097 0.627 1.605 2.719 0.541 -1.078 
Kurtosis 8.58 4.15 3.73 3.50 4.04 5.49 4.01 6.50 5.12 
Number of 
Obs 
74604 1756 7050 6989 8647 10085 13195 18143 8739 
2nd 0.281
 
 decile 0.318
 
0.275
 
0.275
 
0.328
 
0.301
 
0.303
 
0.298
 
0.228
 4
th 0.312
 
 decile 0.346
 
0.301
 
0.302
 
0.350
 
0.320
 
0.332
 
0.314
 
0.246
 6
th 0.335
 
 decile 0.367
 
0.322
 
0.329
 
0.375
 
0.343
 
0.357
 
0.327
 
0.258
 8
th 0.370
 
 decile 0.387
 
0.354
 
0.453
 
0.417
 
0.418
 
0.379
 
0.343
 
0.270
 Natural Gas          
Mean 0.515 0.551 0.555 0.603 0.540 0.536 0.470 0.402 0.561 
Median 0.510
 
0.564
 
0.551
 
0.596
 
0.540
 
0.526
 
0.433
 
0.386
 
0.552
 Maximum 1.480
 
0.727
 
1.480
 
1.429
 
1.026
 
1.202
 
0.973
 
0.937
 
0.888
 Minimum 0.112
 
0.238
 
0.112
 
0.182
 
0.262
 
0.203
 
0.150
 
0.129
 
0.203
 Std. Dev. 0.131
 
0.077
 
0.169
 
0.133
 
0.062
 
0.107
 
0.137
 
0.088
 
0.103
 Skewness 0.710 -0.704 1.204 0.524 0.046 0.961 0.821 0.988 0.091 
Kurtosis 4.63 3.48 6.21 3.16 3.55 5.52 2.81 4.13 2.36 
Number of 
Obs 
79162 1425 8111 8481 10883 15615 15384 11938 7324 
2nd 0.422
 
 decile 0.486
 
0.423
 
0.486
 
0.490
 
0.451
 
0.351
 
0.332
 
0.467
 4
th 0.475
 
 decile 0.542
 
0.521
 
0.562
 
0.525
 
0.502
 
0.398
 
0.368
 
0.516
 6
th 0.530
 
 decile 0.582
 
0.581
 
0.623
 
0.556
 
0.552
 
0.471
 
0.405
 
0.597
 8
th 0.602
 
 decile 0.617
 
0.647
 
0.703
 
0.592
 
0.613
 
0.599
 
0.460
 
0.660
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Table VIII. The implied volatility term structure 
Panel A. The term structure pattern 
The “All-strike ISD Mean” and the “ATM ISD Mean” columns report the average 
implied standard deviations (ISDs) over all options with -.2 ≤ (X/F-1) ≤ .2 where X is 
the option’s strike price and F is the underlying futures price and the average ISDs on 
ATM options when the sample is stratified by time to expiration. ISDs are calculated 
from daily closing prices of futures and call options on futures.  
The “Forward ISD” column reports the average forward ISDs calculated from ISDs on 
nearby, second-, third- and fourth-month options with -.2 ≤ (X/F-1) ≤ .2. The forward 
ISDs are calculated as follow. If on a given day, the ISD of an option expiring in t1 
days is x, and that of an option in the same “moneyness” group maturing in t2 days is 
y, the forward ISD over the period from day t1+1through day t2
1 2 1
2 2
t t ty x
t t
   −
−   
   
 is calculated as 
. Thus, the second-month forward group contains forward ISDs 
calculated from ISDs on nearby and second-month options, the third-month forward 
group contains forward ISDs calculated from ISDs on second- and third-month 
options and so on.  
The “Different futures contracts volatility” column presents the annualized standard 
deviation of nearby, second-, third- and fourth-month futures contracts over the next 
month which are calculated according to the following formula: 82
1
1 252
82j jj
σ σ
=
 
= ⋅ 
 
∑  
where jσ = ∑
=
−
−
k
t
t rrk 1
2)(
1
1 ; )/ln( 1−= ttt FFr ; Ft is the closing futures price on day t; k is 
the next month’s number of days; Fk is the futures price on the day the nearby futures 
expires, F1
0F
 is the price of the same contract on the day the contract switches from 
second-month to nearby contract (for nearby futures), from third- to second-month 
(for second-month futures), from fourth- to third-month (for third-month futures) and 
from fifth- to fourth-month (for fourth-month futures).  is the price of the same 
contract on the previous day. Therefore, 0.3645 is the average of annualized standard 
deviations of nearby futures returns over next month, 0.3353 is the average of 
annualized standard deviation of second-month futures returns over next month and so 
on. 82 is the number of months in the sample from September 1999 through June 
2006. 
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Crude Oil                  
Time to 
expiration 
All-
strike  
ISD 
Mean 
ATM 
ISD 
Mean 
 Forward 
ISD 
 Different 
futures 
contracts 
volatility 
       
Near-
month 
0.3556 0.3442 Nearby 0.3556 Nearby 0.3645 
Second-
month 
0.3468 0.3406 Second-
month 
forward 
0.3477 Second-
month 
0.3353 
Third-
month 
0.3333 0.3308 Third-
month 
forward 
0.3180 Third-
month 
0.3125 
Fourth-
month 
0.3212 0.3194 Fourth-
month 
forward 
0.2915 Fourth-
month 
0.3005 
 
Natural Gas 
 
Time to 
expiration 
All 
strike  
ISD 
Mean 
ATM 
ISD 
Mean 
 Forward 
ISD 
 Different 
futures 
contracts 
volatility 
Near-
month 
0.5720 0.5614 Nearby 0.5720 Nearby 0.6010 
Second-
month 
0.5432 0.5369 Second-
month 
forward 
0.5150 Second-
month 
0.5520 
Third-
month 
0.5088 0.5072 Third-
month 
forward 
0.4625 Third-
month 
0.4978 
Fourth-
month 
0.4757 0.4750 Fourth-
month 
forward 
0.4180 Fourth-
month 
0.4462 
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Panel B. ISDs by time to expiration and option’s strike price 
This panel reports the average implied standard deviations (ISDs) when the sample is 
stratified by time to expiration and by the option’s strike price. In the “Group” 
column, the second letter (I or O) refers to In-the-money (low-strike calls) or Out-of-
the-money (high-strike calls); and the last digit indicates the “moneyness” of that 
group where 1 indicates that the group is the nearest-to-the-money and 2 indicates that 
the group is 4% in or out of the money, etc. The “moneyness” of a group is measured 
by (X/F – 1) where X is the strike price and F is the underlying futures price. 
 
  Crude Oil 
  Mean ISD 
Group   Moneyness 
(X/F – 1) 
Nearby Second 
month 
Third month Fourth 
month 
      
GI7 (0.28)-(0.24) 0.4579 0.3792 0.3297 0.3094 
GI6 (0.24)-(0.20) 0.4031 0.3508 0.3242 0.3026 
GI5 (0.20)-(0.16) 0.3788 0.3488 0.3321 0.3147 
GI4 (0.16)-(0.12) 0.3575 0.3372 0.3218 0.3044 
GI3 (0.12)-(0.08) 0.3442 0.3381 0.3254 0.3111 
GI2 (0.08)-(0.04) 0.3451 0.3401 0.3288 0.3175 
GI1 (0.04)-0.00 0.3429 0.3404 0.3298 0.318 
GO1 0.00-0.04 0.3456 0.3429 0.3318 0.3207 
GO2 0.04-0.08 0.3513 0.3467 0.3346 0.3233 
GO3 0.08-0.12 0.3619 0.3509 0.3378 0.3269 
GO4 0.12-0.16 0.3796 0.3565 0.3415 0.3315 
GO5 0.16-0.20 0.404 0.366 0.3475 0.3365 
GO6 0.20-0.24 0.4342 0.3777 0.356 0.3403 
GO7 0.24-0.28 0.4818 0.3959 0.3705 0.3463 
GO8 0.28-0.32 0.5302 0.4179 0.3912 0.3567 
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  Natural Gas 
  Mean ISD 
Group   Moneyness 
(X/F – 1) 
Nearby Second 
month 
Third month Fourth 
month 
      
GI6 (0.24)-(0.20) 0.481 0.496 0.4597 0.4293 
GI5 (0.20)-(0.16) 0.5115 0.4954 0.4642 0.433 
GI4 (0.16)-(0.12) 0.5148 0.4975 0.4677 0.4393 
GI3 (0.12)-(0.08) 0.5339 0.514 0.4822 0.45 
GI2 (0.08)-(0.04) 0.5433 0.5219 0.4935 0.462 
GI1 (0.04)-0.00 0.5548 0.5308 0.5024 0.4704 
 
 
GO1 0.00-0.04 0.5679 0.5429 0.5119 0.4796 
GO2 0.04-0.08 0.5826 0.5569 0.5201 0.4882 
GO3 0.08-0.12 0.612 0.5652 0.5282 0.4954 
GO4 0.12-0.16 0.6546 0.5783 0.5391 0.5014 
GO5 0.16-0.20 0.6938 0.5962 0.5493 0.5106 
GO6 0.20-0.24 0.6968 0.6159 0.5626 0.5219 
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Panel C 
 
Correlation in monthly returns 
 
This panel presents the results from the following specification: 
Returnst = µ + a1Returnst-1 + a2Returnst-2 + a3Returnst-3 + et 
where Returns
          (18) 
t
 
 represents the monthly returns in month t.  
 Crude oil returns Natural gas returns 
 Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
µ 0.0106 0.0076 0.0100 0.0118 
a 0.0796 1 0.0964 0.1300 0.0893 
a -0.0355 2 0.0954 -0.1227 0.0870 
a -0.0240 3 0.0958 -0.0539 0.0865 
 
Panel D 
 
Volatility of nearby futures returns over different periods 
 
This Panel presents the annualized standard deviations of monthly, two-, three- and 
four-month nearby futures returns which are calculated according to the following 
formula: 83 2
,
1
1 ( ) 12 /
83 1
i
i month returns T i monthreturns
T
R R i
i
σ
−
− −
=
= − ⋅
− − ∑
 where )/ln(, ireturnsmonthiT FFR −− = ττ ; τF is 
the nearby futures price on the expiration date and iF −τ  is the price of the same contract 
on the day it switches from second-month to nearby contract (i=1), from third- to 
second-month (i=2), from fourth- to third-month (i=3) and from fifth- to fourth-month 
(i=4).  
 
 Annualized Standard 
Deviation 
 Crude oil Natural gas 
   
1-month 
returns 
0.2763 0.5042 
2-month 
returns 
0.3083 0.5507 
3-month 
returns 
0.3149 0.5531 
4-month 
returns 
0.3167 0.5523 
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Table IX. The implied volatility smile 
This table presents the implied standard deviation (ISD) pattern when the sample is stratified 
by maturity and by the options’ strike price. ISDs are calculated from daily closing prices of 
futures and call options on futures. The sample ranges from September 01, 1999 to June 30, 
2006. In the “Group” column, the second letter (I or O) refers to In-the-money (low-strike 
calls) or Out-of-the-money (high-strike calls); and the last digit indicates the “moneyness” of 
that group where 1 indicates that the group is the nearest-to-the-money and 2 indicates that the 
group is 4% in or out of the money, etc. The “moneyness” of a group is measured by (X/F – 1) 
where X is the strike price and F is the underlying futures price. The “Mean ISD ratio” 
measures the ratio of the mean ISD on the options in the “Group” column to the average ISD 
of the two nearest-the-money groups: GI1 and GO1.  
 
Panel A. The smile 
 
Crude Oil  
 
  Nearby Second 
 X/F – 1 
 
 
Mean 
ISD 
 
Mean 
ISD 
ratio 
Obs 
 
 
Mean 
ISD 
 
Mean 
ISD 
ratio 
Obs 
 
 
GI7 (0.28)-(0.24) 0.4579 1.0974 104 0.3792 1.0273 265 
GI6 (0.24)-(0.20) 0.4031 1.0988 316 0.3508 1.0158 625 
GI5 (0.20)-(0.16) 0.3788 1.0700 668 0.3488 0.9997 931 
GI4 (0.16)-(0.12) 0.3575 1.0252 1102 0.3372 0.9820 1290 
GI3 (0.12)-(0.08) 0.3442 1.0026 1432 0.3381 0.9936 1505 
GI2 (0.08)-(0.04) 0.3451 1.0052 1532 0.3401 0.9966 1565 
GI1 (0.04)-0.00 0.3429 0.9962 1569 0.3404 0.9968 1594 
GO1 0.00-0.04 0.3456 1.0038 1599 0.3429 1.0032 1618 
GO2 0.04-0.08 0.3513 1.0176 1585 0.3467 1.0149 1624 
GO3 0.08-0.12 0.3619 1.0351 1372 0.3509 1.0275 1628 
GO4 0.12-0.16 0.3796 1.0554 955 0.3565 1.0435 1605 
GO5 0.16-0.20 0.4040 1.0719 552 0.3660 1.0603 1449 
GO6 0.20-0.24 0.4342 1.0784 290 0.3777 1.0697 1183 
GO7 0.24-0.28 0.4818 1.0906 132 0.3959 1.0866 867 
GO8 0.28-0.32 0.5302 1.1100 71 0.4179 1.1016 543 
GO9 0.32-0.36    0.4447 1.1189 300 
GO10 0.36-0.40    0.4838 1.1333 151 
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  Third Fourth 
 X/F – 1 
 
 
Mean 
ISD 
 
Mean 
ISD 
ratio 
Obs 
 
 
Mean 
ISD 
 
Mean 
ISD 
ratio 
Obs 
 
 
GI7 (0.28)-(0.24) 0.3242 0.9771 632 0.3026 0.9501 572 
GI6 (0.24)-(0.20) 0.3321 0.9786 917 0.3147 0.9683 800 
GI5 (0.20)-(0.16) 0.3218 0.9686 1285 0.3044 0.9595 1218 
GI4 (0.16)-(0.12) 0.3254 0.9886 1499 0.3111 0.9830 1452 
GI3 (0.12)-(0.08) 0.3288 0.9956 1592 0.3175 0.9982 1577 
GI2 (0.08)-(0.04) 0.3298 0.9965 1636 0.3180 0.9961 1628 
GI1 (0.04)-0.00 0.3318 1.0035 1648 0.3207 1.0039 1645 
GO1 0.00-0.04 0.3346 1.0130 1640 0.3233 1.0130 1641 
GO2 0.04-0.08 0.3378 1.0227 1621 0.3269 1.0233 1636 
GO3 0.08-0.12 0.3415 1.0334 1550 0.3315 1.0341 1592 
GO4 0.12-0.16 0.3475 1.0487 1440 0.3365 1.0475 1535 
GO5 0.16-0.20 0.3560 1.0550 1267 0.3403 1.0578 1471 
GO6 0.20-0.24 0.3705 1.0709 1017 0.3463 1.0708 1361 
GO7 0.24-0.28 0.3912 1.0833 723 0.3567 1.0841 1073 
GO8 0.28-0.32 0.4086 1.0869 466 0.3687 1.0949 855 
GO9 0.32-0.36 0.4274 1.0918 308 0.3828 1.1053 611 
GO10 0.36-0.40 0.4522 1.0919 188 0.3946 1.1100 440 
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Natural Gas  
  Nearby Second 
 
 
X/F – 1 
 
 
Mean 
ISD 
 
Mean 
ISD 
ratio 
Obs 
 
 
Mean 
ISD 
 
Mean 
ISD 
ratio 
Obs 
 
 
GI8 (0.32)-(0.28)    0.4465 0.7702 220 
GI7 (0.28)-(0.24)    0.4830 0.8445 563 
GI6 (0.24)-(0.20) 0.4810 0.8287 206 0.4960 0.8758 946 
GI5 (0.20)-(0.16) 0.5115 0.8855 543 0.4954 0.9097 1235 
GI4 (0.16)-(0.12) 0.5148 0.9206 867 0.4975 0.9345 1386 
GI3 (0.12)-(0.08) 0.5339 0.9566 997 0.5140 0.9611 1434 
GI2 (0.08)-(0.04) 0.5433 0.9784 1016 0.5219 0.9774 1472 
GI1 (0.04)-0.00 0.5548 0.9888 1049 0.5308 0.9903 1508 
GO1 0.00-0.04 0.5679 1.0113 1040 0.5429 1.0095 1533 
GO2 0.04-0.08 0.5826 1.0331 1000 0.5569 1.0307 1507 
GO3 0.08-0.12 0.6120 1.0546 834 0.5652 1.0479 1479 
GO4 0.12-0.16 0.6546 1.0692 586 0.5783 1.0664 1435 
GO5 0.16-0.20 0.6938 1.0819 312 0.5962 1.0819 1321 
GO6 0.20-0.24 0.6968 1.0922 155 0.6159 1.0961 1162 
GO7 0.24-0.28    0.6411 1.1101 934 
GO8 0.28-0.32    0.6431 1.1252 613 
GO9 0.32-0.36    0.6475 1.1340 334 
GO10 0.36-0.40    0.6416 1.1526 117 
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  Third Fourth 
 
 
X/F – 1 
 
 
Mean 
ISD 
 
Mean 
ISD 
ratio 
Obs 
 
 
Mean 
ISD 
 
Mean 
ISD 
ratio 
Obs 
 
 
GI8 (0.32)-(0.28) 0.4655 0.8227 553 0.4307 0.8147 683 
GI7 (0.28)-(0.24) 0.4618 0.8515 849 0.4245 0.8471 1008 
GI6 (0.24)-(0.20) 0.4597 0.8831 1154 0.4293 0.8813 1203 
GI5 (0.20)-(0.16) 0.4642 0.9123 1305 0.4330 0.9085 1347 
GI4 (0.16)-(0.12) 0.4677 0.9363 1406 0.4393 0.9335 1431 
GI3 (0.12)-(0.08) 0.4822 0.9622 1458 0.4500 0.9577 1442 
GI2 (0.08)-(0.04) 0.4935 0.9797 1504 0.4620 0.9770 1488 
GI1 (0.04)-0.00 0.5024 0.9908 1551 0.4704 0.9911 1540 
GO1 0.00-0.04 0.5119 1.0091 1563 0.4796 1.0087 1561 
GO2 0.04-0.08 0.5201 1.0277 1565 0.4882 1.0268 1562 
GO3 0.08-0.12 0.5282 1.0452 1543 0.4954 1.0446 1557 
GO4 0.12-0.16 0.5391 1.0613 1508 0.5014 1.0607 1510 
GO5 0.16-0.20 0.5493 1.0783 1456 0.5106 1.0765 1461 
GO6 0.20-0.24 0.5626 1.0932 1390 0.5219 1.0916 1415 
GO7 0.24-0.28 0.5747 1.1121 1304 0.5322 1.1063 1331 
GO8 0.28-0.32 0.5927 1.1220 1148 0.5440 1.1208 1241 
GO9 0.32-0.36 0.6097 1.1371 1018 0.5598 1.1368 1110 
GO10 0.36-0.40 0.6236 1.1526 810 0.5722 1.1488 951 
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Panel B. Sample Statistics for crude oil and natural gas daily returns 
 
This Panel reports some descriptive statistics for crude oil and natural gas daily return series 
from September 01, 1999 to June 30, 2006. ** on D-statistic indicates rejection at the 0.01 
level. For a .01 significance level, the critical value of the D-statistic is given by 0.026. Under 
the assumption of normality, the asymptotic standard errors for kurtosis and skewness are 
respectively given by (24/N).5 and (6/N).5
 
 where N denotes the number of observations. For N 
= 1702, these standard errors are calculated as 0.1187 and 0.0594, respectively.  
 Crude oil 
 Nearby Second-
month 
Third-
month 
Fourth-
month 
Observations 1702 1702 1702 1702 
Mean return  0.0654 0.0681 0.0706 0.0730 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0239 0.0219 0.0204 0.0197 
Skewness -0.6059 -0.4715 -0.3768 -0.4674 
Kurtosis 6.0133 5.6260 4.8176 6.0415 
D-Statistic 0.0380 0.0265** 0.0294** 0.0313** 
Skewness/s.e 
** 
-10.20 -7.94 -6.34 -7.87 
Excess kurtosis 
/ s.e 
25.39 22.12 15.31 25.62 
  
Natural gas 
 Nearby Second-
month 
Third-
month 
Fourth-
month 
Observations 1702 1702 1702 1702 
Mean return  0.0595 0.0621 0.0656 0.0770 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0390 0.0355 0.0326 0.0291 
Skewness 0.4528 0.1316 -0.5064 -0.1606 
Kurtosis 8.4198 6.1718 9.6408 7.0398 
D-Statistic 0.0536 0.0506** 0.0510** 0.0497** 
Skewness/s.e 
** 
7.62 2.21 -8.53 -2.70 
Excess kurtosis 
/ s.e 
45.66 26.72 55.95 34.03 
 
 159 
 
Panel C: Average trading volume 
This panel reports the average number of crude oil and natural gas call and put options traded 
per day during the period from September 1999 through June 2006. The options are stratified 
by term-to-maturity and the options’ moneyness. Deep ITM calls and deep OTM puts are 
options with (X/F)-1 ≤ -.10; ITM calls and OTM puts are options with -.10<(X/F)-1 < -.02. 
ATM calls and puts are options with -.02 ≤ (X/F) -1 ≤ .02. OTM calls and ITM puts are 
options with .02 < (X/F)-1 < .10. Deep OTM calls and deep ITM puts are options with (X/F)-1 
≥ .10. 
 
  Call options   Put options 
Crude Oil 
Deep 
ITM ITM ATM OTM 
Deep 
OTM   
Deep 
OTM OTM ATM ITM 
Deep 
ITM 
Nearby 7,009 899 4,169 6,865 1,823  4,275 11,643 8,367 265 112 
Second-month 1,301 777 2,974 2,604 5,289  7,148 4,645 2,997 176 86 
Third-month 4 16 2,892 2,227 3,068  4,232 3,572 813 28 5 
Fourth-month 2 7 545 469 698  1,693 1,358 366 17 2 
            
Natural Gas            
Nearby 7 37 131 674 1,026  295 834 410 236 82 
Second-month 48 39 19 814 485  260 437 46 27 3 
Third-month 14 68 273 27 387  288 55 22 4 2 
Fourth-month 6 4 15 17 225   196 23 11 3 1 
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Table X. Month-of-the-year pattern 
This table reports mean values of the forward implied standard deviations where the sample is 
stratified by month-of-the-year. ISDs are calculated from daily closing prices of futures and 
call options on futures. The second-, third- and fourth-month forward columns represent the 
average forward ISDs over all options with -.2 ≤ (X/F-1) ≤ .2 (where X is the option’s strike 
price and F is the underlying futures price) for the expiration month in the first column. For 
example, the figure of .3133 in the first row is the average forward ISD over all options with -
.2 ≤ (X/F-1) ≤ .2 for January expiration month calculated from the ISDs observed in October 
of fourth-month options expiring in January and of third-month options expiring in December. 
Winter is from November to February. Summer is from May to September. The sample ranges 
from September 01, 1999 to June 30, 2006. **
 
 on F- and t-test statistics denote rejection at the 
0.01 level. 
 
Expiration month  
of the option 
 
Nearby 
 
Second-
month 
forward 
Third-
month 
forward 
Fourth-
month 
forward 
Panel A. Crude oil     
January (F) 0.3768 0.3825 0.3785 0.3133 
February (G) 0.3841 0.3754 0.3756 0.3251 
March (H) 0.3612 0.3325 0.3282 0.3443 
April (J) 0.3835 0.3543 0.2996 0.3008 
May (K) 0.3734 0.3258 0.2995 0.2549 
June (M) 0.3372 0.3063 0.2916 0.2647 
July (N) 0.3249 0.3139 0.2758 0.2708 
August (Q) 0.3232 0.3189 0.2841 0.2573 
September (U) 0.3222 0.3138 0.3004 0.2716 
October (V) 0.3362 0.3369 0.3031 0.2898 
November (X) 0.3712 0.3673 0.3132 0.2893 
December (Z) 0.3758 0.3839 0.3443 0.2892 
F-Statistic 14.70 26.63** 32.49** 22.87** 
(H
** 
0: μF=μG =μH =μJ=μK =μ  M     
=μN=μQ =μU=μV=μX=μZ  )    
t-statistic     
(H0: μSummer =μNon-Summer 11.71) 13.95** 12.27** 11.16** 
 
** 
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Panel B. Natural Gas  
 
January (F) 0.7292 0.6909 0.5928 0.5017 
February (G) 0.7085 0.5778 0.5305 0.4177 
March (H) 0.6153 0.4263 0.2825 0.2749 
April (J) 0.5250 0.3905 0.3459 0.2672 
May (K) 0.4453 0.4117 0.3737 0.3492 
June (M) 0.4741 0.4552 0.4154 0.3668 
July (N) 0.5116 0.4934 0.4686 0.4282 
August (Q) 0.4898 0.4991 0.5173 0.4791 
September (U) 0.4877 0.5105 0.5074 0.5040 
October (V) 0.5351 0.5067 0.4828 0.4762 
November (X) 0.5721 0.5648 0.5126 0.4896 
December (Z) 0.6422 0.6448 0.5898 0.5351 
 
F-Statistic 184.09 56.72** 106.50** 697.94** 
(H
** 
0: μF=μG =μH =μJ=μK =μ  M    
=μN=μQ =μU=μV=μX=μZ  )    
t-statistic 33.40 19.33** 19.05** 12.88** 
(H
** 
0: μWinter =μNon-winter   )       
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Table XI. Day-of-the-week pattern 
This table reports mean values of the log percentage change in the implied standard 
deviations, ln(ISDa,t/ISDa,t-1), calculated from nearby near-the-money options where the 
sample is stratified by day-of-the-week. ISDs, based on trading days, are calculated from daily 
closing prices of futures and call options on futures. ISDa,t is the average ISD of the two 
nearest-the-money options (GO1 and GI1) in the nearby group on day t. The sample ranges 
from September 01, 1999 to June 30, 2006. * and ** 
 
on t-statistics denote rejection, at the 0.05 
and 0.01 levels. 
   Natural Gas 
 Crude Oil Natural 
Gas 
Before 
May 2002 
After May 
2002 
Monday (M) -0.0381 -0.0198 -0.0157 -0.0217 
Tuesday (T) 0.0145 0.0197 0.0257 0.0171 
Wednesday (W) -0.0035 0.0139 0.0021 0.0197 
Thursday (R) -0.0136 -0.0107 -0.0021 -0.0149 
Friday (F) -0.0113 0.0107 0.0111 0.0105 
F-Statistic 7.5592 17.9749** 4.1975** 16.0246** 
(H
** 
0: µM= µT= µW= µR= µF  )    
t-Statistic  (H0: µM= µT,W,R,F -4.3319) -5.9401** -2.8356** -5.2422** 
t-Statistic  (H
** 
0: µT= µM,W,R,F 4.0631) 4.4274** 3.0965** 3.2735** 
t-Statistic  (H
** 
0: µW= µM,T,R,F 0.9679 ) 3.1093 -0.2944 ** 4.0247
t-Statistic  (H
** 
0: µR= µM,T,W,F -0.7466 ) -3.9286 -1.0201 ** -4.0970
t-Statistic  (H
** 
0: µF= M,T,W,R -0.3306 ) 2.2362 1.0791 * 2.0076* 
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Table XII. Impact of unexpected positive and negative returns on implied 
volatility 
 
Estimates from specification:  
( ) ( )
4 0 0
{ } { }
, 0 , 1 , 1
1 1 1
/ 252 / 252 (19)a t i i j t j a t j j t j a t j t
i j j
ISD D R ISD R ISD uα α δ κ+ −+ + − + + −
= =− =−
   ∆ = + + + +   ∑ ∑ ∑  
are reported where ΔISDa,t is the change in average implied standard deviations of the 
two nearby nearest-the-money options, GI1 and GO1; Di’s are dummy variables to 
control for day-of-the-week effects; Rt=ln(Ft/Ft-1) where Ft is the price of the nearby 
futures contract on day t and Ft-1 is the price of the same contract on day t-1.
 {+}
 and 
{-}
 
denote positive and negative returns, and ut is an error term. The model is estimated 
using an ARMA (2,1) model. Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficient 
estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100. * and **
 
 denote rejection at the 
0.05 and 0.01 levels.  
 
 
 
 Crude oil Natural gas 
α -0.7211 0 
(0.5358) 
-1.1271 
(0.9446) 
Monday -0.4344
(0.1609) 
** -2.1067
(0.4415) 
** 
Tuesday 0.1790 
(0.1478) 
-0.3746 
(0.4498) 
Wednesday -0.1385 
(0.1314) 
 
Thursday  -1.4905
(0.4417) 
** 
Friday -0.2120 
(0.1373) 
0.0120 
(0.4332) 
δ 0.26920 
(0.1491) 
* 2.7033
(0.2241) 
** 
δ 0.44271 
(0.0841) 
** 0.4960
(0.2235) 
* 
κ -0.80500 
(0.1363) 
** -0.7480
(0.2636) 
** 
κ -0.19811 
(0.0813) 
* -0.7066
(0.2624) 
** 
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Table XIII.  Realized volatility regressed on implied volatility 
The table reports regression results from Equation 21: 1 , , , ,( ) ,t i j t i j tISD uσ τ α β= + ⋅ +  for 
each of the subsample defined by maturity and “moneyness” of oil and gas options between 
September 01, 1999, and June 30, 2006. The coefficients are fitted by OLS, but the standard 
errors (labeled s.e) are corrected for intercorrelation. ISDi,j,t
t τ+ 
is the implied standard deviation 
computed from the price of the call option from maturity group i (expiring at ) and 
“moneyness” group j on date t. ( )tσ τ is the realized standard deviation of the underling futures 
log returns from date t  to t τ+ . , ,t i ju  is the regression error. 
* and ** designate parameters 
which are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively and † and †† 
, ,i j tISDdesignate coefficients of  which are significantly different from 1.0 at the 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively. Tests are two-tailed for intercept and one-tailed for slope coefficient. Υ is 
the reciprocal of the ratio of the sum of squared errors (SSE) from the regression for strike j to 
the SSE from a regression with the average ISD for ATM options as the independent variable 
over observations common to both regressions. 
Crude Oil 
Nearby GI4 GI3 GI2 GI1 GO1 GO2 GO3 
α 0.1561 0.0928** 0.0497 * 0.0342 0.0283 0.0314 0.0285 
s.e 0.0430 0.0448 0.0456 0.0462 0.0473 0.0481 0.0522 
β 0.49301 0.6917**
 
0.8179**
 
0.8717** 0.8851** 0.8614** 0.8486** ** 
s.e 0.1321 0.1418 0.1439 0.1473 0.1498 0.1497 0.1581 
Adj.R 0.1085 2 0.1727 0.2158 0.2287 0.2304 0.2303 0.2257 
Υ ratio 0.9212 0.9379 0.9662 0.9993 1.0002 0.9990 0.9890 
Second 
 
       
α 0.2059 0.1442** 0.1214** 0.1075* 0.1066* 0.0981* 0.0924 * 
s.e 0.0532 0.0514 0.052 0.0504 0.0492 0.048 0.0481 
β 0.41441 0.5924**
 
0.6584**
 
0.7024**
 
0.7031**
 
0.7211**
 
0.7283**
 
**
 
s.e 0.1599 0.1509 0.1539 0.1493 0.1438 0.1388 0.1376 
Adj.R 0.1362 2 0.2285 0.2541 0.2780 0.2774 0.2908 0.2972 
Υ ratio 0.9020 0.9434 0.9734 1.0011 1.0012 1.0213 1.0259 
Third        
α 0.2474 0.2113** 0.1826** 0.1642** 0.1513* 0.1471* 0.1371 * 
s.e 0.0525 0.0612 0.0635 0.0689 0.0706 0.0715 0.0717 
β 0.27231 0.3803*,
 
0.4732*,
 
0.5341**
 
0.5711**
 
0.5787**
 
0.6023**
 
**
 
s.e 0.1648 0.1774 0.1868 0.2076 0.212 0.2135 0.2117 
Adj.R 0.082 2 0.1222 0.1646 0.1927 0.2114 0.2158 0.229 
Υ ratio 0.9152 0.9638 0.9798 0.9859 1.0103 1.0134 1.0240 
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Fourth        
α 0.2797 0.2627** 0.2410** 0.2257** 0.2143** 0.2029** 0.1973* * 
s.e 0.0659 0.065 0.0706 0.0804 0.0832 0.0825 0.0816 
β 0.1393 1 0.2044 0.2858 0.3390 0.3738 0.4062 0.4199*,
 
s.e 0.2098 0.1969 0.2092 0.2453 0.2542 0.2506 0.2445 
Adj.R 0.0269 2 0.0428 0.0706 0.0855 0.1001 0.1161 0.1258 
Υ ratio 0.9796 0.9819 0.9886 0.9914 1.0009 1.0153 1.0239 
 
Natural Gas 
Nearby GI4 GI3 GI2 GI1 GO1 GO2 GO3 
α 0.1180 0.0752 * 0.0622 0.0587 0.0488 0.0693 0.1065 
s.e 0.0578 0.0463 0.0509 0.0514 0.0559 0.0640 0.0747 
β 0.81931 0.8581**
 
0.8709**
 
0.8685** 0.8684** 0.8092** 0.7458**
 
**
 
s.e 0.0955 0.0712 0.0829 0.0775 0.0851 0.0953 0.1106 
Adj. R 0.2613 2 0.3465 0.3188 0.3276 0.3174 0.2676 0.2255 
Υ ratio 0.9991 1.0116 1.0072 1.0030 0.9993 0.9947 0.9878 
Second 
  
       
α 0.1136 0.0892 0.0810 0.0824 0.0760 0.0841 0.0742 
s.e 0.0588 0.0606 0.0622 0.0598 0.0638 0.0644 0.0700 
β 0.80841 0.8412** 0.8436** 0.8276** 0.8279** 0.7935** 0.7982** ** 
s.e 0.1234 0.1252 0.1274 0.1211 0.1275 0.1252 0.1348 
Adj. R 0.4485 2 0.4554 0.4516 0.4487 0.4347 0.4201 0.4036 
Υ ratio 0.9921 0.9868 0.9950 1.0113 0.9961 0.9771 0.9740 
Third 
  
       
α 0.2084 0.1908** 0.1843** 0.1715** 0.1668* 0.1546* 0.1533* * 
s.e 0.0614 0.0645 0.0644 0.0702 0.0717 0.0759 0.0748 
β 0.52771 0.5613**
 
0.5671**
 
0.5937**
 
0.5928**
 
0.6081**
 
0.5985**
 
**
 
s.e 0.1319 0.1381 0.1358 0.1484 0.1487 0.1572 0.1526 
Adj. R 0.3125 2 0.3199 0.3236 0.3239 0.3209 0.3160 0.3099 
Υ ratio 0.9861 0.9896 0.9948 1.0027 0.9983 0.9921 0.9819 
Fourth 
  
       
α 0.2145 0.1842* 0.1778* 0.1605 * 0.1454 0.1345 0.1278 
s.e 0.0865 0.0863 0.0859 0.0850 0.0856 0.0860 0.0869 
β 0.51801 0.5790**
 
0.5788**
 
0.6145**
 
0.6367**
 
0.6473**
 
0.6482**
 
**
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s.e 0.2049 0.1998 0.1949 0.1904 0.1887 0.1871 0.1863 
Adj. R 0.2245 2 0.2648 0.2679 0.2898 0.3076 0.3171 0.3202 
Υ ratio 0.9407 0.9609 0.9815 0.9890 1.0057 0.9981 0.9946 
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Table XIV. Realized volatility regressed on implied volatility and historical 
volatility 
The table reports regression results from Equation 22: 
1 , , 2 , , , ,( )t i j t i j t i j tISD HIS uσ τ α β β= + ⋅ + ⋅ +  . ISDi,j,t
t τ+
 is the implied standard deviation computed 
from the price of the call option from maturity group i (expiring at ), and “moneyness” 
group j on date t . HISi,j,t
( )tσ τ
 is the volatility forecast over the life of the option generated by the 
Glosten et al. (1993) model. The coefficients are fitted by OLS, but the standard errors 
(labeled s.e) are corrected for intercorrelation. is the realized standard deviation of the 
underlying futures log returns from date t to t τ+ . ui,j,t is the regression error. * and ** 
designate parameters which are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively and † and †† designate coefficients of ISDi,j,t
 
 which are significantly different from 
1.0 at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Tests are two-tailed for intercept and one-tailed 
for slope coefficient.  
Crude Oil 
Nearby GI4 GI3 GI2 GI1 GO1 GO2 GO3 
α 0.0202 0.0069 -0.0107 -0.0107 -0.0049 -0.0011 -0.0143 
s.e 0.0607 0.0582 0.0527 0.0538 0.0600 0.0642 0.0652 
β 0.43431 0.5678**,
 
0.7045**,
 
0.7774**,
 
0.8040** 0.7820** 0.7455** ** 
s.e 0.1263 0.1509 0.1699 0.1793 0.1865 0.1857 0.1939 
β 0.41782 0.3428**,
 
0.2643 *,†
 
0.2039 0.1609 0.1581 0.2086 
s.e 0.1597 0.1709 0.1774 0.1802 0.2035 0.2187 0.2244 
Adj.R 0.1419 2 0.1861 0.2235 0.2336 0.2336 0.2335 0.2313 
Second        
α 0.1569 0.1242* 0.1221* 0.1098* 0.1062* 0.1001* 0.0964* * 
s.e 0.0613 0.0548 0.0505 0.0461 0.0436 0.0437 0.0441 
β 0.36381 0.5633*,†
 
0.6418**,
 
0.7079**,
 
0.7018** 0.7266** 0.7395** ** 
s.e 0.1843 0.1797 0.1923 0.1888 0.1869 0.1781 0.1737 
β 0.1941 2 0.0869 0.0146 -0.0122 0.0026 -0.0113 -0.0228 
s.e 0.2046 0.1751 0.1654 0.1422 0.1359 0.1296 0.1213 
Adj.R 0.1428 2 0.2299 0.2500 0.2781 0.2774 0.2908 0.2974 
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Third         
α 0.2132 0.1917** 0.1689** 0.1541* 0.1463* 0.1452 * 0.1341 
s.e 0.0772 0.0721 0.0730 0.0747 0.0739 0.0766 0.0766 
β 0.2399 1 0.3537 0.4473*,†
 
0.5134*,†
 
0.5595*,† 0.5744*,† 0.5949**,
 
**,
 
s.e 0.1829 0.2036 0.2092 0.2360 0.2468 0.2419 0.2399 
β 0.1406 2 0.0881 0.0686 0.0522 0.0271 0.0103 0.0170 
s.e 0.2536 0.2278 0.2072 0.2072 0.2077 0.2043 0.1999 
Adj.R 0.0870 2 0.1242 0.1659 0.1934 0.2116 0.2158 0.2291 
Fourth         
α 0.2741 0.2514** 0.2350** 0.2172** 0.2037** 0.1946* 0.1857* * 
s.e 0.0626 0.0643 0.0758 0.0821 0.0852 0.0867 0.0854 
β 0.1371 1 0.2003 0.2832 0.3338 0.3659 0.4006 0.4101*,† 
s.e 0.2132 0.1990 0.2096 0.2469 0.2556 0.2505 0.2437 
β 0.0203 2 0.0405 0.0217 0.0324 0.0421 0.0325 0.0472 
s.e 0.0785 0.0809 0.0834 0.0757 0.0781 0.0813 0.0795 
Adj.R 0.0271 2 0.0436 0.0707 0.0859 0.1008 0.1165 0.1269 
Natural Gas 
Nearby GI4 GI3 GI2 GI1 GO1 GO2 GO3 
α 0.1022 0.0618 0.0507 0.0505 0.0420 0.0627 0.1044 
s.e 0.0584 0.0483 0.0542 0.0524 0.0571 0.0655 0.0772 
β 0.69401 0.7492**,
 
0.7593** 0.7579** 0.7694** 0.7097** 0.6326** **,
 
s.e 0.1813 0.1587 0.1501 0.1631 0.1723 0.1792 0.1893 
β 0.1303 2 0.1173 0.1187 0.1132 0.1029 0.1050 0.1126 
s.e 0.1553 0.1559 0.1472 0.1492 0.1569 0.1554 0.1493 
Adj. R 0.2647 2 0.3511 0.3236 0.3316 0.3208 0.2715 0.2302 
Second        
α 0.1395 0.1174 * 0.1076 0.1086 0.0927 0.0987 0.0899 
s.e 0.0694 0.0682 0.0680 0.0657 0.0717 0.0719 0.0757 
β 0.87921 0.9287** 0.9296** 0.9094** 0.8798** 0.8364** 0.8492** ** 
s.e 0.1578 0.1638 0.1685 0.1607 0.1724 0.1712 0.1865 
β -0.1111 2 -0.1323 -0.1292 -0.1258 -0.0809 -0.0694 -0.0803 
s.e 0.1548 0.1506 0.1487 0.1460 0.1693 0.1708 0.1788 
Adj. R 0.4513 2 0.4597 0.4558 0.4527 0.4360 0.4210 0.4049 
 169 
 
Third        
α 0.1984 0.1803** 0.1715* 0.1592* 0.1596* 0.1433 * 0.1436 
s.e 0.0693 0.0742 0.0748 0.0763 0.0806 0.0832 0.0833 
β 0.50621 0.5382**,
 
0.5393**,
 
0.5631**,
 
0.5759**,
 
0.5777**,
 
0.5714**,
 
**,
 
s.e 0.1732 0.1783 0.1747 0.1987 0.1922 0.2105 0.2088 
β 0.0400 2 0.0431 0.0527 0.0548 0.0315 0.0537 0.0478 
s.e 0.1641 0.1759 0.1791 0.1906 0.1935 0.2103 0.2199 
Adj. R 0.3130 2 0.3204 0.3247 0.3243 0.3210 0.3163 0.3099 
Fourth        
α 0.2228 0.1999** 0.1894* 0.1716* 0.1591 * 0.1478 0.1415 
s.e 0.0854 0.0849 0.0831 0.0837 0.0837 0.0833 0.0839 
β 0.53651 0.6190*,† 0.6065** 0.6410** 0.6707** 0.6815** 0.6846** ** 
s.e 0.2670 0.2633 0.2571 0.2483 0.2491 0.2486 0.2490 
β -0.0363 2 -0.0744 -0.0538 -0.0519 -0.0660 -0.0659 -0.0701 
s.e 0.2083 0.2073 0.2047 0.2018 0.2040 0.2055 0.2085 
Adj. R 0.2247 2 0.2673 0.2690 0.2908 0.3094 0.3188 0.3222 
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Figure 1. Crude oil prices and historical volatilities from January 1997 to 
November 2008 
 
 
 
 
This figure presents crude oil prices and historical volatilities from January 1997 through 
November 2008. The vertical axes depict nearby futures prices and annualized rolling 30-day 
standard deviations of returns. 
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Figure 2. The change in conditional volatility following an oil return shock 
 
 
This figure presents the impact of a two-standard deviation oil return shock on the 
predicted volatility. Suppose the conditional variance, ht-1 t-1ζ=Var( ) is at its steady-
state level and suppose there is a shock such that 2t-1ζ = 4Var( t-1ζ ). This figure 
demonstrates the percentage difference in expected volatility on day t+x and on day t-
1, t+x
t-1
Var ( ) -1
Var ( )
ζ
ζ
 
 
 
, assuming E( 2t+xζ ) = Var( t xζ + ) for x > -1 and that negative and 
positive return shocks are equally likely. 
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Figure 3. Estimated News Impact Curves 
 
 
 
This figure depicts how equal positive and negative return shocks at time t-1 impact 
predicted volatility in the crude oil market according to the estimates of the GJR 
model and those of the full model. These curves demonstrate how a return shock in 
time t-1, εt-1, is incorporated into volatility estimates (as measured by Δht, the 
percentage change in conditional variance from day t-1 to day t). ht-1 
 
is assumed to be 
equal the unconditional variance.  
 
Δht 
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Figure 4. Conditional covariance between crude oil prices and the value of the 
dollar 
 
 
Figure 5. Conditional correlation between crude oil prices and the value of the 
dollar 
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Figure 6. Natural gas prices and historical volatilities from January 1997 to 
December 2008 
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This figure presents natural gas prices and historical volatilities from January 1997 
through December 2008. The vertical axes depict nearby futures prices and annualized 
rolling 30-day standard deviations of returns. 
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Figure 7. Estimated News Impact Curves 
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This figure depicts how equal positive and negative return shocks at time t-1 impact 
predicted volatility in the natural gas market according to the estimates of the GJR 
model and those of the full model (in the second and third columns of Panel B in 
Table 2). These curves demonstrate how a return shock in time t-1, εt-1, is incorporated 
into volatility estimates (as measured by Δht), the percentage change in conditional 
variance from day t-1 to day t). ht-1 is assumed to be equal the unconditional variance.  
εt-1 
 
εt-1 
 
ht 
ht 
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Figure 8. The change in conditional volatility following a return shock 
 
 
This figure presents the impact of a two-standard deviation natural gas return shock on 
the predicted volatility. Suppose the conditional variance, ht-1 t-1ζ=Var( ) is at its 
steady-state level and suppose there is a shock such that 2t-1ζ = 4Var( t-1ζ ). This figure 
demonstrates the percentage difference in expected volatility on day t+x and on day t-
1, t+x
t-1
Var ( ) -1
Var ( )
ζ
ζ
 
 
 
, assuming E( 2t+xζ ) = Var( t xζ + ) for x > -1 and that negative and 
positive return shocks are equally likely. 
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Figure 9. Time-of-the-year pattern 
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This figure presents the month-of-the-year pattern according to the estimates in the 
third column of Panel B in Table 2. The vertical axis depicts the ratio of the average 
variance of natural gas volatility on the futures contract expiring in a certain month to 
that on the futures contract expiring in June.  
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Figure 10. Implied Volatility Term Structure 
This figure presents the mean ISD of each “moneyness” subsample in each maturity 
group. “I” or “O” indicates whether the call option is ITM (low-strike calls) or OTM 
(high-strike calls) and the third digit denotes the “moneyness” where “1” is the closest 
to the money. The Y-axis measures the mean ISD for each strike price at each 
maturity. 
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Figure 11. Volatility Surface 
This figure presents surface plots showing the mean relative ISD graphed against each 
“moneyness” group and time-to-maturity. “I” or “O” indicates whether the call option 
is ITM (low-strike calls) or OTM (high-strike calls) and the third digit denotes the 
“moneyness” where “1” is the closest to the money. The vertical axis measures the 
mean ratio of the ISD for that strike price relative to the average of the two nearest-
the-money options, i.e, GI1 and GO1. 
G
I7
G
I6
G
I5
G
I4
G
I3
G
I2
G
I1
G
O
1
G
O
2
G
O
3
G
O
4
G
O
5
G
O
6
G
O
7 Nearby
Second-month
Third-month
Fourth-month
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
 
G
I6
G
I5
G
I4
G
I3
G
I2
G
I1
G
O
1
G
O
2
G
O
3
G
O
4
G
O
5
G
O
6 Nearby
Second-month
Third-month
Fourth-month
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
 
Crude Oil 
Natural Gas 
 180 
 
Figure 12. Average Trading Volume 
This figure presents the average number of crude oil and natural gas call and put 
options traded per day during the period from September 1999 through June 2006.  
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Figure 13. Time-of-the-year pattern in implied volatility 
These graphs present mean values of the implied forward volatility by month-of-the-
year. The horizontal axis presents the expiration month of the option contract.  
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Figure 14. The Slope Coefficient of Implied Volatility by “Moneyness” 
The slope coefficient, 1ˆβ  from estimation results of the equation 
1 , , , ,( ) ,t i j t i j tISD uσ τ α β= + ⋅ + is graphed against the “moneyness” bin for each 
maturity group. The  X-axis represents the “moneyness” bin and the Y-axis measures 
the slope coefficient of implied volatility for that “moneyness” bin.  
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Figure 15. The information “frown” in option prices: relative forecasting power 
of the implied volatility by “moneyness” 
The forecasting power of the equation 1 , , , ,( ) ,t i j t i j tISD uσ τ α β= + ⋅ + is graphed against 
the “moneyness” for each maturity group. The X-axis represents each “moneyness” bin, the Y-
axis measures relative forecasting power as the reciprocal of the ratio of the sum of squared 
errors (SSE) from the regression (2) for each “moneyness” bin j to the SSE for a regression 
with the average ISD for ATM options as the independent variable over observations common 
to both regressions.  
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